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Abstract 
 
This work aims to contribute towards the debate on “decoupling of Emerging 
Economies (EEs) from the Advanced Economies (AEs)” by addressing the following 
main questions: “Has the EEs’ vulnerability to external shocks (both real and credit 
shocks) coming from AEs changed over time? If so, has it grown or decreased, as the 
decoupling hypothesis claims?” 
In order to measure the impact that external shocks would have on the EEs’ GDP 
growth in different periods of last decades, counterfactual experiments were performed 
using an econometric Time Varying Panel VAR model with factorized coefficients. The 
analyses show that over the last thirty years EEs have become less vulnerable to shocks 
spreading from the AEs. Despite this represents evidence in favour of the decoupling 
hypothesis, it is important to note that EEs’ resilience to external shocks has changed in a 
non-progressive manner over time, with phases of greater resilience followed by others of 
lower resilience, and vice versa; this outlines a “wave-like” path whose evidence has yet 
been fully analyzed in the economic literature. 
Moreover, the EEs have shown to be more vulnerable to credit shocks than to real 
ones; this greater relative vulnerability has reached its peak in the most recent years. 
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1. Introduction 
1. Context, rational and objective of the study 
Emerging markets countries also known as Emerging Economies (EEs) play an 
increasingly important role in the international economic scenario, with their contribution 
(together with Developing Economies [DEs]) to global economic production currently 
standing at 50.9% (compared with just 30% in the 1980s)1. From the economic point of 
view, their importance has grown in several respects: for example, they have become 
much more important in terms of direct foreign investment and portfolio investment, of 
the quantity of monetary reserves held, and in terms of their shares in international trade 
and financial transactions (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007). EEs’ ratio of foreign trade to 
GDP – one of the most important indicators of a country’s level of internationalization  – 
rose from 30% in the 1980s to almost 80% by 2005; in particular, there was a significant 
increase in the share of intra-group trade for the EEs, that is between the emerging 
economies themselves, which rose from 9% of total foreign trade in 1960 to more than 
40% in 2005 (Kose and Prasad, 2010). 
Despite the relatively modest economic growth of Advanced Economies (AEs) 
between 2004 and 2007, the growth of EEs remained strong during that same period. This 
reinforced the idea known as the “decoupling hypothesis”, whereby EEs have become 
less dependent on the economic trends of AEs. Advocates of this theory claim that its 
validity is based on the belief that together with the strengthening of the EEs’ economic 
bases, the substantial development of real and financial connections between EEs may 
have reinforced intra-group economic ties, and in this way made such economies less 
vulnerable than before to the “fate” of AEs. 
Nevertheless, following the recent financial crisis, the decoupling debate has 
partially changed direction: the emphasis has now partially shifted towards the idea that, 
as a result of globalization, all economies have become interconnected to a greater 
degree, which has inevitably caused stronger interdependency between the economic 
cycles of EEs and AEs. 
Since the question has yet to be resolved (see Kose and Prased 2010, or Willet et 
al. 2011), either in terms of economic theory, where there is no univocal assessment on 
the decoupling hypothesis, or in empirical terms, I have tried to contribute towards the 
ongoing debate with this essay, also in view of the considerations set out below. 
                                                 
1
 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2013. 
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The question of decoupling is not only interesting from a strictly academic point 
of view, but is also one that interests policymakers and economic operators owing to the 
important practical/operative implications that the phenomenon may have both when 
establishing national and international economic policy, and when defining corporate 
strategies concerning investment diversification and risk management. 
It comes as no surprise to hear Christine Lagarde, Director of the International 
Monetary Fund, underline the importance of taking both national and global dimensions 
into account when establishing economic policy. In a recent speech (23rd August 2013)2 
she stated that: “We need to work better together to understand more fully the impact of 
these unconventional policies [the quantitative easing adopted by the Federal Reserve 
Bank to manage the recent financial crisis] − local and global −…” 
Neither it is surprising to see major investment banks, such as Goldman Sachs 
and Morgan Stanley, among the major players popularizing the idea of decoupling. Jim 
O’Neill, head economist at Goldman Sachs, was one of the main advocates of the 
decoupling hypothesis, in fact the subject has been debated at length outside of academic 
circles as well. 
Empirical analyses of decoupling have recently been performed by a number of 
scholars, many of whom have focused on the development over time of the degree of 
synchronization between the economic cycles of EEs and AEs. Writers such as Wälti 
(2012) and Yetman (2011a, 2011b), for example, have focused on the time path of the 
correlation between the main macroeconomic variables in EEs and AEs. Other writers, 
such as Kose et al. (2008, 2012) or Flood and Rose (2010), have firstly broken down each 
country’s economic fluctuations into different components, namely the global component 
(common to all countries), the regional component (common to countries located in the 
same geographical area), the national component (country-specific), and what could be 
defined as the group component (common to countries with the same development level); 
then they have evaluated the decoupling phenomenon on the basis of the manner in which 
the global and the group components has varied over time. It should be pointed out that 
basically, as Helbling et al. (2007) stated, the breakdown of national economic cycles into 
the aforementioned components can be viewed as an equivalent approach to the 
correlation analysis because, for example, the global component is a measure of the 
extent of co-movement across national economic cycles of all countries.  
                                                 
2
 Speech on “The Global Calculus of Unconventional Monetary Policies”. Downloaded from: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2013/082313.htm in August 25th 2013. 
14 
 
As Forbes and Rigobon (2002) have pointed out, the changes witnessed in the 
degree of synchronization of the economic cycles of different countries may be the result 
of two different forces. On the one hand, there are the structural elements which affect 
economic ties between different nations over the course of time; on the other hand there 
are changes in the nature of the shocks that may impact economies at different periods in 
history. This observation is extremely important since decoupling pertains to the way in 
which economic ties between advanced and emerging economies have changed over the 
course of time. It is a concept of structural importance regardless of the nature of the 
shocks that may affect an economy at various different stages in its history. Neither the 
analysis of correlation nor the breakdown of economic cycles enables us to distinguish 
the effects of the two forces during the course of synchronization (Willet et al. 2011); so 
despite their complexity and sophisticated methodologies, the aforementioned approaches 
may not be particularly suited to an analysis of decoupling. This is why I believe that the 
more appropriate approach is the one adopted by authors such as Guimarães − Filho et al. 
(2008) as well as Dees and Vansteenkiste (2007), who have tried to measure the impact 
of the USA’s economic performance on the economies of given emerging nations. In 
particular, they have studied decoupling by comparing the repercussions that a shock in 
the USA would have had prior to, and after, the globalization era, on the economies of 
Asia’s emerging nations (first paper) and on the emerging economies of Asia and Latin 
America (second paper). 
This essay aims to contribute towards the debate on decoupling, by addressing 
the following questions.  
Has the EEs’ vulnerability to external shocks (that is, shocks outside of the EEs 
themselves) propagated by the AEs changed over the course of time? If so, has it grown, 
or has it indeed decreased as decoupling hypothesis claims? Are EEs more vulnerable to 
the real or credit shocks spreading from AEs? 
With regard to the aforementioned literature, the spirit of the present study is best 
reflected in the approach adopted by Guimarães − Filho et al. (2008) or by Dees and 
Vansteenkiste (2007), and it aims to extend the empirical analysis of decoupling in 
various different directions. 
First of all, it takes into consideration the “bank lending” variable too. The 
majority of empirical studies of decoupling focus on the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
as one of the principal indices of a country’s economic performance or, for example, they 
consider a series of real indices such as industrial production, consumption and 
15 
 
investment, and financial indices such as stock-market values. Bank lending has not been 
duly considered yet, despite the fact that it is widely believed (Kose and Prasad, 2010, 
Helbling et al, 2011) that lending can play a fundamental role in the economic dynamics 
of any country, and in the propagation of economic shocks from one country to another.  
Secondly, unlike the prevailing literature, the present study does not consider the 
resilience of a small group of EEs to shocks spreading from the USA, but analyzes the 
sensitivity of a large number of EEs to the dynamics of a large number of AEs. 
Considering the multiplicity of economic relations between a large number of countries is 
of vital importance to any analysis of the decoupling phenomenon, since one of the 
arguments submitted by the advocates of this hypothesis is that the gradual strengthening 
of economic relations among EEs could have helped reinforced economic ties among 
such economies over the course of time, thus rendering them less vulnerable to shocks 
from the AEs than has been the case in the past. 
Thirdly, unlike the aforementioned studies, the present work does not evaluate 
the time evolution of the EEs’ vulnerability to external shocks by comparing two sub-
periods chosen in a rather arbitrary fashion, in order to test for the existence of a "pre-
decoupling" period and a "post-decoupling" period; instead, as it will be clear soon, this 
work assesses the EEs’ vulnerability in a more flexible manner. Up until now decoupling 
theory has been empirically investigated by looking for some form of structural 
watershed, that is, a break in the coefficients of the econometric model identifiable at 
some point in the time (usually in the late 1980s, when according to many scholars, 
globalization3 has become particularly evident). Such an approach is appropriate and 
effective if the object of study evolves discretely over time, namely as a break at certain 
point of time. However if a gradual evolution over time is plausible, as may well be true 
in the case of decoupling, then it would be more appropriate to utilize an approach (as in 
this work) allowing for a gradual change in coefficients over time rather than for an 
abrupt break. 
In order to deal with the aforementioned questions, a Time Varying PANEL 
VAR with the factorization of the coefficients (Canova and Ciccarelli, 2004, 2009) has 
been utilized. This econometric instrument is particularly well suited to the pursuit of this 
study’s objectives, for a number of different reasons. 
The first reason is that the factorization of coefficients offers two immediate 
advantages: the first is that it significantly reduces the number of parameters that have to 
                                                 
3
 Globalization is the process by which businesses or other organizations develop international 
influence or start operating on an international scale (Oxford Dictionary). 
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be estimated; this reduction is extremely important when handling a large-size PANEL 
model, as is the case in the present study. The second reason is that, depending on the 
factorization employed, the dynamics of the dependent variables may be interpreted as 
the result of various different components (as is the case in the work by Kose et al. 2008). 
Secondly, the model used is particularly useful when investigating the 
international transmission of shocks from AEs to EEs since it duly takes account of the 
interdependency among countries; in other words, it allows for dynamic feedbacks across 
countries and variables. This feature renders analyses more realistic for the purposes of 
the evaluation of the EEs’ responses to negative scenarios in the AEs. 
Thirdly, as already said, decoupling may be a phenomenon that gradually evolves 
over time, rather than a structural break occurring at a given moment in time. Hence it 
could be more appropriate using a model with time varying coefficients, namely a model 
whose coefficients may change at each point in time, rather than remaining constant for a 
certain period and then changing, before remaining stable once again for a further period. 
The empirical investigative approach adopted here consisted in two successive 
phases. Initially, some different model specifications were implemented, that is different 
factorizations of coefficients. For example, one comprised the global factor (i.e. the factor 
common to all countries) and the country-specific factor; another specification of the 
model added the group factor (the factor common to all the countries with the same level 
of economic development, that is the factor common to all emerging countries, the factor 
common to all developing countries, and the factor common to all advanced countries); a 
third specification extended the first by adding the regional factor (the one common to 
those countries belonging to the same geographical area, that is, North and Central 
America, Latin America, Asia, Europe, the Middle East and North Africa [MENA], Sub-
Saharan Africa [SSA], and Oceania). 
The specification best supported by the data, according to estimated marginal 
likelihood, was then used to perform experiments of counterfactual analyses (CAs); in 
particular, the experiments performed are the differences between two conditional 
expectations. In one case, the conditional expectation is the one the model would have 
obtained for the GDP of each country based on the hypothesis that the GDP growth rates 
of each advanced economy in the year of the simulated “shock” were lower than the 
actual GDP (namely the data observed at the time in which the shock is simulated). In the 
other case, the conditional expectation of GDP is the one the model would have obtained 
based on the actual GDP growth rate of each advanced economy. Note that these are one 
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type of conditional forecasting exercises that, for example, Central Banks usually conduct 
in the assessment of current and future economic conditions. 
These counterfactual experiments are designed to measure the impact a shock 
spreading from the AEs would have on the EEs’ GDP. The intensity of the impact is an 
indicator of the vulnerability of the EEs to such external shock, and can thus be 
interpreted as an “indicator of the vulnerability” of the EEs. A lower impact suggests a 
lower vulnerability. These experiments were conducted for each year of the sample 
period, and so the “indicator of vulnerability” was calculated for each year in question. 
The results were then compared with one another in order to determine whether the EEs 
display a tendency towards lesser (or greater) vulnerability to negative scenarios in the 
AEs. 
One of the main conclusions of this study is that the median results obtained from 
the simulations show that over the last thirty years, despite remaining sensitive to the 
effects of the shocks spreading from the AEs, emerging economies have nevertheless 
become less vulnerable to such external shocks, whether of a real or credit nature. One 
can say that the EEs are less vulnerable to external shocks from the AEs now than they 
were thirty years ago, however it is important to point out that their resilience to such 
shocks has changed in a non-progressive manner over the course of time, with phases of 
greater vulnerability being followed by phases of lower vulnerability, and vice versa. This 
“wave-like” dynamic, whose evidence has yet to be fully analyzed, may “upset” 
supporters of decoupling hypothesis, who on the contrary would have expected the 
economic strengthening of the EEs to have followed a progressive, and in a certain sense 
“monotonic increasing” pattern. 
Another interesting finding is that during almost the entire period under 
examination, the EEs proved more relative vulnerability to external shocks of credit 
nature than to those of real nature. This greater relative vulnerability reached its peak in 
the latter years of the sample period, that is during the five years between 2006 and 2010. 
2. Summary of the chapters 
The essay is organized as follows. 
The first chapter is entitled “The decoupling of Emerging Economies, a long-
debated issue but still an open question. A survey”. It aims to trace the debate on 
decoupling, presenting 1) the various interpretations of the phenomenon given in the 
literature; 2) details of how the prevailing opinion among academics and leading 
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international observers has changed over the course of time; 3) the approaches followed 
in the empirical investigation, as well as their respective results and “strengths and 
weaknesses”. 
The second chapter  is entitled “Is decoupling in action?”. An attempt has been 
made here to utilize a broad selection of countries (112 in total). To this end, the focus 
has necessarily been placed on just one of the most important economic variables, that is, 
the rate of growth of GDP (at purchasing power parity per capita). Attention has thus 
been focused exclusively on the real economy. In this chapter, the empirical investigation 
strategy described above has been used to measure the evolution over time of the EEs’ 
vulnerability to the adverse scenarios affecting the real economies of the advanced 
nations; moreover, following most of relative economic literature, I have also measured 
the degree of synchronization between the economic cycles of the advanced nations and 
those of the emerging nations, and between the advanced nations and those of the 
emerging nations divided into sub-groups on the basis of their respective geographical 
location. 
The third chapter of the essay is entitled “International (spillovers in) 
macroeconomic-credit linkages and the decoupling phenomenon”. This section offers an 
important addition to the empirical model, in the form of one of the most important 
financial variables, namely bank lending. The limited figures available for this variable 
has meant that the set of countries in question has had to be reduced in number, compared 
to that used in the previous section (from 112 countries to 73). Nevertheless, this section 
also provides an evaluation of the EEs’ resilience to financial shocks (namely credit 
shocks) originating from the AEs, in addition to the real shocks (namely GDP shocks) 
from such countries. The addition of this financial variable has also enabled us to 
ascertain whether the emerging economies are more vulnerable to real shocks or to credit 
shocks. 
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2. The decoupling of Emerging Economies, a long-debated issue 
but still an open question. A survey 
1. Introduction 
Emerging economies (EEs) have progressively increased their role in the 
international economic scenario, to the point that the share in the global economy of EEs 
(together with Developing Economies [DEs]) has now reached 50.9% in 2013 (it was 
30.9% in 1980)4. From an economic point of view, their importance has grown along 
different dimensional paths, as mirrored by foreign direct investments and portfolio 
investments, total currency reserves and, in more general terms, their shares in 
international commercial and financial trade. Technological innovation (e.g. more 
efficient means of transport or information communication technology), on the one hand, 
and policies encouraging commercial and financial trade (reduced customs duties or the 
setup of free trade areas), on the other, have lent significant support to integrating 
individual countries at global level (globalization). During the globalization period, for 
the EEs the trade openness5 ratio rose from 30% to around 80% and more interestingly 
for the EEs the increase in international trade was accompanied by a significant rise in 
intragroup trading, which grew from 9% of total foreign trade in 1960 to over 40% in 
2005 (Kose and Prasad, 2010). 
With this growing importance of EEs, a fierce debate has begun as to whether the 
national economic cycles are converging or whether the cycles of EEs and advanced 
economies (AEs) are becoming disconnected, the so-called “decoupling of EEs from the 
AEs”. The convergence argument is based on the idea that all economies have become 
more intertwined through trade and finance, which should make the national economic 
cycles more connected. In contrast, the decoupling argument is based on the idea that, 
together with the strengthening of EE’s economic bases, the recent and prominent 
development of real and financial linkages among EEs may have reinforced the link 
                                                 
4
 Data refer to Gross domestic product based on Purchasing-Power-Parity (PPP) share of world 
total. The source is the International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 
2013. 
5
 Trade openness is the ratio of total trade (export plus import) to GDP. 
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between emerging countries to the detriment of their relationships with the AEs which 
instead may have relatively weakened. 
These two opposing perspectives reflect the fact that theoretical models often 
make different predictions about the effects of trade and financial integration on the 
interrelationships among national economic cycles. 
Trade theories imply that an increase in trade linkages leads to an increase in 
intra-industry or inter-industry product specialization6. The way in which the increased 
specialization affects the degree of comovement in national economic cycles is thought to 
depend on the nature of specialization (Frankel and Rose 1998). More precisely, if the 
industry shocks are important in driving economic cycles, then the comovement of 
economic cycles is expected to decrease when stronger trade linkages are associated with 
inter-industry specialization, whereas the comovement is expected to increase when 
stronger trade linkages are associated with intra-industry specialization. The two types of 
industrial specialization are not mutually exclusive in a country, namely in some 
production sectors there may be inter-industry specialization and in some others there 
may be intra-industry specialization: comparative advantages encourage inter-industry 
specialization, and scale economies sustain intra-industry specialization (Krugman, 
1981). Thus, in theory, the effect of the production specialization on the degree of 
comovement and linkages in economic cycles is not univocal but depends on which type 
of production specialization prevails in the countries. 
There is not univocal theoretical predictions about the effects of financial 
integration on the linkages of national economic cycles. As explained in depth by Kose 
and Prasad (2010), financial integration could decrease the synchronicity of economic 
cycles facilitating inter-industry production specialization through the easy reallocation of 
capital, given the comparative advantage of each country. On the other side, contagion 
effects, transmitted through financial linkages, could increase synchronicity via cross-
country spillovers of macroeconomic fluctuations. The comovement of economic cycles 
could also be increased through demand-side effects, as long as the financial integration 
determines a similar dynamic of wealth across countries. 
Many scholars investigated empirically the decoupling hypothesis, and in some 
cases provided different interpretations of this phenomenon. The decoupling implies a 
break in a relationship that was previously more coupled and closely linked. The concept 
                                                 
6
 Inter-industry trade is the exchange of totally different products between countries. Intra-industry 
trade is the two-way trade of products in the same industry classification. See Krugman (1981) for 
more details.  
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is not precisely defined so it allows for different readings. The basic idea is that the 
economic growth of one area becomes progressively less dependent on growth in another 
area (Rossi, 2009). This concept has been translated in two main different ways, indeed 
strictly connected to each other. Firstly, many authors speak on decoupling in terms of 
decreasing comovement of economic cycles and investigate it by computing correlation 
patterns between the economic cycles of variables of AEs and EEs looking for eventual 
decreasing correlation path (e.g. Wälti 2012), or investigate it by dividing  the sources of 
a country’s economic fluctuations into global, group (namely advanced and emerging 
economies groups) and national factors looking for eventual increasing importance of 
group factors in explaining country’s economic fluctuations (e.g. Kose et al., 2008). 
Secondly, discussions on decoupling frequently proceed in terms of the extent of 
spillover of shocks from AEs to EEs (e.g. IMF, World Economic Outlook 2007). 
From the empirical point of view, the investigation of the decoupling has been 
performed with different tools, namely different statistical and econometric instruments 
such as the correlation analysis or the VAR estimation, and with different set of data such 
a synthetic indicator like the gross domestic product (GDP) or a richer set of data like the 
industrial production, the export index and the unemployment rate for example.   
Despite the different investigation techniques adopted to study it and the various 
way explored, the empirical literature has not yet reached a broadly accepted conclusion. 
As in the economic theory, also in the empirical economic literature there is still no 
prevalent opinion on the potential effects of international integration on the convergence 
or decoupling of EEs and AEs; hence in the academic the subject is still open to debate. 
The question kindles not only the interest of academics. Also policymakers and 
practitioners are interested in the issue given the important practical implications that 
decoupling could have, for example, on the definition of national and international 
economic policies and on business strategies aimed at investment diversification and risk 
management. 
Given the wide range of parties interested in this issue, its important implications 
and the absence of a broadly accepted conclusion, it is no wonder that the decoupling 
issue has been long debated. This survey aims to retrace the steps of this debate. In 
particular, it intends to present the different interpretations of the phenomenon discussed 
in the literature (section 2); the different predictions of economic theory on the issue of 
decoupling in the globalization era (section 3); how prevalent opinion among academics 
and leading international observers has changed historically, with the alternating 
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prevalence of views in support and against decoupling (section 4); the approaches 
adopted in empiric investigation with their respective “strengths and weaknesses” and 
results (sections 5-8). Finally, section 9 presents the conclusions of this chapter. 
2. Different interpretations and measures of decoupling 
2.1 Interpretations 
Decoupling of EEs from AEs implies a break in a relationship between the two 
groups of countries that was previously more coupled and closely linked. This definition 
is quite vague and so allows for different interpretations. Willett et al. (2011) argue that 
“… there are several different legitimate and useful concepts of decoupling and the key to 
productive discussion and analysis is to closely identify the type or types of decoupling 
that are being discussed [in the theoretical or empirical works], not to spend time in 
debate about what a specific concept of decoupling should be”. 
Perhaps there are two main simple reasons for the spread of the idea of 
decoupling among scholars, who then devised different readings of the phenomenon.  
Firstly, a simple analysis of historical GDP dynamic in the various geographic 
areas, one of the variables most studied not only by academics but also by policymakers 
and leading international observers, suggests that the economic growth7 of the advanced 
and emerging economies (Figure 2.1, panels 1 and 2), though similar up to 2001, seem to 
have differed more during the 2000-2010 decade; nonetheless a certain synchronicity of 
movement between the two variables has remained. 
The second reason is that, though it is quite difficult to imagine that in an 
increasingly interconnected world the economy of one area can isolate itself from others, 
it cannot be excluded that the growing global interconnection could shift economic 
balances and change the economic dependencies between different areas as the concept of 
decoupling implies. In fact the idea that the economic growth of one area becomes 
progressively less dependent on growth in another area does not conflict with the 
phenomenon of globalization and, as illustrated in section 3 of this chapter, the economic 
                                                 
7
 Reference is made here both to the GDP growth rate and the deviation of GDP from its trend 
extracted by the HP (Hodrick-Prescott) filter (fully bearing in mind, however, the considerations 
made in following sub-section 2.1 on the possibility that the various trend extraction methods 
might not be equivalent). 
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theory leaves room for the possibility that globalization and decoupling could co-exist 
without conflicting. 
Basically, the idea of the decoupling is that the economic growth of one area 
becomes progressively less dependent on growth in another area8 (Rossi, 2009). As 
anticipated in the introduction of this chapter, this concept of decoupling has been 
translated in two main different ways, not mutually exclusive, but indeed strictly 
connected: 1) a decreasing comovement of economic cycles between AEs and EEs over 
time, 2) an increasing resilience of the EEs to adverse scenarios in AEs. 
With respect to the first point, many scholars used mainly two empirical 
investigation techniques which are different but basically equivalent. Firstly authors like 
Wälti (2012) computed correlation patterns between the growth of economic variables of 
AEs and EEs. Secondly, others authors (e.g. Kose et al., 2008) divided the sources of a 
country’s economic fluctuations into global, group (namely advanced and emerging 
economies groups) and national factors, and stated the decoupling in terms of gradually 
increasing importance of group factors in explaining those fluctuations. Note that, this 
second way of interpreting decoupling is strictly linked to the first because breaking 
down national economic cycles can be seen as a different method for quantifying 
synchronization across countries; in fact the contribution of the global factor is a measure 
of the extent of comovement across national business cycles of all the countries, and the 
                                                 
8
 Let me note that this reading of decoupling is implied by a more “extreme” concept which refers 
to decoupling as the notion that one area becomes a self-contained economic entity with potential 
for maintaining its own economic growth trend regardless of the economic trend of another area. 
This stance is quite extreme because decoupling is viewed as referring to almost complete regional 
insulation. It became a popular theme mainly in Asian policy circles in the first years of the 2000s 
when, despite the 2001 recession and the tepid economic growth of advanced economies from 
2004 to 2007, the growth of India and China remained strong during that same period (Athukorala 
and Kohpaiboon, 2009); nevertheless it did not received significant consideration in the economic 
literature. 
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group factor is a measure of the extent of comovement across national business cycles of 
countries belonging to the same group, as highlighted by Helbling et al. (2007). 
With respect to the second point, discussions on decoupling frequently proceed in 
terms of the extent of spillover of shocks from AEs to EEs (e.g. IMF, World Economic 
Outlook 2007). 
2.2 Measures 
In general, any concept (decoupling is not an exception) needs to be translated or 
associated with data in order to perform empirical investigations or for operational 
purposes. So the question is how to measure the decoupling phenomenon. 
The Gross Domestic Product (GDP), despite the well-known criticism on the 
capacity of this variable to represent the real economic status of a country, is probably 
one of the economic indicators that best summarizes the economic activity of a country, 
in fact most literature on decoupling has focused on the GDP data. On the other side, 
some papers did take into account a more extensive set of variables such as the industrial 
production index, consumer price index or current accounts, for example, to have a more 
detailed picture of a country’s economy9. However, over and above the variable (or set of 
variables) considered, what actually makes the various contributions to the literature 
profoundly different is not so much the type of variable observed but how it is processed 
to extract the country’s economic trend and the country’s economic cycle. 
In effect, using a set of indicators such as industrial production, export and 
unemployment or a synthetic indicator such as GDP to measure the fundamental 
characteristics of a country’s economy is essentially equivalent, disregarding the greater 
or lesser detail level relating for example to the timing of turning points of the economic 
cycle if the synthetic indicator and set of indicators have different time frequencies (for 
example quarterly, monthly, etc.). Obviously the information like the exact timing of the 
economic cycle is a very important one but separating economic trend from economic 
cyclical is even a more delicate aspect. Economists like Marshall, Edgeworth and Keynes 
often stressed the distinctions between long term (which refers to economic trend) and 
short term (which refers to economic cycle), but despite the importance of these concepts, 
there is no unanimity on the way in which the two components of the economic dynamic, 
namely trend and cycle, should be handled when investigating the decoupling 
phenomenon. 
                                                 
9
 One advantage of using indicators other than GDP could be, for example, the greater availability 
of information resulting from the higher frequency of data publication. 
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An extensive part of literature (e.g. Kose et al., 2008) focuses on the short-term 
growth rate of real GDP (year on year, for example) to extract economic cycle from the 
time series. Another part of literature (e.g. Wälti, 2012) makes recourse to more 
sophisticated methods to detrend the time series and separate the cyclical component 
from the trend component. The literature indicates several ways of doing this, such as the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter, the Baxter-King filter or the assumption of a quadratic trend for 
example. As Canova explained (1998), it can happen that the different methods lead to 
widely differing results, and therefore there are also contributions in the literature (e.g. 
Flood and Rose, 2010) that instead of using a single method use several to assess the 
reliability of their results from one method compared to another. 
When comparing the economic dynamics of advanced countries against those of 
emerging countries, the method with which the cycle and trend components are handled 
must be taken into great consideration because the two components have very important 
and different roles in determining the overall economic dynamics of the two country 
types. As documented in Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) emerging markets, unlike 
developed markets, are characterized by frequent regime switches, owing to the dramatic 
reversals in fiscal, monetary and trade policies observed in these economies, and 
consequently “... shocks to trend growth are the primary source of fluctuations in these 
markets [emerging markets] as opposed to transitory fluctuations around the trend. On the 
other hand, developed markets are characterized by a relatively stable trend.”. So ignoring 
the fact that there are different ways to treat the two components of economic dynamic 
could be misleading when the results of different papers, which used different methods, 
are compared. 
In addition to the type of method used to extract economic trends and cycles from 
time series, another important element to be taken into account in the study of decoupling 
is the demographic dynamic. As was outlined by Reinhart and Rogoff (2012), the impact 
of population growth on GDP growth is an important consideration when working with 
historical series. Considering only the GDP growth rates and ignoring the demographic 
dynamics can be misleading when the population growth rate is high and unstable, as is 
the case of many EEs in which the high birth-rate, from one hand, and the significant 
emigration phenomenon, from the other, make complex the demographic phenomenon. 
Perhaps, as for the interpretations of the decoupling, there are also several 
different legitimate and useful ways to measure it, and what is really important to 
26 
 
productive discussion is to identify the measure that is being discussed, not to spend time 
in debate about what a specific way to measure it should be. 
3. Decoupling and globalization: could they coexist? 
This section will first describe the key stylized facts on the economic integration 
between different geographic areas (globalization). Further on, it will attempt to illustrate 
how the economic theory leaves room for the possibility that the concepts of 
globalization and decoupling can coexist without necessarily conflicting. 
3.1 Increasing international trade linkages 
In recent decades economies have become more integrated with respect to many 
different dimensions10, not only economic but also, for example, the cultural dimension. 
The volume and nature of international trade linkages have changed drastically as 
result of various forces. Transport and communication costs have been an important 
factor. Air shipping costs have declined over time, and costs of ocean shipping have come 
down due to containerization and other technological efficiencies (Hummels, 2007). 
Further important factors have been policies to improve the liberalization of international 
trade, such as the lowering of trade barriers and the reduction of tariffs, or other means of 
restraining international trade, that were implemented in particular after the breakup of 
the Soviet Union. 
Figure 2.2 panel 1, based on the papers of Sach and Warner (1995) and Wacziarg 
and Welch (2008), shows the fraction of countries with a fully liberalized trade regime, 
                                                 
10
 See, for example, Kose and Prasad (2010) for an extensive description of the time path of trade 
and financial linkages between countries and groups of countries. 
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and as can be seen, trade liberalization has increased sharply from 1986 onwards (during 
the globalization period). 
Lower costs and stronger policies supporting international trade have encouraged 
the intensification of international commercial trade, with its share of GDP gradually 
increasing in all the main geographic areas, as illustrated in Figure 2.2 panels 2 and 3. 
The Figure shows the evolution of the ratio of total trade to GDP separately for six groups 
of countries (G7 economies, Latin American EEs, Sub Saharan Africa EEs, Asian EEs, 
Eastern Europe EEs and Middle East and North Africa [MENA] EEs). In particular, until 
1985, trade openness was relatively stable for G7, Latin America and Sub Saharan Africa, 
and it increased significantly during the globalization period; while for the other groups 
the straitening of the openness ratios was significant also before 1985. 
In Figure 2.3, panel 1 shows the distribution of global export percentages among 
the two groups of countries (G7 and emerging economies). Whilst the share attributed to 
G7 economies is still very high, it gradually reduced from around 70% in the 1990s to 
35% in 2012. At the same time, the percentage of global export attributable to emerging 
economies grew from 20% in 1990 to 40% in 2012. The different distribution of global 
export flows also reflects a different distribution of the trading flows of the two groups of 
countries. In particular, for emerging economies the share of trade with advanced 
economies has remained significant, but gradually reduced over the years from around 
80% of total EEs foreign trade in 1960 to 50% in 2005, whilst in the same period the 
percentage of intragroup trade rose from 9% to 40% (see Figure 2.3 panel 2). 
Information about production opportunities in foreign countries has become 
easier to obtain, for example stronger availability of information through the Internet 
(world wild web), or for example promoted by immigrants11 and multinational companies 
                                                 
11
 In 2007, an estimated $240 billion in remittances went to developing countries, more than 
double the flow in 2001 (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 2008 conference "Remittances and the 
Macroeconomy," February 21-22).  
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facilitating networking (see Kohn, 2008). These factors may have supported the 
expansion of trade in manufactured goods. Figure 2.4 from panel 1 to 6 shows the 
composition of trade by group of countries from 1960 to 2007. While the average share of 
advanced economies’ exports accounted for by manufacturing exports rose slightly and 
remained the highest in the full sample period (see panel 1), for both emerging economies 
and developing economies the share of manufacturing exports rose strongly and, for 
example, became the most important part of exports (see panels 2 and 3). 
These changes in the share of manufacturing exports reflect changes in inter-
industry and intra-industry trade. Intra-industry trade, measured by the average bilateral 
Grubel-Lloyd index, has been increasing between Emerging economies and G-7 countries 
since 1970, although with regional peculiarities. For G-7 countries and Asia the intra-
industry trade increased with higher intensity than others regions (Akin and Kose, 2008), 
and for the countries that joined the EU in 2004, despite the share of intra-industry trade 
has been increasing in recent years, the inter-industry trade still accounts for almost 50% 
of the total trade (Kawecka-Wyrzykowska, 2010).  
 
3.2 Increasing international financial linkages 
Another area of impressive growth in international linkages has been in financial 
activities. The strong increase of financial linkages was mainly associated with the rapid 
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liberalization of financial regimes after the mid-1980s. Figure 2.5 panel 1, based on the 
papers of Bakaert et al. (2006), shows the fraction of countries with a liberalized financial 
systems. As can be seen, financial liberalization increased sharply in the globalization 
period. Many structural changes improving the degree of liberalization of financial 
systems took place among emerging economies. For example the privatization of state-
owned enterprises, or the liberalization of domestic banking systems and stock markets, 
the removal of restrictions on the acquisition of assets by foreigners (see Lane and Milesi 
Ferretti, 2007). 
Following Lane and Milesi Ferretti, the level of financial integration of country 
groups can be calculated as the sum of gross international financial assets and liabilities12. 
These indicators, interpretable as financial openness indicators, are plotted in Figure 2.5 
from panel 2 to 4 for the AEs, EEs and DEs. The Figure shows that financial openness 
increased for all three groups of countries during the globalization period. 
The financial integration has occurred globally, however its evolution has been 
uneven. Integration in industrialized countries measured by the ratio of the sum of their 
foreign assets and liabilities to GDP has tripled since 1990, while an analogous 
measurement for emerging and developing economies shows an increase of about 50 
percent (Lane and Milesi Ferretti, 2007). 
                                                 
12
 The total assets and liabilities contains debt, foreign direct investment (FDI), equity, financial 
derivatives and total reserves.   
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3.3 Decoupling and increasing international linkages: what does theory say? 
Does economic integration between different countries preclude the option of 
decoupling? In theory, as will be illustrated in this sub-section, the growing international 
integration could either favour or counter decoupling. 
Theoretical models make different predictions about the effects of trade 
integration on comovement among national economic cycles. 
International trade linkages represent the way through which both supply-side 
and demand-side spillovers can spread across countries. These spillovers can increase the 
degree of business cycle comovement. For example, boosting consumption in one 
country can generate increased demand for imports, reinforcing economies abroad. 
However, the stronger trade linkages can be associated to stronger intra- or inter-
industry trade, namely an increase of international trade can be associated to an increase 
in intra- or inter-industry specialization. The way in which the increased specialization 
affects the degree of comovement in national economic cycles depend on the nature of 
specialization (Frankel and Rose 1998). More precisely, if industry shocks are important 
in driving economic cycles, then the comovement of economic cycles is expected to 
decrease when stronger trade linkages are associated with inter-industry specialization, 
whereas comovement is expected to increase when stronger trade linkages are associated 
with intra-industry specialization. The two types of industrial specialization are not 
mutually exclusive in a country: for some country’s production sectors the comparative 
advantages encourage inter-industry specialization, and for some others the scale 
economies sustain intra-industry specialization. Thus, in theory, the effect of production 
specialization on the degree of comovement in economic cycles is not univocal but 
depends on which type of production specialization prevails in the country. 
There is also no univocal theoretical prediction about the effects of financial 
integration on the comovement of national economic cycles. As explained in depth by 
Kose and Prasad (2010), financial integration could decrease the synchronicity of 
economic cycles facilitating inter-industry production specialization through the easy 
reallocation of capital, given the comparative advantage of each country. On the other 
hand, contagion effects and shocks transmitted through financial linkages could increase 
synchronicity via cross-country spillover of macroeconomic fluctuations (Classens and 
Forbes, 2001). The comovement of economic cycles could also be increased through 
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demand-side effects, as long as the financial integration determines a similar dynamic of 
wealth across countries (Lewis 1999 and Van Wincoop 1999). 
Foreign direct investment flows could be the way that knowledge and 
productivity shocks spread from one country to others and so, as explained in Kose et al. 
(2009), foreign direct investments may increase the comovement of economic cycles. 
According to some authors, communication technology may play an important 
role in driving the economic cycle fluctuations (Cochrane, 1994). Faster and more 
accurate dissemination of news13 may have a positive impact on the synchronization of 
economic cycles in the case, for example, good news on the economic perspectives of a 
country increase domestic demand and also raise the consumer demand of other countries 
holding stocks in the country to which the good news refers.       
Macroeconomic policies could act in favour of increasing synchronicity of 
business cycles across countries, but they could also generate decreasing synchronicity. 
On the one hand, increased economic integration could affect the synchronization 
of economic cycles by conditioning the way in which macroeconomic policies are 
implemented in the different countries, namely the stronger economic linkages may lead 
to a higher degree of policy coordination. This could have a positive impact on the 
comovement of economic cycles because it could increase the correlation between shocks 
associated with country-specific policies. This point has been debated by many authors 
such as Darvas et al. (2005), Flood and Rose (2010), Crucini et al. (2008). 
On the other hand, macroeconomic policies can also lead to lower 
synchronization of economic cycles. More disciplined fiscal policies and more credible 
monetary policies could act as shock absorbers against external shocks (Rose, 2007 and 
Ghosh et al., 2009). For example, prudent fiscal policies with a low level of public debt 
and deficit could create room to contrast external adverse shocks by implementing strong 
countercyclical fiscal policies. 
4. The long-debated issue: a brief historical excursus 
The decoupling has been long debated in both academic and non-academic 
spheres. This is not surprising because, as already seen, from one hand the economic 
theory (and also the empirical investigation, as will be seen in-depth later on) fails to 
                                                 
13
 Jaimovich and Rebelo (2008) analyze the effects of news about future productivity on business 
cycles in a small open economy model. 
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provide a single key to reading the issue of decoupling, but rather indicates an array of 
potential effects of stronger international integration on the level of comovement and 
interdependence of economic cycles; from the other hand, the decoupling has 
considerable practical implications on the country’s economic policy and on the corporate 
strategies. Knowing whether fluctuations in the AEs and EEs are similar, understanding 
their sources and characterizing their time-related variations is important for both 
policymakers and managers. 
If variations in economic activity in countries with different institutions, 
economic structures or economic policies are driven by a common cause then 
international policies, or national policy coordinated at international level are (more than 
national policies alone) the key way to manage national economic activity. Moreover, 
knowing whether and to what extent the economic dependence between different groups 
of countries has been affected by increasing international linkages is crucial because 
structural time variations may weaken the usefulness of policies that may have been 
effective in the past14. For example the IMF Director, Christine Lagarde, said “We need 
to work better together to understand more fully the impact of these unconventional 
policies [the quantitative easing adopted by the Federal Reserve Bank to manage the 
recent financial crisis] local and global…” (speech of 23 August 2013). 
As regards industrial strategies, accepting or rejecting the idea of decoupling has 
wide-ranging implications because it affects the potential profit margins and risk 
management of a business as it determines a range of possible optimal allocations of 
resources and has an impact on investment diversification. Therefore, it is no wonder that 
major investment banks such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley have been among 
the key players in discussing the idea of decoupling. Jim O’Neill15, chief economist of 
Goldman Sachs, was one of the main advocates of the decoupling idea, and Keith Fitz-
Gerald, the investment director for Money Morning, wrote a book in 2010 entitled “Fiscal 
Hangover: How to Profit from the New Global Economy”, a broad section of which is 
dedicated to the decoupling issue. 
The issue of decoupling has always kindled a great deal of interest and, as 
described by Willet et al. (2011), its debate has historically been characterized by 
                                                 
14
 The importance of decoupling in the definition of economic policies clearly emerges from 
analysis of the many reports by leading international institutions, e.g. the IMF (World Economic 
Outlook, April 2002, April 2007, October 2012), the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (Transition Report 2009) and the Asian Development Bank (Asian Development 
Outlook 2009, 2010).  
15
 Known for coining the acronym “BRIC” for the world’s biggest emerging markets of Brazil, 
Russia, India and China in 2001. 
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alternation between supporters and opponents. Early talks on decoupling took place in the 
1980s, in Asia, on the basis of a strong domestic demand and consumer confidence in the 
region. However, in 1997-1998 with the explosion of the Asian financial crises the 
concept of decoupling fell into oblivion. The decoupling thesis come back as a popular 
theme in Asian policy circles (Athukorala and Kohpaiboon, 2009) in 2001 when the US 
and Europe first went into recession and later, from 2002 to 2007, saw a relatively tepid 
economic growth, while the growth of emerging economies remained strong during that 
same period. 
The idea of decoupling still continued to be supported in 2007, even after the 
slowdown of the U.S. economy and the first signs of the U.S. subprime crisis. The IMF 
report “World Economic Outlook, April 2007” says “Overall, these factors suggest that 
most countries should be in a position to ‘decouple’ from the U.S. economy and sustain 
strong growth if the U.S. slowdown remains as moderate as expected.” (IMF, 2007). At 
that time, the decoupling idea was not only supported by economists from a number of 
important international institutions, but also by practitioners. Big investment firms like 
Goldman Sachs believed “China, together with emerging Asia, stands a very good chance 
of outperforming and decoupling from the US economy in the coming few years.” (Asian 
Economics Flash, 2007). 
2008 was the year when prevailing opinion swung away from decoupling. With 
the Lehman Brothers’ crash, the financial crisis affected the real economy and spilled 
over to the rest of the world, also sweeping emerging economies into its wake. Doubts 
about the validity of decoupling also found their way into the minds of those who 
previously had been its strongest supporters. In 2008 Goldman Sachs mitigated the extent 
of arguments in favour of decoupling by emphasizing that it was difficult to ignore the 
slowdown in the US economy for most of the rest of the world (O’Neill, 2008). 
The swings between “ayes” and “nays” for decoupling have not stopped, 
however. Even in 2009, when the main advanced economies like Europe and the US 
continued to show signs of economic weakness while China and India quickly rebounded, 
the decoupling thesis returned as crucial topic. In its World Economic Outlook of October 
2009, the IMF pointed out that emerging economies like India and China would lead the 
world economic expansion that year, growing at rates of 5.4% and 8.5%, respectively. El-
Erian (2009) wrote “Given the pick-up in economic activities of some emerging 
economies and the fact that equity valuations are now back above the pre-Lehman levels, 
the decoupling argument is again gaining consensus today”. 
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5. Synchronization of economic cycles between AEs and EEs 
As is now common practice in literature (see e.g. Frankel and Rose, 1998, Rose 
and Engel, 2002, Kose et al., 2003, Imbs, 2004, 2006, Baxter and Kouparitsas, 2005, 
Fidrmuc and Korhonen, 2006), the economic cycle synchronization is usually measured 
using the Pearson correlation coefficient between output growth (usually measured by 
GDP growth) of two countries16 as follows: 
 = ∑ 	
	 − 
 
	 − 
∑ 	
	 − 
  ∑ 
	 − 
 																																																					2.1 
where G 	t is the output growth rate of the country " at time  and 
  is the arithmetic 
mean of the output growth rate over the period 	t = 1,2,3,…T ; and mutatis mutandis for 
	 and 
 . 
In Kose et al. (2003b), the authors perform an empirical investigation based on 
annual data over the period 1960–1999 for real growth of GDP per capita and real growth 
of per capita consumption, using a sample of 76 countries: 21 industrial and 55 emerging 
and developing. They compute the correlation coefficients of the growth rates of the two 
variables in each country with the growth rates of the corresponding world variables17. 
They find that, for emerging and developing countries the correlations are in general 
decline in the 1990’s, thus, during the most recent period of globalization, there is some 
evidence that on average business-cycle comovements have become less synchronized18.  
Whilst the results presented in Kose et al. (2003b) support decoupling, those 
reported by Flood and Rose (2010) are against it. Flood and Rose computed correlation 
coefficients over five-year rolling sub-samples of quarterly GDP data from 1974 to 2008 
of 64 countries (21 developed economies and 43 emerging economies). In addition to 
considering the annual GDP growth rate, the authors also performed their investigation 
on detrended data using other methods: the Hodrick-Prescott filter, the Baxter-King filter 
                                                 
16
 Or more countries by averaging the correlation coefficients between pairs of countries.  
17
 The PPP-weighted aggregates (Purchasing Power Parity) of GDP and consumption in G-7 
countries were used as the measure of world variables.   
18
 To further study and understand the change in the degree of synchronization, the authors also 
perform a regression analysis of the factors that influence correlations of each country’s 
macroeconomic variable with the corresponding world variable. For the output variable, their 
results are essentially in line with those of some other studies, e.g. as per Imbs (2004), and 
highlight the importance of trade and financial linkages in accounting for economic cycle 
comovement among emerging economies and the world economy. For consumption the results are 
weaker and only trade linkages appear to have a positive effect on cross-country movements in 
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and the assumption of linear and quadratic trends. The data have been used to compute 
correlation coefficients between pairs of countries in which one country is industrial and 
the other is emerging. The main finding is that the average level of economic cycle 
synchronicity (the correlation coefficient) varies somewhat over time, but is typically at a 
level of 0.25 or thereabouts. There is no evidence that the average correlation coefficient 
is significantly lower towards the end of the sample period. Hence, there is no evidence in 
favour of decoupling. The conclusion is the same if only the synchronicity between 
emerging countries and the G-7 aggregate19 is considered. 
An important aspect considered by Kose et al., but disregarded by Flood and 
Rose, was the demographic dynamic. As mentioned in section 2.2, GDP growth can be 
misleading when the population growth rate changes significantly, as is the case in many 
emerging economies. Therefore using the GDP per capita, as did Kose et al., is more 
appropriate in cross time and cross country analyses. 
On the other hand, however, compared to that of Kose et al., Flood and Rose’s 
analysis − albeit on a more limited set of countries − takes more account of the problem 
relating to breaking down the economic dynamic of countries into two components: trend 
and cycle. In fact, unlike Kose et al., Flood and Rose assess the reliability of their results 
against the different methods for detrending time series20. 
Although it is common practice in literature to measure economic growth 
synchronization by computing the correlation coefficient between the economic variables 
of two countries, or a group of countries, the correlation’s ability to describe the 
economic cycle synchronization is subject to three important critiques: 1) the use of 
correlation coefficients over rolling sub-samples of data is problematic in identifying a 
structural break in the degree of business cycle synchronization (see Wälti, 2012); 2) the 
correlation coefficient can be counter-intuitive in its treatment of data (see Yetman 
                                                 
19
 The PPP-weighted aggregates of GDP in G-7 countries were used as the measure aggregate 
variable. 
20
 An investigation on the decoupling hypothesis with a special emphasis on the distinction 
between trend and cycle is presented in Dilip and Dubey (2013). The authors used two heavily 
data-intensive frequency domain methods: causality testing in the frequency domain and wavelet 
correlations . They needed to use a highly frequently available measure of output, so the authors 
employed the industrial production index on which data is generally available monthly. Their 
focus was on 7 Asian emerging economies and, for both methods the conclusion offered strong 
evidence in favor of decoupling. As stated in Dilip and Dubey, frequency domain causation was 
suggested in the seminal paper by Granger (1969) and later extended by Geweke (1982, 1984), 
and the properties of wavelets are discussed in Percival and Walden (2000). See Dilip and Dubey 
for an overview of the two methods. 
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2011a); 3) the correlation coefficient may be biased due to heteroskedasticity of the time 
series (see Forbes and Rigobon, 2002, and Willett et al. 2011). 
5.1 First critique: problem in identifying structural breaks using correlation 
coefficients over rolling sub-samples of data  
With respect to the first critique, as explained in Wälti (2012), by using rolling 
sub-samples of data it can happen, for example, that the last estimated correlation 
coefficient is calculated using the last five years of data. In this case, if the degree of 
business cycle interdependence changes around the end of the last time window, the 
correlation coefficient may not catch it. Moreover, in general, the choice of windows can 
be quite arbitrary and different time windows for the same data set can return different 
results21. 
To overcome this problem, Wälti proposed an innovative measure of economic 
cycle synchronization which can be computed at each point of time (for example, each 
year in the case of yearly data) and expresses the same qualitative information as the 
correlation coefficient. The advantage of this innovative indicator is that, as it can be 
calculated at each point of time, it allows for proper identification of structural breaks 
even if they occur at the end of the sample period. 
Wälti started from the fact that the Euclidean distance between two standardized 
random variables conveys the same information as the correlation coefficient22. Hence he 
proposed measuring the synchronization between the economic cycles of countries " and ' 
by 
(	 = )*	 − *	)																																																																																												2.2 
where *	 and *	 are, respectively, the standardized23 economic growth at time t of 
the country " and the country '. If (	 is equal to zero, it means that at time  the 
economies of the countries " and ' are perfectly synchronized. Any positive value means 
less than perfect synchronization; the larger the value of the Euclidean distance indicator, 
the less synchronized the countries are. 
                                                 
21
 For example, this is the case of Artis and Zhang (1997, 1999) and Inklaar and de Haan (2001). 
They used the same data, different time windows and reached the opposite conclusion about the 
relationship between the economic cycle synchronization.  
22
 See Wälti (2012) for a detailed description of the indicator. 
23
 *	 = 	+,	-+.///	 	-⁄ ∑ 	+,	-+.///12345  where G 	t is the output growth rate of the country " at time  
and 
  is the arithmetic mean of the output growth rate over the period 	t = 1,2,3, …T .  
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Wälti based his empirical investigation on a dataset ranging from 1980 to 2008 
and covering 56 countries, of which 30 emerging economies24 and 26 advanced 
economies. He focused on detrended data of the GDP, in particular on the “output gap”, 
namely the percent deviation of actual GDP from the trend GDP25. The output gap of 
each country was standardized by subtracting the mean and dividing by its standard 
deviation. In this way for each country	" 	" = 1,2,3,…56 he computed the quantity *	 
used in equation 	2.2. 
The author concluded that there has been no decoupling in recent years because 
the average degree of business cycle synchronization between the business cycles of the 
30 emerging markets and the business cycles of the 26 advanced economies has increased 
during the last decade. This result was robust both in relation to the different filters 
applied to extract the trend from the original time series and to the different grouping of 
emerging economies (Asian, Latin American and Eastern European emerging countries). 
 Wälti’s work did not take “population trends” into account. However, as can be 
seen in Figure 2.6 (panels from 1 to 5), if the same method is applied to per capita GDP, 
albeit on a broader sample (112 countries of which 23 advanced, 59 emerging and 30 
                                                 
24
 The emerging market countries come from different regions of the world: 8 Asian economies, 9 
Latin American countries and 13 Eastern European economies. 
25
 Wälti explored three different alternative filters (Hodrick-Prescott, Baxter-King, Christiano-
Fitzgerald ) to extract the trend from the original data. 
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developing) and the years 2009 and 2010 are also included, the main conclusions drawn 
by Wälti remain unchanged. Nevertheless it seems that with the escalation of the worst 
financial crisis of the last 40 years, the indicator jumped to historic highs in 2009, 
indicating a low degree of correlation between economic cycles. However, in some cases, 
for examplefor the MENA or Europe emerging economies, this movement of the 
indicator was temporary and by early 2010 the indicator returned under the average of the 
last 20 years. 
 
5.2 Second critique: the correlation coefficient may be counter-intuitive in its 
treatment of data 
With respect to the second critique, as explained in Yetman (2011a), the 
correlation coefficient may be counter-intuitive. To overcame this critic, Yetman (2011a) 
proposes an indicator which, as will be shown in this section, is equivalent to the Wälti ‘s 
indicator described in  the above sub-section 5.1.  
Following Yetman (2011a, 2011b), the Pearson correlation can be broken down 
into its period-by-period contributions. 
Consider the quantity 
*	 = 	
	 − 
 	1 	8 − 1⁄ ∑ 	
	 − 
  																																																														2.3 
which is the same quantity used in equation 	2.2 for country ". Let compute also *	. 
The product 
	 = *	*																																																																																																								2.4   
is interpretable as a measure of the comovement between countries " and ' at time  and, 
up to degrees of freedom correction, the average of these measure equals the Pearson 
correlation coefficient26 of equation 	2.1, namely 18: 	 = 8 − 18  																																																																																									2.5 
At this point, Yetman easily shows that the correlation coefficient is counter-intuitive in 
its treatment of data. Consider, for example, the case in which ρ <	t is equal to zero. 	 = 0 means that data at time t suggest a complete decoupling between countries " 
and ' and in fact, as can be seen from equation 	2.5, it is zero the contribution to the 
                                                 
26
 See Yetman (2011a, 2011b) for more details. 
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correlation coefficient  coming from data at time . The point is that there are different 
cases in which ρ <	t can be zero, and they give very different information on the 
synchronization but, even so, the contribution to the correlation coefficient is the same 
(namely zero). 
More precisely, there are three possible cases: 
1. 
	 = 
  and 
	 ≠ 
 ; 
2. 
	 ≠ 
  and 
	 = 
 ; 
3. 
	 = 
  and 
	 = 
   
While the first and second cases are more consistent with the decoupling idea because 
average growth in one country occurs simultaneously with deviation from average growth 
in the other, the third case is more consistent with a strong synchronicity owing to both 
economies growing at the respective average rate. 
Hence, the Pearson correlation coefficient is an indicator which can process data 
in a way not fully appropriate to the ultimate aim of analyzing the economic 
synchronicity between countries. 
To overcome this critique, instead of the Pearson correlation coefficient, Yetman 
proposes using the absolute value of the difference between the quantities  *	 and *	 (seen in the 	2.4) multiplied by -1, namely the same indicator proposed by Wälti 
multiplied by -1. As explained by Yetman, his alternative measure is intuitively 
appealing. For example, the three cases listed above, from point 1 to point 3, that generate 	 = 0 would be treated differently with the alternative measure. Case 3, where both 
economy’s growth rates are equal to the respective average levels, would be seen as 
consistent with high synchronization rather than decoupling, in fact in this case the 
difference between *	 and *	is zero. On the other cases, 1 and 2, the alternative 
measure proposed by Yetman would evidence the distance between the growth rate and 
the average growth rate across the two countries. 
The following Table 2.1 reproduces the results of Yetman (2011a). On a sample 
of 12 Asian countries and GDP data from 1971 to 2008, the author computes the Pearson 
correlation coefficients between the GDP growth rates of each of the 12 Asian countries 
and the US (columns a and b); he also computes the comovement between GDP growth 
rates using the alternative indicator he proposed (columns c and d). 
As seen in Table 2.1, while the correlation coefficients (columns a and b) decline 
from the oldest sub-sample (1971-1989) to the late sub-sample (1990-2008) for many 
countries supporting the idea of Asian decoupling from the US, applying the alternative 
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measure of economic comovement the results are mainly inconsistent with the decoupling 
idea. 
Table 2.1 GDP growth rate correlations: Asia-Pacific with United 
States 
Usual Measure Alternative Measure 
Countries 1971-1989 1990-2008 1971-1989 1990-2008 
  a b c d 
Australia 0.47 0.73 -0.88 -0.41 
China 0.49 0.12 -0.76 -0.77 
Hong Kong 0.5 0.04 -0.95 -0.75 
Indonesia 0.29 -0.34 -1.04 -1.54 
India -0.11 0.25 -1.32 -0.68 
Japan 0.63 -0.14 -0.81 -0.81 
Korea 0.49 -0.11 -0.86 -0.93 
Malaysia 0.28 -0.06 -1.1 -0.93 
New Zeland 0.34 0.33 -0.98 -0.59 
Philippines -0.15 0.12 -1.12 -0.63 
Singapore 0.22 0.34 -1.11 -0.87 
Thailand 0.39 -0.30 -0.99 -1.31 
Source: Yetman J. (2011a). 
 
5.3 Third critique: distortion due to heteroskedasticity 
The third critique, namely that the correlation coefficient may be biased owing to 
the heteroskedasticity of the time series, is claimed by Forbes and Rigobon (2002). 
The correlation of output growth rates between countries " and ' mixes27 two 
different components (see the following equation (2.6)). One is the structural link 
between the two economies, namely the sensitivity of the output growth rate of country ' 
to the output growth rate of country " (? in equation (2.6)); and the other one is the ratio 
of the output volatilities (@ @⁄ ): 
 = ? A@@B																																																																																																															2.6 
As can be seen from (2.6), even if the beta coefficient remains the same, the correlation 
increases when the volatility of the output growth rate of country " increases relative to 
the volatility of the output growth rate of country '; for example owing to the changes 
over time in the nature of the local shocks in country " which could modify the volatility 
of GDP growth rate of country ". 
                                                 
27
 See also Yeyati and Williams (2012). 
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This observation is particularly important because some previous studies showed 
that the ratio between the volatilities of different time series can change over time. For 
example, Kose et al. (2003c) measured the volatility of GDP growth rates of different 
countries. For the two groups of countries (industrial economies and developing 
economies) they computed the median volatilities. As can be deduced from their results, 
for both groups of industrial economies and developing economies the median volatility 
decreased from the 1960-1972 sub-sample to the 1986-2002 sub-sample and the ratio of 
the two median volatilities decreased, although slightly, from 0.6 to 0.5. So, when the 
decoupling phenomenon is studied by observing changes in the patterns of correlations, it 
is very important to remember that part of the explanation for changes in the correlation 
patterns can be due to changes in volatility (perhaps due to changes in the nature of 
country-specific and global shocks) in addition to changes in the structural linkages 
between the two countries ? which indeed is what really matter in studying the 
decoupling phenomenon. 
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) proposed applying a correction to the correlation 
coefficients to take into account any changes in volatility from one period to another. 
Suppose we are interested in comparing the synchronicity of output growth rates between 
country " and ' across two sub-samples, and suppose that the correlation coefficients 
obtained for the two sub-samples are respectively 	 for subsample 1 and 	 for 
subsample 2. Following Forbes and Rigobon, Yetman (2011a) shows it is incorrect to 
compare 	 and 	, instead one of them should be adjusted for the change in volatility 
between the two time periods, i.e. it is more correct to compare 	 and 	∗ where 
	∗ = 	1 + E F1 − 	G																																																																																								2.7 
and 
E = @@ − 1																																																																																																																					2.8 
is the relative variation in the volatility of the output growth rate of country j between the 
first and the second sub-sample periods. 
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Using the method proposed by Forbes and Rigobon, Yetman (2011a) finds that 
the correction28 had quantitatively important effects on the correlation coefficients, 
nevertheless he reached the same conclusions obtained from the unadjusted usual 
measure of the correlation coefficients (those showed in Table 2.1, columns a and b), 
namely declining correlation from the oldest sub-sample to the late sub-sample 
supporting the idea of Asian decoupling from the US. 
In addition to the Forbes and Rigobon correction, a further way to overcome the 
heteroskedasticity-related distortion in evaluating the decoupling phenomenon is to 
estimate the parameter beta, namely estimating the structural link between countries 
(coefficient ? in equation (2.6)). For example, this is what Yeyati and Williams (2012) 
did. They investigated decoupling by estimating the structural link between the output 
growth rates of EEs and AEs (more precisely 21 emerging countries and the members of 
the G-7 group). They regressed the GDP growth rates of EEs on the G-7 GDP growth rate 
in two panel regressions, one on the sub-samples 1993-200 and the other one on 2001-
2010 period. They found decreasing betas, so they concluded in favour of real decoupling 
of EEs because, basically, they found a lower sensitivity of EE output growth rate to AE 
output growth rate in the last decade than in the previous decade. This approach to 
studying the decoupling phenomenon, which contains important contributions to the 
economic literature on the decoupling issue, will be described in more detail in section 7 
of this chapter. 
6. Breakdown of advanced and emerging countries’ economic fluctuations  
Some authors study changes in the nature of the economic cycle over time by 
employing the dynamic latent factor model to estimate global and country-specific 
components in the macroeconomic output. Their objective is to answer the following 
question: has the global factor become more important in explaining economic cycles in 
both advanced and emerging countries? If so, it means that the connection between AEs 
and EEs has increased over time, casting doubts on the decoupling hypothesis. As already 
mentioned (subsection 2.1), the contribution of the global factor is a measure of the extent 
of comovement across national business cycles, hence the above question may be 
                                                 
28
 As explained by Yetman, he used the Forbes and Rigobon correction knowing that it is strictly 
accurate when there are no omitted variables or endogeneity between markets, nevertheless it may 
provide an indication as to how sensitive the results are to changes in volatility.   
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rephrased as follows: have national economic cycles become globally more 
synchronized? This is basically the same question posed by the authors cited in section 5 
above. 
Kose et al. (2012), on the basis of the work of Kose et al. (2003, 2008), use a 
dynamic latent factor model29 to break down the growth rates of national output, 
consumption and investment of 106 countries (23 advanced economies, 24 emerging 
economies and 59 developing economies) into the following factors: 1) a global factor, 
which captures fluctuations common across all variables and countries; 2) three factors 
specific to each group of countries (advanced economy factor, emerging economy factor 
and developing economy factor) which catch fluctuations common to all variables of the 
countries in the same group; 3) country factors common across variables in a given 
country; 4) idiosyncratic factors specific to each time series. 
Their sample period ranges from 1960 to 2008 and, to study how economic 
cycles have evolved over time, the authors divide the sample into two separate periods. 
The first is the pre-globalization period (1960-1984) which was characterized by a set of 
common shocks associated with strong oil price fluctuations in the 1970s and 
synchronized contractionary monetary policies in some of the major industrial 
economies. The second is the globalization period (1985-2008) characterized by 
increasing global trade and financial flows. 
Their major result is that there has been a decline over time in the importance of 
the global factor in accounting for national economic cycle fluctuations. In parallel, 
during the globalization period, the group factors have become more important than the 
global factor in driving national economic cycles in both the advanced economies group 
and the emerging economies group. So the authors conclude that there is evidence of 
economic cycle convergence within each of the two groups but divergence (decoupling) 
between them. 
This conclusion is in line with the results presented in Mumtaz et al. (2011) on a 
dataset of 30 countries, 5 regions (North America, South Africa, Europe, Asia and 
Oceania), and annual data for GDP growth and inflation from 1860 to 2007. The authors 
apply the same econometric approach performed by Kose et al. and find that similarities 
in the growth rates of output increase within regions, while they decrease between 
regions. 
                                                 
29
 The authors use a multifactor extension of the single dynamic factor model in Otrok and 
Whiteman (1998). 
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As Kose et al. (2012), Dong and Wei (2012) break down the economic cycle 
fluctuations into global, regional and country specific components. They use quarterly 
data for 16 countries (9 emerging Asian economies and the G-7 countries) from 1981:Q1 
to 2008:Q4 of GDP growth rate and inflation. They find that, while the output 
fluctuations in emerging Asia have remained less linked with the global common factor 
than industrial countries, the Asian regional factor has become increasingly important in 
driving output fluctuations in emerging Asia. Also this results give support to the idea of 
decoupling although Dong and Wei’s paper did not consider explicitly the distinction 
between AEs and EEs but instead divided the countries by geographical groups30. 
The papers mentioned above, based on the same econometric tools, reach the 
same conclusions in favour of the decoupling. Unfortunately, as with the correlation 
analysis, their approach does not allow disentangling the two forces which affect the path 
of the synchronicity, namely the effects due to changes in structural linkages and the 
effects due to changes in the nature of shocks. This point is well highlighted in the paper 
of Kose et al. (2012). The authors, in explaining their results, say that during the pre-
globalization period there were two large common disturbances (the oil shocks) and 
certain correlated shocks in the major advanced economies (the austerity policies in the 
early 1980s), while during the globalization period common global disturbances have 
become less important. The authors highlighted that these phenomena may have led to a 
decline in the importance of the global factor in explaining national economic cycles 
during the globalization period. Hence, the finding of Kose et al. is not only the result of 
eventual changes in the structural linkages between AEs and EEs but it is also the result 
of the changing nature of shocks. 
Canova and Ciccarelli (2012) investigated the economic fluctuations in the 
Mediterranean basin and explored similarities and convergence, breaking down national 
economic cycles into indicators representing regional components and country-specific 
components. They did not use the factor model, but instead used a panel VAR model with 
time varying parameters of the type developed in Canova and Ciccarelli (2009) and 
Canova et al. (2007). They used a dataset covering 16 countries (5 Western countries, 4 
Eastern countries and 7 countries from the Middle East and North Africa) and GDP, 
consumption and investment growth rates from 1980 to 2010. One of their main results is 
that the time variations in the regional and country specific indicators are not in line with 
either convergence or decoupling because both phenomena are present but temporary. By 
                                                 
30
 In this case grouping countries by geographical regions is basically similar to grouping them by 
EEs group and AEs group. 
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comparing Pairwise rolling (10 years) correlations between the regional indicators, they 
found different periods of convergence (increasing correlation) and decoupling 
(decreasing correlation) across different regions. 
7. Regression analysis and VAR estimations of spillover from AEs to EEs 
Some authors study how economic sensitivity of some emerging countries to US 
country has changed over time. They use regression analysis to estimate the parameters 
representing the structural linkages between countries, or use impulse response functions 
with vector autoregression (VAR) model to evaluate for example how the spillover of 
shocks from US to some EEs has changed over time. These econometric tools, adding 
proper control variables as will be shown in this section, allow us to focus on the 
economic sensitivity of EEs controlling for the changing nature of shocks and the other 
sources of coefficient distortion. 
With this approach, the question at which to answer is: has the sensitivity of 
emerging economies’ output growth to the advanced economies’ output growth decreased 
(decoupling) or increased over time? 
Akin and Kose (2008) used a dataset of 106 countries (23 advanced economies, 
23 emerging markets and 60 emerging and developing economies) covering 1960-2005. 
The authors estimated panel regressions relating GDP growth rate of the emerging 
economies vs. the GDP growth rate of advanced economies. The regression coefficients 
provided a measure of the magnitude of sensitivity of EEs to AEs. To control for different 
sources of GDP growth, the set of explanatory variables was extended to include several 
other output growth determinant such as the investment to GDP ratio, population growth, 
the government spending to GDP ratio and inflation. They found that the regression 
coefficient associated with the GDP growth rate of advanced economies is greater in the 
pre-globalization period than in the globalization period. From their estimated 
parameters, a 1 percentage point increase in the advanced economies GDP growth 
corresponds to 0.76 percentage points increase in the average GDP growth of emerging 
economies during the pre-globalization period, and this coefficient is about 0.4 
percentage points higher than in the globalization period. This means that spillovers from 
advanced economies to the growth rate of emerging economies have declined in the 
globalization period compared to the earlier period. 
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Based on panel regression analysis, Alder and Tovar (2012) assessed for some 
emerging countries how the sensitivity of their output to an external financial shock 
varies across regions and time. Their analysis was based on quarterly data for a sample of 
40 emerging economies and 9 advanced economies from 1990 to 2010. They used the 
S&P Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index as the financial market 
stress indicator. Their main result is that, while still significantly vulnerable, both 
emerging Latin America and emerging Asia are less sensitive in recent years to external 
financial shocks than in the past. On the other hand, emerging European economies are 
now more sensitive.  
While the results in Akin and Kose (2008) and Alder and Tovar (2012) are 
basically in favour of the decoupling hypothesis, Helbling et al. (2007) reached the 
opposite conclusion. On a dataset covering 130 countries and annual data over 1970-
2005, Helbling et al. estimated panel regressions relating per capita growth of output in 
EEs to US growth, Euro Area growth, Japanese growth, and several control variables: 
terms-of-trade changes, a short-term interest rate, population growth, controls for the 
Latin American debt and Tequila crises, for the Asian financial crises of 1997–98, and for 
the Argentine crisis of 2001–02. The regression analysis suggested that the magnitude of 
the spillovers may have increased over time. 
The evolution over time of the magnitude of spillovers was also described in 
Guimarães-Filho et al. (2008) which estimated the US spillovers to Asian emerging 
economies by both the estimated coefficients of the panel regression and the impulse 
response function performed using vector autoregressions (VARs). Like Helbling et al. 
(2007), Guimarães-Filho et al. (2008) did not find evidence in favour of decoupling. 
From the coefficients of the panel regression, Guimarães-Filho et al. concluded that 
spillovers from the US seem to have grown in recent years, in particular for China and 
India, because the estimated coefficients of the panel regression have increased between 
1991-2001 and 2001-2007. This result was broadly consistent with that obtained with the 
impulse response functions performed using the VAR model. In fact, the impulse 
response functions showed that the impact of US shocks was lower for the 1980-95 sub-
sample than the 1996-2007 sub-sample. 
Dèes and Vansteenkiste (2007), following Stock and Watson (2003), estimated a 
Factor-Structural VAR model to explain GDP growth rate with the lagged growth rates, 
the common international shocks and the country-specific shocks. They used a dataset 
covering 23 countries (advanced economies, emerging Asia and emerging Latin America) 
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on quarterly data from 1979 (2th quarter) to 2003 (4th quorter) and considered two sub-
periods: 1979-1992 and 1992-2003. From their results evidence emerges in favour of the 
decoupling phenomenon. In particular, the spillover effects decreased from the sub-
periods 1979-1992 to 1992-2003. Moreover it seems that emerging Asia tends to be 
mostly affected by regional shocks, while common shocks remain limited. For emerging 
Latin America it seems that the regional factor is the most important component in 
explaining the GDP growth rate, and its importance increases from the first sub-period to 
the second. 
Dèes and Vansteenkiste (2007) work is particularly interesting because on the 
one hand, like for example Kose et al. (2012), it allows evaluation of the different 
components of the economic cycles, and on the other hand it also allows disentangling of 
the effects of structural interdependence (sensitivity) from the effects due to the different 
nature of shocks (common or country specific shocks), in fact the equation they estimated 
is: K = L	MK- + N 																																																																																																								2.9 K is the vector of GDP growth rates, L	M is the coefficients matrix providing 
information about the sensitivity of EE GDP growth to AE GDP growth, while the error 
term P is broken down as follows N = ΓR + S 																																																																																																																2.10 
  where R are the common international factors, Γ is the matrix of factor loadings, and ε 
are the country-specific shocks31. 
I believe that the approach described in this paragraph is particularly suited to the 
study of decoupling because it allows us to focus on the economic sensitivity of EEs 
while controlling for the changing nature of shocks. However it is important to make a 
series of observations on papers quoted in this paragraph. First, some of the papers quoted 
measure the sensitivity of several emerging countries to the U.S. economy. It is widely 
believed that the U.S. may be the leading economy in the world, but one should also 
consider other advanced countries for a more appropriate assessment of the phenomenon 
under discussion. 
Second, some papers, even if they considered other EAs in addition to the U.S., 
used a set of countries rather smaller than those that were the ambitions of the research 
pursued. Using a small set of countries is not only very inappropriate with respect to the 
statistical significance of the observed sample, but also affects the realism of the model 
                                                 
31
 See  Dèes and Vansteenkiste (2007) for more details. 
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used because it does not allow us to take into account the many economic interrelations 
between many countries observed in the real world. Considering the multiplicity of 
economic relations between many countries is crucial in the study of decoupling because 
one of the reasons adopted by supporters of decoupling in justifying the phenomenon is 
that the progressive increase of real and financial linkages among EEs may have favoured 
the strengthening of economic linkages within EEs while at the same time possibly 
favouring their moving away from AEs. 
Finally, in all the papers cited decoupling is investigated by looking for a 
structural break in the estimated coefficients located roughly around the end of the 
eighties. This approach is appropriate and effective if the interrelationship between the 
countries is assumed to evolve in a discrete fashion over time. The introduction of 
structural breaks is less effective if the relationship between the countries follows a 
gradual progression over time, as it could be decoupling; thus, in this case it should be 
more appropriate to investigate the decoupling phenomenon by assuming that the 
coefficients can gradually change over time. 
8. Analysis of shock spilliovers from AEs to EEs using micro-funded 
economic models 
Another way forward in investigating the decoupling phenomenon is to follow a 
more structural approach by designing micro-funded economic models and examining the 
transmission of shocks from AEs to EEs through trade and financial linkages. The 
characteristic of this approach, which differentiates it from the approach presented in 
section 7 above, is that the theoretical base of the models is micro-funded and particularly 
rich. 
Starting from the "real business cycle" (RBC) approach to economic dynamics, 
which originated in the pioneering work of Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott (1982), 
most models that emerged have essentially been built on rational expectation with the 
explicit incorporation of microeconomic behaviour of forward-looking economic agents. 
Mendoza (1991) developed an extension of the real business cycle framework to the case 
of a small open economy (SOE), providing a, let us say, “standard small open economy 
RBC model”. 
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Since then, a growing economic literature on emerging economies has extended 
the Mendoza (1991) model to take into account the empirical features of emerging market 
economies. This led to several evolutions of the “standard small open economy RBC 
model” in the form of both additional different shocks and nominal frictions, the latter 
considering the (new) Keynesian flavour in the RBC approach. Given this literature 
extension and its various aspects, it is useful to first focus on its main features, without 
entering into too much technical detail as it would be beyond the intentions of this survey, 
and then emphasize the contributions of the relative literature that directly investigated 
the decoupling phenomenon. 
8.1 Micro-funded economic models: a brief excursus 
The standard small-open-economy RBC model in Mendoza (1991) features a 
representative infinitely-lived household, a representative firm operating a neoclassical 
production technology subject to random productivity disturbance, and an international 
credit market of one-period bonds. In this model the credit market is perfect in the sense 
that the small open economy can borrow or lend any amount of financial assets consistent 
with the household’s “no-Ponzi game” 32 condition at the “appropriate” market-
determined real interest rate. 
In this model, time is discrete and indexed by t=1,2,3…. There is only one type 
good in each period, which can be produced with a technology given by K = LU	V , ΓM																																																																																																						2.11 
Where K 	denotes output, V	capital available in period , M 	labour input, and U	∙ is a 
neoclassical production function and L is the total factor productivity L = XY3 																																																																																																																									2.12 
where Z 	is a shock to total factor productivity, assumed to follow the process: Z[ = YZ + SY,[																																																																																																			2.13 
where |Y| < 1 and SY, is an i.i.d. shock with mean zero and variance @Y . In this model 
the shock SY, is the only source of uncertainty, and the total factor productivity is a 
stationary process. 
Γ is a term allowing for labour-augmenting productivity growth. In this basic 
standard model, Γ is assumed to follow a deterministic path: Γ[ = X^Γ																																																																																																																			2.14 
                                                 
32
 The No-Ponzi game condition states that the present discounted value of wealth at infinity must 
be non-negative (Blanchard and Fisher, 1989, p. 49). 
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where _ is the constant growth of labour augmenting productivity. 
Capital accumulation is given by the equation: V[ = 	1 − EV + ` −Φ	V[, V																																																																			2.15 
where ` denotes investment, E the rate of depreciation of capital, and Φ	V[, V is the 
adjusting capital cost function. Adjusting capital cost functions are commonly used in the 
business cycle literature of small open economies in order to avoid excessive investment 
volatility. As explained in Mendoza, investment reacts very differently to productivity 
shocks in open-economy models than in closed-economy models. Access to foreign 
markets permits individuals to separate savings and investment by allowing them to 
finance any gap between the two from external resources. Mendoza (1991) shows that a 
small open economy model - in which capital can be freely accumulated without 
adjusting cost - exaggerates the variability of investment. This “anomaly” can be avoided 
by introducing moderate capital-adjustment costs, thus adopting the view that financial 
capital is more mobile than physical capital, a view previously explored by Dooley et al. 
(1987). 
The economy is inhabited by a representative household with the following utility 
function: b = b	c, 1 − M																																																																																																						2.16 
Where c denotes consumption at time , the total amount of time available for work or 
leisure is normalized at unity, and  b	∙ is a neoclassical utility function. 
The representative agent has access to a world market of the only one type bund 
“B”. Her budget constraint is therefore: 
c + ` + d = eM + fV + 1 + g-h d-																																																				2.17 d is the one-period real asset that household holds at time t, namely d > 0 (credit) if the 
household is a lender and d < 0 (debt) if the household is a borrower. The variable e 
denotes the real wage, f the real rental of capital, and gh the international (foreign) real 
interest rate. 
In Mendoza (1991), it is assumed that the real international interest rate is 
sensitive to the level of the country’s international financial position (lending or 
borrowing position) in the sense that the interest rate a country’s citizen pays on 
international borrowing is an increasing function of the country’s international debt, and 
the interest rate that citizens receive for international savings declines as a function of 
total savings. This assumption does not derive from a solution to the optimal 
borrower/lender problem, but it is coherent with observed practice in the current credit 
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market. Moreover the assumption has a key role in open economy models for two 
reasons. On the one hand it reflects the concept of country risk, and on the other hand, as 
showed in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003), it “closes the model”, that is it allows to find 
a single stationary state equilibrium. Note that in this basic standard small open economy 
the financial market is perfect, one in which the small open economy can borrow or lend 
any amount that is consistent with the household’s no-Ponzi-game condition at the 
“appropriate” market-determined real interest rate. 
In more formal terms, it is assumed that residents of this hypothetical small open 
economy face an international interest rate given by: 
gh = g∗ + N	d																																																																																																										2.18 
where g∗ is the world real interest rate assumed to be constant. P	d can be 
interpreted as a spread on g∗. P	d must be a decreasing function33. From the (2.15) and 
(2.17) and (2.18) we get the following equation: c + V[ +d = eM + fV + 	1 − EV −Φ	V[, V+ 1 + g∗ + N	d-d-																																																																								2.19 
The household chooses the sequence of values for jc, M , V[, dkl∞  to maximize the 
expected discounted utility, subject to constraint (2.19) and “no Ponzi game” condition.  
The conditions for the solution of the utility maximization problem give the 
equilibrium conditions to which we have to add the factor payments conditions in order to 
arrive at the general equilibrium conditions. Given the production function (2.11) and the 
assumption that factor markets are competitive, the rental rate paid to the owners of 
capital f and real wage e, are given by marginal productivities f = LUm	V, ΓM																																																																																																					2.20 e = LUn	V, ΓM																																																																																																				2.21 
Where Uo	∙ and Un	∙ are the partial derivatives of U	∙ w.r.t. V and M respectively. Note 
that, as shown for example in Mendoza (1991), under the assumption of a production 
function homogeneous of degree one w.r.t. V and M, from (2.17), (2.20) and (2.21) the 
good market clearing condition holds, that is K = c + ` + d − 	1 − g-d-																																																																			2.22 
Where the net trade balance at time  coincides with pd − 	1 + g-d-q. So, 
given the initial conditions jVl, dl, g∗k, the competitive equilibrium of the economy is 
defined by the processes jc, M , V[, d[, e , fkr  that solve the utility maximization 
                                                 
33
 For example, McCandless (2008) assumes P	d = −sd , s is a positive constant. The minus 
sign says that as a country accumulate foreign debt, the international interest rate it pays will rise.  
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problem, satisfy the competitive market factor prices condition (2.20), (2.21) and the 
markets clearing conditions.  
The Mendoza (1991) model was extended in different dimensions adding (a) 
shocks to productivity trend, (b) shocks to world interest rate, (c) shocks to terms of trade, 
and especially adding (d) nominal friction (sticky prices) and (e) credit market 
imperfection. 
Aguiar and Gopinath (2007), introduces a stochastic productivity trend, in 
addition to the temporary productivity shocks already present in Mendoza’s (1991) Small 
Open Economy Model. This seemingly small addition, Aguiar and Gopinath argue, goes 
a very long way towards addressing some of the known empirical figures of emerging 
market economies, including the strong counter-cyclical behaviour of trade surplus and 
the higher volatility of consumption relative to output. 
Aguiar and Gopinath (2007), motivated by the frequent policy regime switches 
observed in emerging markets, have hypothesized that these economies are subject to 
substantial volatility in trend growth. Their model has the same framework as the 
Mendoza (1991) model with addition of the assumption of stochastic productivity growth Γ. So the assumption (2.14) is replaced by Γ[ = Xt3u5Γ																																																																																																														2.23 
Where * follows the stochastic process *[ = 1 − t_ + t* + St,[																																																																									2.24 
)t) < 1, Stis an i.i.d. process with mean zero and variance @t, and _ is the long-run 
mean value growth of labour-augmenting productivity.  * is the shock to productivity growth. We can refer to the realizations of * as 
the growth shocks since they constitute the stochastic productivity trend. A positive 
realization of St, implies that the growth of productivity (labour productivity) is 
temporarily increased, however, such a shock is incorporated in Γ and hence results in a 
permanent productivity improvement. 
That the addition of permanent productivity shocks has the potential to account 
for some stylized facts observed in some EEs is intuitively explained by a permanent 
income view of consumption. After a favourable realization of St,, productivity increases 
permanently. Accordingly, permanent income and therefore consumption can increase 
more than current income; this explains why consumption may be more volatile than 
income in emerging economies. The same reasoning implies that after a positive shock to 
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the productivity growth rate the representative household may want to issue debt on the 
world market to finance consumption in excess of current income, leading to a 
countercyclical current account. 
Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Uribe and Yue (2006), motivated by the 
observation that the cost of foreign credit appears to be countercyclical in emerging 
economies data, propose to introduce foreign interest rate shocks to the Mendoza 
framework, coupled with the working capital assumption (namely the need for firms to 
finance a fraction of labour costs in advance) and a country risk determined endogenously 
as a function of shocks to productivity. 
Qualitatively, the endogenous real interest rate spread and the “working capital” 
assumption should work as follows. With a spread process endogenously determined as a 
function of productivity, a favourable productivity shock increases output and reduces the 
interest rate applicable to representative household debts, thus boosting consumption and 
investment even beyond the boost to output, at the same time, with the working capital 
assumption, a drop in the world interest rate reduces the cost of labour, which stimulates 
output. 
Let us modify the basic small open economy model to formally take into account 
the hypothesis proposed in Neumeyer and Perri (2005). 
Firstly, the international interest rate equation (2.18) is modified to consider both 
the changing world interest rate and the specific country risk 
gh = g∗v 																																																																																																																						2.25 
where v is the country-specific spread over g∗ paid by borrowers in particular 
economy at time t. The assumption behind the equation (2.25) is that there are two forces 
at play in the interest rate dynamics faced by an emerging economy: international 
investors’ attraction to risky assets captured by changes in g∗, and the specific country 
risk default captured by v. 
The more important issue to resolve is what drives v. Neumeyer and Perri 
(2005) propose a minimal country risk model to conduct their quantitative analysis. Their 
idea is that fundamental shocks to a country’s economy (in their model productivity 
shocks) drive the business cycle and country risk at the same time. In other words they 
assume that default probabilities and, hence, country risk are a function of productivity 
shocks. The functional relationship does not derive from a solution to the optimal 
borrower/lender problem, but is an assumption based on the idea that default probabilities 
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are high when expectations of positive productivity shocks are low. Thus the country-risk 
component of gh is a decreasing function of expected productivity, hence v = w	xpL[q																																																																																																									2.26 
where w	∙ is a decreasing function. Note that in Neumeyer and Perri (2005) model the 
international real interest rate is not sensitive to the level of the country’s international 
financial position (lending or borrowing position), so the model must be “closed”34 in 
some other way. The authors propose closing their model by adding in the bond holding 
costs,  y	d, where y	∙ is a convex function. At time t households spend the proceeds 
from bond holdings and their labour and capital income on consumption, investment, 
bond purchases and the cost of holding bonds. The household’s budget constraint (2.17) 
is then given by 
c + ` + d + y	d = eM + fV + 1 + g-h d-																																				2.27 
Under the assumption that the firm has to borrow zeM units of goods during the 
period  (the working capital assumption), the real profit function of the firm is 
{ = K − 	eM + fV − ghzeM																																																																						2.28 
where 	θ captures the importance of working capital. From the maximization of 
(2.28), under the assumption that factor markets are competitive, the condition (2.21) on 
equilibrium real wage becomes 
e1 + zgh = LUn	V, ΓM																																																																																2.29 
Of course, if z is set to zero, firms do not need working capital, the term 
capturing the cost of the working capital in the firm’s profit function (2.28) disappears 
and the supply side of the model reduces exactly to the basic standard small open 
economy model presented at the beginning of this section. 
More recently, Cicco, Pancrazi and Uribe (2010) presented an SOE RBC model 
which combines the features both of the Aguiar Gobinath (2007) and Neumeyer Perri 
(2005) models. 
One dimension in which Emerging Economies differ from developed economies 
is that EEs rely heavily on a narrow range of primary commodities for their export 
earnings, and depend heavily on imported capital goods and intermediate input for 
domestic production. In the light of these structural features, it should not be difficult to 
see that fluctuations in world prices (fluctuations in the prices of primary, capital, and 
                                                 
34
 Remember that “model closure” means finding a single stationary state equilibrium and then 
being able to find a log-linear approximation of the dynamic model around the stationary state. See 
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) for the ways of achieving “model closure”.  
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intermediate goods, and in the world real interest rate) have an important impact on 
economic dynamics in small open emerging countries (M. Kose 2002). The role of world 
prices in inducing business cycles in Emerging Economies was explored in depth by 
Mendoza 1995, and then by M. Kose 2002. They borrow the RBC theory to compute the 
equilibrium processes of three sector models (non-tradable goods, exportable goods and 
importable goods) in a small open economy.  
A large portion of recent empirical literature on emerging markets takes into 
account financial market imperfections. This literature proposes financial transmission 
mechanisms that can be roughly divided into two categories. As well-explained by 
Arellano and Mendoza (2002), in the first category we find studies that explore financial 
transmission mechanisms driven by a borrower’s ability to pay. In these models, 
borrowers may be willing to repay their debts but their ability to do so is threatened by 
the realization of “bad” states of nature. Creditors aim to cover their exposure to this 
default risk by imposing lending conditions on borrowers (usually in the form of 
collateral or liquidity requirements) or by choosing to incur monitoring costs to assess a 
borrower’s claim that he is unable to repay. The second category emphasizes a 
borrower’s willingness to pay. In these models, borrowers optimally decide to renege on 
their debts when the expected lifetime payoff of defaulting, net of any default penalty, 
exceeds the expected lifetime payoff of repaying . 
Quantitative application of “ability to pay” models in SOE setting is represented 
for example by Mendoza and Smith (2002), which considers a RBC model with two 
sectors (tradable and non-tradable) and with a borrowing constraint set in terms of a 
fraction of GDP. This model was extended by Mendoza (2008), adding an environment in 
which foreign creditors retain as collateral a fraction of the value of the economy’s capital 
stock. 
Collateral constraints are features of a variety of private credit contracts but when 
it comes to instruments like sovereign debt there is very limited scope for enforcing 
contracts featuring those constraints. In this context, a modelling approach based on 
“willingness-to-pay” considerations seems an appealing alternative. Arellano (2008) 
studies a small open economy that faces a credit-market participation constraint. In case 
of default, the country is punished by permanent exclusion from world financial markets, 
so default is not optimal whenever the expected useful life of staying in a credit 
relationship exceeds that of living permanently under financial autarky. 
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Nominal friction and credit market imperfections together with a monetary policy 
framework have been considered by authors such as Elekdag et al. (2005), Cespedes et al. 
(2004), Devereux et al. (2004), Elekdag and Tchakarov (2004), as well as Gertler et al. 
(2003), and more recently Gertler et al. (2007). These authors built upon the model with 
financial accelerator developed by Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), extending the 
small open economy environment by adding sticky prices, an imperfect credit market and 
a monetary policy framework. 
8.2 Micro-funded models’ contribution to the debate on decoupling 
It is clear that the degree of mathematical complexity has increased over time to 
improve the accuracy and realism of the micro-funded economic models. However, while 
the reduced form of models have empirically documented shock transmission from AEs 
to EEs, the small open economy models have found it difficult to account for foreign 
disturbances in EEs35 despite their richness in terms of possible shocks and nominal 
frictions (see Hernàndez and Leblebicioğlu, 2011). This difficulty is probably the reason 
why, in spite of the extensive literature on small open economy models, only a small 
number of them have been directly used to investigate decoupling, as Hernàndez and 
Leblebicioğlu (2011) for instance. 
Hernàndez and Leblebicioğlu (2011) develop a two-country real business cycle 
model in which one country represents the emerging market and the other represents the 
US market. The emerging country is characterized by a more risky and greater financial 
market imperfection with respect to that of the US. 
In their model, financial linkages are established through borrowing and lending 
in the international markets and financial market frictions are adopted in their model as in 
Neumeyer and Perri (2005). The emerging country must pay an interest rate which 
reflects the risk level of the country, namely a spread on the US interest rate. As in 
Neumeyer and Perri (2005), changes in the country spread and the US interest rate affect 
goods production in the emerging country due to the working capital constraint. 
The trade channel is defined as follows. Each country produces a non-traded good 
and is also completely specialized in producing a traded good. 
Their model is estimated with seventeen quarterly time series for Mexico and the 
US from 1994 to 2007. From the results, they conclude that the spillover from the US to 
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 In designing a small open economy model for Canada, Justiniano and Preston (2010) 
demonstrate that the inability of the model to generate spillover becomes more evident when the 
model is estimated instead of calibrated. 
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Mexico increased over time. While during the first part of the 1990s the Mexican 
economy’s poor performance was driven prevalently by domestic shocks, in the second 
part of the 1990s the Mexican GDP growth benefited from US economic growth. Based 
on data of Mexican economy, their finding is against the decoupling idea. 
9. Conclusion 
Decoupling implies a break in a relationship that was previously more coupled 
and closely linked. There is no precise definition of decoupling and so the phenomenon 
has been interpreted in various ways. 
Some authors focused on the historical path of synchronization between 
economic cycles of EEs and AEs by using the rolling windows correlation analyses, or by 
breaking down the economic cycles into their components, for example the common 
component and country-specific component. As explained in the paragraph 5 of this 
chapter, the historical path of synchronization between economic cycles may depend on 
two distinct forces. It may depend not only on the actual economic linkages between the 
countries, let us say the sensitivity of the economic cycle of a country to the economic 
cycle of the other country, but also from the way in which the nature of shocks changes 
over time. The correlation analysis and the breakdown of economic cycles do not allow 
disentangling of the effects of the two forces on the historical path of the synchronization. 
This observation is highly important because decoupling refers to how the economic 
linkage between advanced economies and emerging economies changes over time. It is a 
concept of structural significance regardless of the nature and type of shocks that can 
affect an economy from time to time in different historical periods. For this reason, a 
number of other authors (e.g. Akin and Kose, 2008) tried to study the phenomenon 
focusing on the sensitivity of some emerging country economic cycles to same advanced 
country economic cycles by controlling for the changing nature of shocks over time. 
Given the different interpretations of the phenomenon, several authors have used 
different statistical/econometric techniques to analyze the data in their empiric studies; 
moreover, they have used different data and economic indicators. 
As regards the statistical/econometric techniques adopted, these range from 
correlation analysis on a rolling time window to dynamic latent factor models to study the 
synchronicity of economic cycles in EEs and AEs, and from econometric estimations to 
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simulations of micro-funded models to study the sensitivity of EEs’ economic cycles to 
AEs’ economic cycles. 
With regard to the indicators, in some cases only GDP was considered, whilst in 
other cases a broader set of economic indicators, such as the industrial production index, 
consumption and investments for example, were used. In certain studies, e.g. Kose et al. 
(2008), a mere calculation of the short-term growth rate (year on year growth rate in the 
case of the paper cited) was used to extract the cyclical component from the time series; 
in others, such as Flood and Rose (2010), different methods were used to break down the 
time series into cycle and trend components, such as the Hodrick-Prescott or Baxter-King 
filters. 
Basically, in agreement with Willett et al. (2011), the various interpretations of 
decoupling are useful and legitimate and, rather than wasting time discussing which is 
most suitable, it is important to clarify the type of concept to use as reference and 
document related conclusions in order to effectively contribute to the debate on this issue. 
Therefore, if on the one hand the dissimilarity between interpretations of the 
phenomenon and investigative approaches can be confusing to those seeking to 
understand if and to what extent the economic linkage between EEs and AEs has 
changed, on the other hand those dissimilarity enhance the study of a phenomenon which 
is complex and wealth of aspects, namely a phenomenon which lends itself to observation 
from a variety of viewpoints. 
Unfortunately, however, even in works based on the same concept of decoupling, 
conflicting conclusions are drawn. This uncertainty in results can be seen regardless of 
whether the statistical/econometric techniques used were sophisticated or simple. 
Despite the fact that the decoupling hypothesis is long-debated, not only among 
academics, but also among policymakers and practitioners, it is still an open question 
both from a theoretical and empiric point of view. 
The absence of a broadly accepted answer calls for further investigative efforts 
based on the most recent empiric study techniques and by steering studies both 1) towards 
large groups of countries and 2) towards specific countries. 
Advancing research along the first path could prove useful in measuring how the 
degree of sensitivity of a group of countries to economic disturbances from other groups 
of countries evolves over time; and the use of a wider sample of countries, as in a Global 
VAR for example, could make simulations of international shock transmission more 
realistic; the next two chapters go along this direction.  
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Studies targeting specific countries, on the other hand, could be useful as case 
study in identifying existing relationships between the evolution over time of an emerging 
country’s vulnerability to external shocks and the structural characteristics of its 
economy, e.g. its level of international openness, its geographic proximity to other 
countries, the availability and quality of its production factors or the implementation of 
country specific economic policies. 
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3. Is Decoupling in action? 
 
1. Introduction 
As explained in chapter 2, the decoupling hypothesis essentially refers to a 
structural change in the degree of business cycle interdependence between the two groups 
of economies (EEs and AEs). It implies two main consequences that should be 
empirically observable: 1) a decreasing comovement of economic cycles between AEs 
and EEs over time, 2) an increasing resilience of the EEs to adverse scenarios in AEs. 
Among the numerous works that have investigated the two points mentioned 
above, see the survey in chapter 2, there are some particularly important to contextualize 
this chapter, that is Kose et al. (2012) and Wälti (2012) (which have focused the point 1), 
Guimarães-Filho et al. (2008), Dèes and Vansteenkiste (2007) (which have focused the 
point 2). For the convenience of the reader, let me recall briefly the contributions of their 
works. 
Kose et al. (2012)36, similar to Kose et al. (2003), perform their investigation on a 
dataset of 106 countries, employing a dynamic factor model37 to decompose the national 
economic cycles of each country into different components38. Through variance 
decomposition analysis, they conclude that the global factor became less important for 
macroeconomic fluctuations in AEs and EEs during the period of globalization (from the 
1980s), whereas the group-specific factor became significantly more important for both 
AEs and EEs. This result shows a disconnection between the economic cycles of EEs and 
AEs that, in the authors’ opinion, supports the decoupling hypothesis. Wälti (2012), in his 
study of the economic cycles39 of 30 emerging and 26 advanced markets, concludes that 
there is no evidence in favour of the decoupling; rather, the comovement of the economic 
                                                 
36
 An earlier version of this article was published by the same authors in NBER Working Paper 
14292, 2008. 
37
 See Kose et al. (2003) for details on this approach. 
38
 Components include the global factor, representing the economic dynamic common to all 
countries; group factors, representing the economic dynamics common to the EEs, developing 
economies, and AEs, respectively; and  country-specific factors, representing the specific 
economic dynamic of each national economic cycle. 
39
 Wälti (2012) performs his analysis on the so called deviation cycle, which is the difference 
between the actual GDP and its trend.  
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cycles appears to have become stronger over time, as the correlation between the 
economic cycles in emerging and advanced markets has shown an increasing path. 
Guimarães-Filho et al. (2008) estimated the US spillovers to Asian emerging 
economies by the impulse response function performed with the vector autoregressions 
(VARs). The impulse response functions showed evidence against the decoupling 
because the impact of US shocks has been lower for the subsample 1980-95 than the 
following subsample 1996-2007. 
Dèes and Vansteenkiste (2007), following Stock and Watson (2003), estimated a 
Factor-Structural VAR model to explain the GDP growth rate with the lagged growth 
rates, the common international shocks and the country specific shocks. They used a 
dataset covering 23 countries (advanced economies, emerging Asia and emerging Latin 
America) on quarterly data from 1979(2) to 2003(4) and considered two sub-periods: 
1979-1992 and 1992-2003. From their results emerges evidence in favor of the 
decoupling phenomenon. 
Two crucial points for understanding the decoupling phenomenon have been no 
fully considered in Guimarães-Filho et al. (2008) or Dèes and Vansteenkiste (2007). The 
first point is that investigating the decoupling looking for a structural break in the 
estimated coefficients in a certain point of the time could not be a very good strategy 
when the relationship between the countries follows a gradual progression over a longer 
time, as it could be for the decoupling. In this last case, it should be more appropriate to 
investigate the decoupling phenomenon by assuming that the model’s estimated 
coefficients can gradually change over time. The second point is the number of countries 
in the sample set. As already known, using a small set of countries affects the realism of 
the empirical model because it does not allow to take into account the many economic 
interrelations between countries (in particular between EEs) which instead are crucial in 
studying the decoupling because, for example, one of the reasons adopted by the 
supporters of decoupling in justify the phenomenon is that the progressive increase of real 
and financial linkages among EEs may have favored the strengthening of economic 
linkages within EEs while at the same time may have supported their moving away from 
AEs. 
The purpose of the present chapter is to study the decoupling phenomenon by 
measuring how the resilience of EEs has changed over time. It extends the empirical 
research on the decoupling in different dimensions. First, unlike the prevalent literature, 
this chapter does not evaluate the temporal path of the resilience of the EEs to shocks in 
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EAs comparing two sub-periods defined in an arbitrary manner to divide the sample 
period in the "pre-decoupling" and the “post-decoupling " one, but rather the sensitivity 
of EEs is assessed in each year of the entire sample period. Second, this chapter, unlike 
the related prevalent literature, does not consider the sensitivity of the EEs to the U.S. or 
the G7 group, rather than it evaluates the sensitivity of the EEs in a large set of advanced 
economy countries. 
In this chapter I have also evaluated the economic correlation between the two 
groups of countries to get a richer set of empirical evidence. 
Two recently developed econometric tools: the Euclidean distance proposed by 
Wälti (2012) and the time-varying Panel VAR model with factorization of the 
coefficients40, as proposed by Canova and Ciccarelli (2009)41, were used to study a 
sample of 112 countries (of which 23 advanced countries, 59 emerging countries and 30 
developing countries) on annual data from 1970 to 2010. 
The Euclidean distance between two standardized series conveys the same 
qualitative information as the correlation coefficient, moreover the Euclidean distance has 
the considerable advantage that it can be computed on an annual basis, unlike the 
correlation coefficient that must be estimated over relatively large subsamples of data; 
hence the Euclidean distance may be used to better evaluate the changes in the correlation 
over time. 
The model with the factorization of coefficients as proposed by Canova and 
Ciccarelli (2009) has various advantages. First, the use of the factorization of the 
coefficients offers a great advantage from the computational perspective and also from 
the economic point of view. From the computational perspective, it significantly reduces 
the number of parameters that must be estimated. This is very important in managing 
large dynamic panel, as the case of this work. From the economic perspective, the 
factorization of coefficients, as explained in deep by Canova and Ciccarelli (2009), 
produces indices that can be interpreted as components of the national economic cycles, 
e.g. global, regional, and country-specific cycle components. 
                                                 
40
 Coefficients of the model depend on a low-dimensional vector of time-varying factors, which 
can capture coefficient variations that are common across countries (“global” effect); variations 
that are specific to the group to which the country belongs, namely, advanced or emerging groups 
(“group” effect); variations that are specific to each geographical region (“region” effect) and to a 
specific country (“country” effect); or variations that are specific to the variable (“variable” 
effect). 
41
 Canova Ciccarelli (2009) change the model proposed in Canova and Ciccarelli (2004) by 
providing a coefficient factorization that facilitates the estimation process. 
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Second, The model specification is well suited for investigating how the 
international transmission of shocks form AEs to EEs is changed over time as the model 
can account for cross-unit lagged interdependencies. Dynamic feedbacks across countries 
are possible and this aspect increases the realism of the analysis to evaluate the response 
of EEs to adverse scenarios in AEs in a global framework. Finally, thanks to time varying 
coefficients it isn’t necessary to implement a structural break in the model parameters. I 
believe that, as already said, the time variations of coefficients should be the solution 
more appropriate to study the decoupling that, presumably, is more similar to a gradually 
evolving phenomenon, rather than a structural break that occurs at a given instant in time. 
The empirical investigation of the resilience of EEs was performed in two steps. 
In the first step, three different model specifications were implemented, which 
differed in terms of their coefficients factorization (i.e., factors). The first model 
specification included the global factor (i.e., the factor that was common to all countries) 
and the country-specific factors. The second model specification added the group factors 
(i.e., the EEs, the DEs, and the AEs factors) to the global and country-specific factors. 
The third model specification added the regional factors (i.e., factors that were common 
among countries in the same geographical region, i.e. North and Central America, Latin 
America, Europe, Asia, Middle East and North Africa [MENA], Sub-Saharan Africa 
[SSA], Oceania) to the global and the country-specific factors. According to the estimated 
marginal likelihood, the model specification with the regional factors combined with the 
global and the country-specific factors was preferable to the other two models. 
In the second step, the specification which got the greatest support by data was 
used to perform counterfactual analyses (CAs) to measure the impact on EEs of simulated 
shocks spreading from AEs. The intensity of the impact suggests the degree of resilience 
of the EEs to shocks from EAs, so it can be used as an indicator of EEs’ resilience. The 
CA experiments were conducted for each year of the sample period, and the results were 
compared across time to determine whether EEs show a tendency to become more or less 
resilient to adverse scenarios in AEs, in other words, to determine whether the intensity of 
the impact shows a tendency to weaken or to become stronger over the sample period. 
In terms of the principal results, two points may be highlighted here. Firstly, a 
graphical inspection of the Euclidean distance indicator suggests that the synchronicity 
between the economic cycles of EEs and AEs increased, rather than decreased, from the 
latter half of the 1970s to the early 2000s, even though signs of a possible inversion in 
this trend appeared during the latter half of the 2000s. The analysis of the Euclidean 
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distance fails to provide any clear and prevalent evidence in favour of the decoupling 
hypothesis. Nevertheless, in evaluating the results of this analysis it is important to 
consider that the degree of correlation between EEs and EAs, namely the value of the 
Euclidean indicator, may vary not only as a result of a change in the economic ties 
between the countries in question, which may become weaker or stronger, but also in 
virtue of changes in the nature of the shocks, which may become more or less global. 
Secondly, contrary to the Euclidean distance indicator, the counterfactual analyses 
supports the decoupling hypothesis as they have shown that the resilience of EEs to 
shocks spreading from AEs has increased over the course of the last twenty years, even 
though the process has not been a gradual, constant one, but indeed has been 
characterised by an alternation of periods of greater resilience and periods of lesser 
resilience. In particular, over the last ten years, EEs have lost some of their resilience to 
external shocks, but notwithstanding this, their degree of resilience remains higher now 
than it was during the early 1990s. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section discusses the 
international synchronicity of economic cycles through the Euclidean distance method, 
then presents the empirical model and the results of the CA experiments. Section 3 
concludes this chapter. 
2. Empirical analysis of the decoupling hypothesis 
2.1 Countries and dataset 
The data come from the Penn World Table 7.142 database that covers 112 
countries (of which 23 advanced countries, 59 emerging countries and 30 developing 
countries) with annual data from 1970 to 2010. From the geographical point of view, in 
the country set there are 3 Central and North American countries, 29 Latin American 
countries; 17 Asian countries, 24 European countries, 11 Middle East and North African 
countries (MENA), 25 Africa Sub Saharan countries (ASS), and 3 Oceania countries;  
                                                 
42
 Alan Heston, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 7.1, Centre for 
International Comparisons of Production, Income, and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, 
Nov. 2012. 
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they cover more than 90% of the world's GDP (at PPP) and more than 85% of the world’s 
population43 (see the appendix A for the list of all countries). 
According to Pritchett (2000) and Abdul Abiad et al. (2012), AEs were defined 
primarily by their pre-1990 membership in the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development. All other economies were classified as EEs or DEs. The DEs were 
defined based on their current eligibility for concessional IMF loans. Remaining countries 
were classified as EEs. As a result of this classification scheme, some economies 
currently classified as AEs by the WEO (2012) of the IMF were classified as EEs in this 
article. However, according to Abdul Abiad et al. (2012), this categorization is 
appropriate because it is acceptable to think that those countries have acted more like EEs 
than AEs over the past 40 years. 
The countries used in this work are only those with a data quality grade44 of “C” 
(or higher) in the Penn World Table 7.1. 
To the end of using a broad selection of countries, in this chapter I focused on 
just one of the most important economic variables, that is, the annual rate of growth of 
real Gross Domestic Product (per capita, at purchasing power parity), and I used annual 
data. 
Some authors, such as Kose et al. (2012), focus on the growth rate of the real 
Gross Domestic Product (not per capita) as a measure of the economic cycle. However, as 
                                                 
43
 Own computation on data provided by the IMF, WEO Database, April 2013.  
44
 The grade is a judgment on the quality of data expressed by the author  of the dataset. The grade 
goes from D (low quality) to A (high quality); see the cited authors for more details. 
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was recently outlined by Reinhart and Rogoff (2012), the impact of population growth on 
real Gross Domestic Product growth rate is an important consideration when working 
with historical series. The real Gross Domestic Product growth rate can be misleading 
when the population growth rate changes significantly, as is the case in many EEs. 
Therefore, in this work, the real gross domestic product per head at purchasing power 
parity (from now on simply GDP)  was used. 
Given the time and the geographical dimensions, the dataset has high 
heterogeneity. In the entire dataset the average GDP growth rate (in per cent point) is 2.1 
with a standard deviation at 5.9, the minimum at -55.5 and the maximum at 83.7. If we 
explore the main stylized facts along the regional dimension (Central North America, 
Latin America, Asia, Europe, MENA, ASS, Oceania), ignoring the economic type 
dimension (AEs, EEs and DEs), we find the Asian region to have the highest average 
GDP  growth rate, about twice as much as the average of the entire dataset (see Figure 
3.1); moreover, as highlighted in Figure 3.1, the ASS and the MENA regions have the 
highest standard deviations, and the highest contraction of the GDP growth rate is 
recorded within the MENA region, while the record high is recorded within the ASS area. 
Exploring data along the economic type dimension (see Figure 3.2), it can be 
noted that the average GDP growth rate in EEs is the highest, and the greatest standard 
deviation is in the DEs group, where there is the lowest average economic growth too, 
while in the AEs group the standard deviation is the lowest. 
Fig. 3.2
 Main stylized facts of GDP growth rate (%) along the economic type dimension
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From Table 3.1 it is possible to see the main stylized facts for sub-group of 
countries “crossing” the regional and the economic type dimensions45. It is interesting to 
note that, among the EEs, the Asian emerging countries have the highest average rate of 
GDP growth while in the MENA emerging countries there is the highest standard 
deviation. Among the AEs, the Asian advanced economy countries have the highest 
average growth rate while within the European advanced economy group there is the 
greatest standard deviation. 
 2.2 Synchronicity of national economic cycles  
The aim of this sub-section is to investigate whether the comovement 
(synchronicity) of the economic cycles of EEs and AEs show a decreasing path in the last 
40 years or not. 
2.2.1 Method 
Economic cycle synchronicity is usually measured as the correlation between 
economic variables see, e.g., Frankel and Rose (1998), Rose and Engel (2002), Kose et 
al. (2003), Imbs (2004, 2006), Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005), and Fidrmuc and 
Korhonen (2006). Correlation coefficients are estimated over (typically rolling) 
subsamples of data e.g., Flood and Rose (2010), however the last-estimated correlation 
coefficient may not identify the change in the degree of the economic cycle 
interdependence when this change occurs around the end of the time window used for the 
estimation. For this reason, in this chapter, the economic cycle synchronicity was 
evaluated by using the measure proposed by Wälti (2012): namely, the Euclidean distance 
between two standardized variables. 
The Euclidean distance46 is the absolute value of the numerical difference 
between two standardized time series47 at each time . When the difference is zero at time 
                                                 
45
 See appendix B for descriptive statistics of GDP  data for each country. 
46
 See the article of Wälti for details on the Euclidean method. 
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, the two variables are perfectly in tune at that time. Any positive value indicates 
imperfect synchronisation; the larger the distance between economic cycles is, the less 
interdependent they are. Although this measure conveys the same qualitative information 
as the correlation coefficient, its advantage is that it can be computed for each year and 
also allows for the proper evaluation of the synchronicity of the time series at the end of 
the sample period. I computed the Euclidean distances to measure the economic cycle 
synchronicity of emerging and developing economies (different groups were considered: 
all EEs, EEs and DEs together, Latin American, Asian, European, MENA, and SSA 
emerging economies) with the group of all advanced economies. The measure of the 
economic cycle synchronization for each group was the average of the Euclidean distance 
of the group members48. 
2.2.2 Results 
Figure 3.3 shows the degree of economic cycle synchronization, namely 
comovement, of the group of all EEs plus all DEs with the group of all AEs (panel 1) and 
the degree of economic cycle synchronization of EEs with AEs (panel 2), the blue lines 
indicate the Hodrick-Prescott filter. Since the second half of the 1970s, the comovement 
has been increased (i.e., the Euclidean distance has been decreased), and it reached a 
record high in 2006 (i.e., the record low for Euclidean distance). With the escalation of 
the worst financial crisis of the last 40 years which, with different degrees of impact, 
spread from the USA to many other countries in the world, the indicator jumped to 
historic highs in 2009, indicating a low degree of correlation between the economic 
                                                                                                                                     
47
 The GDP growth rate of each country was standardized by subtracting its mean and dividing by 
its standard deviation and then the synchronicity was evaluated through the Euclidean distance 
indicator. 
48
 The unweighted average was chosen because the data were “per head” and, thus, already 
weighted by the dimension of the country.  
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cycles of advanced markets and emerging markets. This result was temporary and by 
early 2010 the indicator returned to just under the average of the last 20 years49. 
To check if the above results were general and reflected similar figures in 
subsamples of EEs grouped by geographical area, the synchronicity of economic cycles 
of five EE subgroups (Latin American, MENA, SSA, Asian, and European emerging 
economies) with all AEs was plotted in Figure 3.4. The pattern of the subgroups50 was 
substantially consistent with the correlation shown in the Figure 3.3, although some 
regional peculiarities emerged. For the Latin American, MENA, and SSA EEs, the degree 
of synchronicity with the AEs was very markedly increased (Figure 3.4, from panel 1 to 
3), whereas the synchronicity showed a more gradual path for the emerging Asian 
countries (Figure 3.4, panel 4) and an almost-flat path for the European emerging 
countries (Figure 3.4, panel 5)51. 
                                                 
49
 Wälti (2012) previously applied this same approach to the GDP deviation cycles of 56 countries, 
covering the period from 1980 to 2008. Despite the different sets of countries and data, Wälti came 
to the same conclusions as presented above. However, due to the lower temporal extension of his 
sample period, he was unable to observe the temporary jump of the indicator in 2009. 
50
 The results of each single emerging economy are available on request to the author. 
51
 The same conclusions were got when the deviation cycle, instead of the growth cycle, was used 
(namely the same definition of economic cycle used by Wälti (2012). See the appendix C for these 
results.  
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In general, the results suggest that insofar as the degree of correlation between 
EEs and AEs may be determined by the decoupling phenomenon, there isn’t any clear 
and prevalent evidence of decoupling. Unfortunately we cannot know whether the 
reduction (or increase) in the correlation is due to the fact that over the course of time EEs 
and EAs have become interlinked to a greater (or lesser) extent, or whether it is due to a 
change in the nature of economic shocks which have become more (or less) global than 
before52. Regardless of the fundamental economic ties linking the various countries, it 
could be that during a period characterized by global shocks, the correlation among 
economic cycles is greater than it is in a period characterized by local shocks, as a global 
shock acts by rendering the economic cycles of different countries more similar. 
Therefore, for the purposes of our investigation on the decoupling phenomenon, the 
information offered by the Euclidean distance indicator is not so accurate since the 
indicator does not allow to distinguish between the effect due to the historical evolution 
of the actual economic ties among countries and the effect due to the historical evolution 
in the nature of the shocks.  The Euclidean distance, although useful, can only provide 
certain rough indications, and so it is important to go more in deep in the empirical 
investigation through analysis enabling us to measure the influence of the AEs on the EEs 
and to measure how this influence has changed over the course of time. I have tried to do 
so by means of the simulation experiments presented in the following section. 
2.3 Responses of EEs to adverse scenarios in AEs: have they changed over time? 
In this Section a time-varying Panel VAR model with factorization of 
coefficients, of the type developed in Canova and Ciccarelli (2009) and Canova et al. 
(2007), was applied to decompose GDP fluctuations into global, regional, group and 
country specific components and to quantify how the  responses of EEs to adverse 
scenarios in AEs have changed over time. 
2.3.1 Econometric model 
The empirical model employed has the following form 
} = ∑ v,nK-n~n +  + X 																																																																																												  
                                                 
52
 For more details on this point see the sub-section 5.3 in chapter 1.  
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where " = 1,… , are countries; * = 1,… , 
 are variables for each country;  = 1,… , 8 
is time;  is the number of lags; }t is the variable * of country " at time ; } is a 
column vector 
 × 1, } = } , … , }+′; K = 	}′, … , }′′ is a column vector with 
dimension 
 × 1; v,n is the matrix of coefficients with dimension 
 × 
 for M = 1,… , ;  is a vector 
 × 1 of constant terms for the country ", and the vector of 
errors X has dimension 
 × 1.  
The system of equations can be written as follows: 
K = ∑ ,nK-n~n + c + x 					x~	0, Ω																																																												3.1  
where ,n is an 
 ×
 matrix which contains the v,n matrices as follows ,n =
v,n..v,n; c = 	′, … , ′

 is 
 × 1 vector; and x is a column vector 
 × 1 of 
random disturbances, namely x = 	X′, … , X′′, for which a normal distribution is 
assumed. 
The system of equations 	3.1 displays some peculiarities that add realism to the 
empirical model and make it ideal for the purposes of this article. First, the coefficients 
are allowed to vary over time; time variations are really appropriate to examine the 
evolution of the economic cycles and to study the decoupling phenomenon. Second, 
whenever the 
 × 
 matrix ,n is not diagonal for some L, cross-unit lagged 
interdependencies matter; thus, dynamic feedbacks across countries are possible. This 
characteristic greatly expands the types of interactions that the empirical model can 
account for and increases the realism of the experiment in terms of evaluating the 
responses of EEs to adverse scenarios that affect AEs. Third, dynamic relationships are 
allowed to be country-specific. This feature reduces eventual heterogeneity biases, and it 
allows for the evaluation of similarities and differences across regions or countries. 
However, this appreciable characteristic of the model have a cost. To illustrate 
this cost, the system of equations 	3.1 can be rewritten as follows: 
K = E + x 																																																																																																															3.2  
where  = `+ ⊗; 	 = K-′ , K-′ , … , K-~′ , 1, `+ is the identity matrix 
 × 
 
and the symbol ⊗ stands for the Kronegher product; E is the column vector of 
parameters at time , namely E = 	E , … , E ′ and, for " = 1,… ,, E is 
	
 +
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1 × 1 vector containing stacked the 
 rows of the matrix v = v,, … , v,~,  whose 
dimension is 
 × 	
 + 1.   
2.3.2 Factorization of the coefficient vector E 
Without restrictions, at each time  and for each equation, V = 
 + 1 
parameters must be estimated. The number of equations is 
; thus, at each time , 
V 
parameters (the dimension of the column vector	E) must be estimated. Thus, without 
restrictions, there is an overparameterization problem. To solve this problem, one could 
assume that δ does not depend on the unit (country) or that there are no 
interdependencies across each unit53. However, neither of these assumptions is attractive 
for the purposes of this paper, because country-specific time-varying parameters are 
essential for evaluating the evolution of economic cycle interrelations across regions and 
across countries over time. 
A more appealing solution of the over-parameterization problem is to factorize 
the vector of parameters E54, as proposed by Canova and Ciccarelli (2009). The vector E 
is expressed as a linear combination of a new set of parameters z, which is a vector 
whose dimension is strictly lower than the dimension of E v"	z ≪ v"	E: 
E = Ξz +  					~	0, 																																																																																							3.3  
In eq. (3.3),  is the vector of residuals;  is assumed to be   = Σ⨂; and 	Σ = Ω as is 
standard in related literature55 (see Kadiyala and Karlsson 1997). Given that the factors 
have similar units, a spherical assumption is adopted on , namely  = @`o where `o is 
the identity matrix V × V and @ is a constant parameter. Finally, Ξ = 	Ξ, … , Ξ and 
each Ξh, for R = 1,… , U, is a matrix of dimension 
V × v"h; z = 	z′, … , z′′ 
and each zh, for R = 1,… , U, is a column vector with dimension v"h × 1, and so z is a 
column vector whose dimension is ∑ v"hh × 1. 
For example, the following specification could be defined: Ξz = Ξz +Ξz + Ξz, where Ξ, Ξ, and Ξ are loading matrices of dimension V × 1, V ×*, and V × , respectively; the scalar z captures movements in the coefficient vector 
                                                 
53
 These two options have been adopted in the literature (e.g., see Holts Eakin et al. (1988) and 
Binder et al. (2000)).  
54
 See Canova and Ciccarelli (2009) for more details on the factorization of coefficients and its 
economic interpretation. 
55
 This assumption allows considerable simplification in the calculus of the posterior density 
functions of parameters. 
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E that are common across all countries; the vector z, whose dimension is 1 × f, 
captures movements in the coefficient vector E that are common across the * 
geographical groups of countries; and the vector z, whose dimension is 1 × , captures 
movements that are specific to the  countries. In this example, at time  it is needed to 
estimate 	1 + f +  parameters while v"	E = 
V, and so 	1 + f + 	 must be 
lower than 
V to have useful factorization.   
As explained by Canova and Ciccarelli, the factorization of E is useful from both 
computational and economic points of view. From a computational perspective, by 
construction, the factorization of E reduces the number of parameters that need to be 
estimated. 
From an economic perspective, the factorization decomposes K in different 
components that have an economic interpretation. To illustrate this point, eq. 	3.3 can be 
substituted into eq. 	3.2, and given the assumption on the variance/covariance matrix  
we have (see Canova 2007, Del Negro and Schorfheide 2011, or Canova and Ciccarelli 
2013, among others): 
K = z +						~	0, @Ω																																																																															3.4  
where @ = 	1 + @, the vector of residuals is  =  + x, and the residuals in 	3.2 and 	3.3 are assumed independent. The regressors are  = Ξ, namely the 
averages of certain right-hand-side variables56 of the original VAR specification 	3.1. 
Economically, with eq. 	3.4, the vector of dependent variables K can be decomposed in, 
for example, common and country-specific cycle indices; in fact,  when for example z = 	z′, z′′ with z of dimension 1 × 1 and z of dimension 1 × , 
 ` =z is interpretable as the index of the global cycle common to all countries, and c ` = z is the vector whose elements are interpretable as the country-specific cycle 
indices. It must be noted that 
 ` and c ` are correlated because the same variables enter 
in  and , but they become uncorrelated as the number of countries  increases. 
2.3.3 Transition equation 
To estimate the model, the empirical specification must be completed with the 
transition equation57 of z, namely, the time-evolution of the vector of factors z.  
                                                 
56
 Given the equal weighting scheme used in averaging the variables of the original VAR, all data 
have been standardized. 
57
 Known as the “evolution equation” in the jargon of the state space model. 
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There are different ways in which z can change over time. For instance, 
structural breaks could be introduced into the model at certain time points. This approach 
is appropriate and effective if the interrelationship between the countries time-evolves in 
a discrete fashion. However, the introduction of structural breaks is less effective if the 
relationship between the countries follows a gradual progression over time. Under the 
latter condition, it could be more appropriate to assume coefficients can gradually change 
over time. 
In this paper, it was assumed that z evolves over time by following a random 
walk58: 
z = z- +  ,						~	0, d																																																																																			3.5                                                              
where the stochastic term  in 	3.5 is assumed to be normally distributed. The matrix 	d 	x is a block diagonal matrix, d ≡ v"s*	d, … , d, to guarantee the orthogonality 
of factors, and  is the dimension of the column vector z, namely  = ∑ v"hh .  
To summarize, the empirical model has the following state space structure59: 
K = Ξz +	 																																																																																																										3.6z = z- +  																																																																																																														3.7 
Where the residuals  and  are assumed to be independent and have the conditional 
distributions as in 	3.4 and 	3.5, respectively. 
To compute the posterior probability density functions (pdf) of the parameters of 
the empirical model it is needed to do assumption on the prior densities for 	Ω, @, d and zl. To minimize the impact of the prior choices on the posterior distribution of the 
indicators, rather loose but proper priors were specified. The discussion of their exact 
form and the values of hyperparameters are shown in Appendix D, which shows also the 
conditional posterior distributions of the model parameters and provides details on the 
numerical approach used to sample them from the conditional posterior distributions. 
                                                 
58
 It is well known that the random walk process hits any upper or lower bound with a probability 
of 1. This implication of the model is clearly undesirable. However, a random walk process is very 
commonly assumed for the transition equation in papers that use state space models (e.g., Koop 
and Korobilis, 2010, Primiceri, 2005 or Canova et al., 2007), because eq. (3.3) is thought to be in 
place for a finite period of time and not forever. 
59
 The equation for the economic variables is also known as the “observation equation” in the 
jargon of the state space model.  
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The model shown in eq. 	3.6-	3.7 has been estimated by the Bayesian methods 
because the Bayesian approach allows the sample distribution of the parameters of 
interest to be obtained even when T and N are small. 
2.3.4 Use of the model to investigate the decoupling hypothesis 
The model has been estimated with the GDP growth rates coming from the 
dataset presented in the section 2.1 of this chapter, with annual frequency and one lag in 
the explanatory variables60. Before the estimation, the GDP growth rates have been 
standardized61 to make coherent the equal weighting scheme in the system (3.6)-(3.7). 
Through the counterfactual analysis experiments, the estimated Panel VAR 
model was used to investigate how the resilience of the EEs changed over time. 
Responses of the emerging countries economic cycles to simulated adverse scenarios 
affecting the advanced countries economic cycles were quantified through CA 
experiments in different years, and the results were compared to identify any tendencies 
in the changes. 
The experiments performed in this work are the differences between two 
conditional expectations62 (see Canova and Ciccarelli 2009 for more details on this 
method). In one case, the conditional expectation is the one the model, estimated using 
the data prior to time  when the supposed shock appears63, would have obtained for the 
GDP of each country on the time horizon  +   (  = 1,2,3,… for example) based on the 
hypothesis that the actual GDP growth rates of each advanced economy in the year  of 
the simulated shock were reduced by 1.0 point64 (one-time shock). In the other case, the 
conditional expectation of GDP is the one the model would have obtained based on the 
actual GDP growth rate of each AE at time . Given the way in which the experiment has 
been designed, the shock is given by the difference between the counterfactual and the 
                                                 
60
 So the number of lags, indicated with  in the presentation of the model, is equal to 1. 
61
 Each series has been standardized by subtracting its mean and dividing by its standard deviation; 
accordingly, each series has zero mean and unit variance. 
62
 The conditional expectations are computed orthogonalizing the covariance matrix of the reduced 
form shocks, assuming that AEs block comes first; a natural choice given the patterns of trade, 
remittances and capital flows discussed in the second chapter.  
63
 Part of the experiments presented in this section have been performed also using the model 
estimated on the entire data sample (1970-2010). See the appendix F for more details. 
64 Remind that before the estimation of the model the data have been standardized. This makes 
coherent the equal weighting scheme in the system (2.6)-(2.7) and also makes easier to interpret 
the comparison across time of the results of the simulations. 
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actual GDP growth rates of the AEs, namely a negative shock of 1.0 point65. Such an 
experiment pose the question: what would have happened to the GDP dynamics in EEs if 
the GDP dynamics in AEs had been 1.0 point lower than actually were 
 Let me precise that, since the identification scheme has little economic content, it 
is not possible to give responses any structural interpretation; for example I cannot say 
whether policy matters or not, and whether the shock I consider is a technological one, 
but this exercise is still useful for the purpose of this work as it allows us to observe how 
the resilience of the EEs changed over time. 
Three different model specifications were implemented, and the model with the 
greatest support of the data66 was used to perform the CA exercises. The specifications of 
three models differed from each other in their factorizations. The model specifications 
included the global factor (i.e., the factor that was common to all countries) and the 
country-specific factors in all three models, together with the group factors (i.e., the EEs, 
the DEs, and the AEs factors) in the second model or the regional factors (i.e., factors that 
were common among countries in the same geographical region: North and Central 
America, Latin America, Europe, Asia, Middle East and North Africa [MENA], Sub-
Saharan Africa [SSA], Oceania) in the third model. 
2.3.5 Results 
The first step was to determine which of the three models was most supported by 
the data. According to the marginal likelihood calculations67, the model specification with 
the global, country-specific, and regional factors (the third model) was preferable to the 
other two models, because the log of Bayes factors were 30.2 (when the first model and 
the third one are compared) and 20.2 (when the second model and the third one are 
  
                                                 
65
 Let me note that, given that data have been standardized, in all cases I am simulating a 1.0 
standard deviation shock. It is assumed that the shock does not alter the law of motion (3.7), so the 
estimated low of motion is used to compute z[¡ over the horizon for which we are computing 
expectations. With my random walk assumption on equation (3.7), this is equivalent to freezing 
the coefficients at their end-of sample values (on this point see Canova and Ciccarelli, 2009). 
66 In Bayesian econometrics, the model j is preferred to the model j* if the ratio of the marginal 
likelihoods ¢ ℓ¤ 	; 	K¥¤v¤ ¢ ℓ∗¤∗ 	; 	K¥¤∗v¤∗¦  is greater than 1 (when the same 
probability is assigned to each model, as it is in this paper), where the function ℓ¤ 	; 	K is the 
likelihood under the model ' and ¥¤ is the prior probability density function of the parameters 
of model '; mutatis mutandis for ℓ∗¤∗ 	; 	K and ¥¤∗. For details, see Lancaster (2005), for 
example, among others. 
67
 Marginal likelihoods are computed as harmonic mean (Newton and Raftery 1994). 
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compared). On the basis of Jeffreys Guidelines68, it can be said that data gave “decisive 
support” for the model with regional factors. Although one might think that the 
specification with regional factors received the greatest support from the data because it 
allowed for more degrees of freedom, this was not the case. When the first model was 
compared against the second model, the log of Bayes factor (12.0) discriminated in 
favour of the model with fewer degrees of freedom. Table 3.2 reports the marginal 
likelihood in logarithmic terms.     
All of the results presented in the remainder of this chapter were derived from the 
model with the global, country-specific, and regional factors (the third model). 
2.3.5.1 Global and regional cycles 
Figure 3.5 displays the median (black line) and the posterior credible interval 
(16th and the 84th percentiles, blue lines) of the global cycle indicator (panel 1) and the 
regional cycle indicators (from panel 2 to 8). The global cycle indicator reflected some of 
the most important economic facts of the past four decades: the positive cycle of the early 
1970s and the deep recession of the mid-1970s after the first oil price shock; the mild 
recession of the early 1990s; the 2000 recession, after the collapse of the “dot-com 
bubble”, and the subsequent recovery; and the global recession associated with the latest 
financial crisis (the worst recession since the mid-1970s), with a rebound in 2010.  
Consistent with other studies (see Backus and Crucini, 2000), fluctuations in oil 
prices seemed to be related to turning points of the global economic cycle, in fact 
significant recessions, as measured by the global cycle indicator, occurred with increases 
in the price of oil; for example, the major oil price increases of the mid-1970s was 
associated with global recessions. 
The Europe region indicator (panel 2) displayed five recessions from the early 
1970s until 2010 which were located around the official CEPR dates for the whole Euro 
area69. The synchronicity of the cyclical fluctuations in the region showed changes over 
                                                 
68
 See Greenberg (2008), pp. 35. 
69
 Recession dates: 1974Q3-1975Q1, 1981Q1-1982Q3, 1992Q1-1993Q3, 2008Q1-2009Q2. 
Table 3.2 Estimated Log marginal likelihood of models. 
Model 
Global cycle plus Country 
Specific cycles 
Global cycle plus Country 
Specific cycles plus Group 
cycles 
Global cycle plus Country 
Specific cycles plus 
Regional cycles 
Harmonic Mean -14080 -14093 -14060 
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time, in fact the dispersion was largest around the cyclical trough; namely, the posterior 
credible intervals were wider at those dates. Let us note that the most recent recession 
appeared to be deeper than the previous ones as because the median value and the 
credible set were much lower than those of the other occasions. 
The Central North America region indicator (panel 3) showed six recessions from 
the early 1970s until 2010. These recessions were located around the official NBER dates 
for the USA70, with the exception of the 1997 recession, which was actually the smallest 
recession as measured by the indicator. The recent recession and the recession in early 
1980 were the deepest in the sample period. Let us note that the synchronicity of the 
cyclical fluctuations in the region did not change over time, and the posterior credible 
intervals were quite large in the entire sample period. 
                                                 
70
 Recession dates: 1973Q-1975Q1, 1980Q1-1980Q3, 1981Q3-1982Q4, 1990Q3-1991Q1, 
2001Q1-2001Q4, 2007Q4-2009Q2. 
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The Latin America region indicator (panel 4) generally showed a persistent cycle 
with relatively long recessionary periods (e.g., the 1980-1984 period and the “W” 
recession of 1998-2002). The recent recession that started in 2008 appeared to be deep 
and almost equal to the recession of the early 1980s, and the regional cycle also showed a 
phase of significantly long expansion from 2002 to 2007. The synchronicity of the 
cyclical fluctuations in this region showed changes over time. Since 1993, the dispersion 
of the indicator has been lower (lower posterior credible intervals) than that of previous 
periods.  
The Asia region indicator (panel 5) showed that the recent recession, which was 
significantly more shallow than the strong recession of 1999, followed a strong expansion 
path during the 2002-2008 period. The economic recovery from 2002 to 2008 had just 
one previous similar period of strong economic expansion during the 1970s; instead from 
the early 1980s to the mid-1990s the economic dynamic was weaker. The synchronicity 
of the cyclical fluctuations in the Asian region did not change over time, and the posterior 
credible intervals remained relatively tight in the entire sample. 
The Ocean region indicator (panel 6) exhibited at least five recessions in the 
sample period. The last recession was less strong than the previous ones. The sample 
period can be divided in two subsamples, 1973-1992 and 1993-2010, with the economic 
cycle appeared to be more stable in the second than in the first subsample. The posterior 
credible intervals were quite large in the entire sample. 
The MENA indicator and the SSA indicator (panels 7 and 8, respectively) 
displayed numerous ups and downs, but there were no strong recessions or expansions. In 
general, for the MENA region, the posterior credible intervals were quite large in the 
entire sample, whereas for the SSA region, the credible intervals became slightly tighter 
after 1998. 
The appendix E presents the historical decomposition of fluctuations of GDP for 
each country at each point of time into their components, namely the global component, 
the regional component and the idiosyncratic component (the country specific component 
plus the residual term). 
2.3.5.2 Path of the resilience of EEs 
For each year of the sample period from 1991 to 2010, CAs were performed to 
compute the responses of EEs71 to shocks spreading from AEs. Both the immediate effect 
                                                 
71
 100,000 iterated simulations have been performed. 
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(“impact effect”), that is the effect felt at time 	 + 1 (the year after the shock), and the 
effect felt in each of the further subsequent three years, were computed. By summing the 
impact effect and that felt in the three years thereafter, we get what can be called the 
cumulated impact. Table 3.3 presents the median responses of EEs together with the 
lower and upper values (16th and the 84th percentiles, respectively) for different sub-
samples of the whole period72. 
For the sub samples 1991-2000 and 2001-2010, the median immediate responses 
of all EEs, and the median cumulated responses, have also been plotted in Figure 3.6, 
panels 1 and 2. As one can see from Figure 3.6, the resilience of EEs was higher during 
the last ten years of the period than in the preceding ten years, both when the evaluation is 
made in terms of the immediate impact and when it is made in terms of the cumulated 
impact. During the period 2001-2010, for example, the cumulated impact resulting from 
the simulation has been about 15% lower than it has been in the period 1991-2000. 
In other word, the simulated weaker economic dynamic in the AEs during the 
2001-2010 period would have had a softer negative impact on the EEs than would the 
simulated weaker dynamic in the 1991-2000 period. 
                                                 
72
 Further results are available in appendix F. 
Table 3.3 Dynamic impact of the adverse scenario in AEs on all emerging economies 
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 
Cumulated median 
impact  
  U M  L  U M  L  U M  L  U M  L  U M  L  
1991-2000 -0.05 -0.17 -0.29 -0.04 -0.09 -0.14 -0.04 -0.07 -0.12 -0.03 -0.08 -0.15 -0.16 -0.42 -0.70 
2001-2010 -0.05 -0.15 -0.25 -0.03 -0.07 -0.11 -0.02 -0.04 -0.07 -0.01 -0.05 -0.09 -0.10 -0.30 -0.52 
Subsamples                               
1991-1995 -0.08 -0.20 -0.33 -0.03 -0.08 -0.14 -0.04 -0.08 -0.12 -0.05 -0.10 -0.16 -0.20 -0.47 -0.75 
1996-2000 -0.03 -0.14 -0.25 -0.05 -0.09 -0.14 -0.03 -0.07 -0.12 -0.01 -0.06 -0.13 -0.11 -0.36 -0.64 
2001-2005 -0.03 -0.13 -0.22 -0.03 -0.07 -0.11 0.00 -0.03 -0.06 0.03 -0.03 -0.08 -0.04 -0.25 -0.47 
2006-2010 -0.06 -0.17 -0.28 -0.03 -0.07 -0.12 -0.03 -0.05 -0.09 -0.03 -0.06 -0.09 -0.14 -0.35 -0.57 
Note: M stands for median, L and U stand for lower and upper values (16th and the 84th percentiles, respectively). 
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To assess whether the above results would reflect the behavior among the 
subsamples of EEs grouped by geographical areas, the above experiments were replicated 
for the EEs at geographical levels (namely Latin American, Asian, MENA, European, 
and SSA EEs). As with the entire group of EEs, the increasing resilience of EEs to 
adverse scenarios affecting AEs was observable, although certain regional peculiarities 
emerged. In fact, during the sub-sample 2001-2010 the magnitude of the cumulated 
impacts were estimated to be lower than the impact measured in the sub-sample 1991-
2000 with percentages ranging from about 27% in Latin American EEs to 17% in SSA 
EEs for example (Figure 3.7, panels from 1 to 5, and Table 3.4). 
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The whole sample period has also been broken down into smaller, five-year sub-
samples, in order to obtain more detailed information on how the EEs’ resilience evolved 
over time. A very interesting fact emerges here. If we observe the last ten years of the 
sample period, we see that the resilience of the EEs fell rather than rose during that 
period. The immediate impact (Figure 3.8, panel 1) measured during the five-year period 
2006-2010 was 29% stronger than that measured in the previous five-year period (2001-
2005). The same conclusions are reached if the results obtained for the cumulated impacts 
are considered (Figure 3.8, panel 2). Nevertheless if we extend the timeframe we see that, 
despite the increase in the intensity of impacts during the last ten years, the effect of the 
shock simulated in the five-year period 2006-2010 was lower than the impact in the five-
year period 1991-1995 (about 15% and 25% in terms of immediate impact and cumulated 
impact, respectively). Therefore, the EEs’ resilience (vulnerability) at the end of the 
2000s is greater (smaller) than it was during the early 1990s. 
Table 3.4 Dynamic impact of the adverse scenario in AEs on EEs grouped by regions 
t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 
Cumulated median 
impact 
  U M  L  U M  L  U M  L  U M  L  U M  L  
Latin America EEs                               
1991-2000 -0.05 -0.16 -0.28 -0.04 -0.09 -0.14 -0.04 -0.07 -0.12 -0.03 -0.08 -0.14 -0.15 -0.40 -0.68 
2001-2010 -0.04 -0.14 -0.24 -0.03 -0.07 -0.11 -0.01 -0.04 -0.07 -0.01 -0.05 -0.09 -0.09 -0.29 -0.51 
Asia EEs                
1991-2000 -0.05 -0.17 -0.29 -0.04 -0.08 -0.14 -0.03 -0.07 -0.12 -0.01 -0.06 -0.12 -0.13 -0.39 -0.66 
2001-2010 -0.05 -0.15 -0.25 -0.03 -0.07 -0.11 -0.01 -0.04 -0.06 0.00 -0.04 -0.07 -0.09 -0.28 -0.50 
MENA EEs                               
1991-2000 -0.05 -0.17 -0.29 -0.03 -0.08 -0.13 -0.03 -0.07 -0.11 -0.01 -0.06 -0.12 -0.12 -0.38 -0.65 
2001-2010 -0.05 -0.15 -0.25 -0.03 -0.07 -0.11 -0.01 -0.04 -0.06 0.01 -0.03 -0.07 -0.08 -0.28 -0.49 
Europe EEs                               
1991-2000 -0.04 -0.15 -0.28 -0.03 -0.08 -0.13 -0.02 -0.06 -0.11 0.00 -0.06 -0.11 -0.09 -0.35 -0.63 
2001-2010 -0.04 -0.14 -0.24 -0.03 -0.07 -0.11 -0.01 -0.03 -0.06 0.00 -0.03 -0.07 -0.08 -0.28 -0.49 
Sub Sahara Africa EEs                               
1991-2000 -0.02 -0.14 -0.27 -0.03 -0.08 -0.14 -0.01 -0.05 -0.09 -0.01 -0.07 -0.13 -0.08 -0.35 -0.63 
2001-2010 -0.05 -0.14 -0.24 -0.03 -0.07 -0.11 -0.01 -0.03 -0.06 0.00 -0.04 -0.08 -0.09 -0.29 -0.50 
Note: M stands for median, L and U stand for lower and upper values of the credible interval, respectively (16th and the 84th percentiles). 
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3. Conclusion 
The decoupling hypothesis states that the degree of economic cycle interdependence 
between EEs and AEs has decreased in recent years. In investigating this hypothesis I 
followed two directions by studying: 1) the synchronicity of the economic cycles of EEs 
and AEs, and 2) the time path of resilience of EEs to adverse scenarios affecting AEs. 
The economic cycles of 112 countries (23 AEs, 59 EEs, and 30 DEs), covering more than 
90% of the world's GDP (at PPP) and more than 85% of the world’s population, were 
studied by two different tools for the empirical investigation: the Euclidean distance (for 
point 1) and the time-varying Panel VAR model (for point 2).  
The Euclidean distance revealed how the synchronicity of economic cycles 
between EEs and AEs has changed over time, both when considering all of the EEs 
together and when considering them from a regional perspective. In general, the 
correlation between the economic cycles of EEs and AEs increased from the latter half of 
the 1970s up to the early 2000s, and it was not until the latter half of the 2000s that signs 
began to emerge of a possible inversion in this trend. This result was consistent with the 
regional figures, although some regional peculiarities emerged. A very significant 
increase of synchronicity was observed in, for example, Latin American or MENA EEs, 
whereas an almost-flat path was observed for the European EEs. However, in no case was 
there a prevailing downward path of synchronicity between the economic cycles of EEs 
and AEs. These results suggest that, insofar as the degree of correlation between EEs and 
AEs may be determined by the decoupling phenomenon, there is no clear evidence of 
decoupling. However the point is that the result of the Euclidean distance may be caused 
not only by the degree of connection achieved between EEs and EAs, but also by any 
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change in the nature of economic shocks over the course of time, as they may have 
become more or less global in character; so it was crucial to examine the decoupling 
hypothesis by attempting to measure how the influence of AEs on EEs has changed over 
time (the point 2 above), by means of simulation experiments. 
The time-varying Panel VAR model with the factorization of coefficients and 
unit-specific dynamic and cross-country interdependences was used to estimate how the 
resilience of EEs to external shocks (i.e., adverse scenarios that affect AEs) has changed 
over time, and to break up the national economic cycle of each country into different 
components. The specification with the regional factors got a greater support by date then 
the specification with the group factors, and the results of the counterfactual analyses 
showed that, despite the fact that during the last ten years EEs became less resilient to 
external shocks, their degree of resilience is currently still higher than it was in the early 
1990s. 
Across what is a rather lengthy period of time, the connection between EEs and 
AEs has changed, with the former now more resilient to adverse scenarios that may arise 
in the latter. This result lends support to the decoupling hypothesis, however it is equally 
clear that the decoupling process is a rather complex one, and does not develop in a 
gradual, constant manner, but tends to evolve in “alternate phases”, with certain phases of 
greater resilience followed by other periods of diminished resilience, and vice versa. Until 
now, this discontinuity has been scarcely documented or discussed in the literature, but is 
a question deserving of greater consideration and more detailed analysis. 
This general result, although with some peculiarities, was confirmed by the 
results of the empirical analysis conducted from a geographical perspective, namely, by 
grouping EEs by geographical area. Regional characteristics mattered, and need to be 
explored in depth; this fact was also confirmed by the marginal likelihood calculations, as 
the data gave decisive support to the model specification that broke up each national 
economic cycle into global, country-specific components, and regional components too. 
It is widely believed that credit plays a crucial role in the economic dynamics, 
and in the spread of shocks across countries. Over the past 30 years, the globalization of 
the banking sector, the increase in cross-border ownership of assets, and the rapid 
development in financial engineering have together increased the inter-dependency of 
banking and credit markets across country borders. Given the importance of financial 
variables, it may be interesting to extend the work discussed in this chapter by adding the 
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credit variables in order to evaluate the decoupling phenomenon within the framework of 
international spillovers in macro-credit linkages; the next chapter will explore this point. 
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Appendix A. Set of Countries 
 
Table A.1 Countries. 
Advanced Economies   Emerging Economies       Developing Economies 
Australiag   Albaniad   Jamaicab   Bangladeshc 
Austriad   Antiguab   Jordaniae   Belizea 
Belgiumd   Argentinab   Korea Repc   Beninf 
Canadaa   Bahamasb   Lebanone   Boliviab 
Denmarkd   Bahraine   Macaoc   Burkina Fasof 
Finlandiad   Barbadosb   Malaysiac   Burundif 
Franced   Bermudab   Mauritiusf   Cameroonf 
Germanyd   Botswanaf   Mexicob   Congo Repf 
Greeced   Brazilb   Moroccoe   Cote d'Ivoiref 
Icelandd   Bulgariad   Omanc   Ethiopiaf 
Irelandd   Chileb   Pakistane   Fijig 
Italyd   China region 1c   Panamab   Gambiaf 
Japanc   China region 2c   Paraguayb   Ghanaf 
Luxembourgd   Colombiab   Perùb   Guineaf 
Netherlandsd   Costa Ricab   Philippinesc   Hondurasb 
New Zealandg   Dominicab   Polandd   Keniaf 
Norwayd   Dominican Repb   Romaniad   Madagascarf 
Portugald   Ecuadorb   Singaporec   Malawif 
Spaind   Egypte   South Africaf   Malif 
Swedend   El Salvadorb   Sri Lankac   Mauritianae 
Switzerlandd   Gabonf   St. Kitss & Nevisb   Nepalc 
United Kingdomd   Grenadab   St. Luciab   Nicaraguab 
United Statesa   Guatemalab   St. Vincent & Granadineb   Nigeriaf 
   Hong Kongc   Syriae   Rwandaf 
   Hungaryd   Thailandc   Sierra Leonef 
   Indiac   Trinidad & Tobagob   Swazilandf 
   Indonesiac   Tunisiae   Tanzaniaf 
   Irane   Turkeyd   Vietnamc 
    Israele   Uruguayb   Zambiaf 
        Venezuelab   Zimbabwef 
Notes: a) Central North America; b) Latin America; c) Asia; d) Europe; e) Middle East and North Africa; f) Sub-Saharan Africa; 
g) Oceania. According to the procedure in Pritchett (2000), AEs are primarily by their pre-1990 membership in the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development. All other economies are classified as EEs or DEs. The DEs are defined as those that 
are currently eligible for concessional IMF loans. Remaining countries are classified as EEs. This classification scheme implies 
that some economies currently classified as AEs by the WEO (2012) are classified as EEs in this article. In line with Abdul Abiad 
et al. (2012), this classification is appropriate, as those countries have likely acted more like EEs than AEs over the past 40 years. 
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Appendix B. Main descriptive statistics 
 
 
Statistics on Series Albania Statistics on Series Malaysia
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 40 Skipped/Missing 1 Observations 41
Sample Mean 2.379 Variance 53.893 Sample Mean 4.615 Variance 27.183
Standard Error 7.341 of Sample Mean 1.161 Standard Error 5.214 of Sample Mean 0.814
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 2.050 Signif Level 0.047 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 5.668 Signif Level 0.000
Skewness -1.765 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000 Skewness -0.286 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.472
Kurtosis (excess) 6.197 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) 2.995 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000
Jarque-Bera 84.783 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 15.879 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000
Statistics on Series Antigua Statistics on Series Mali
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 40 Skipped/Missing 1 Observations 41
Sample Mean 3.082 Variance 35.842 Sample Mean 2.214 Variance 32.680
Standard Error 5.987 of Sample Mean 0.947 Standard Error 5.717 of Sample Mean 0.893
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 3.256 Signif Level 0.002 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 2.480 Signif Level 0.017
Skewness -0.134 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.739 Skewness 0.163 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.682
Kurtosis (excess) 0.182 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.830 Kurtosis (excess) 0.270 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.747
Jarque-Bera 0.175 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.916 Jarque-Bera 0.305 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.858
Statistics on Series Argentina Statistics on Series Mauritiana
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 41 Observations 41
Sample Mean 1.338 Variance 22.711 Sample Mean 1.234 Variance 50.786
Standard Error 4.766 of Sample Mean 0.744 Standard Error 7.126 of Sample Mean 10.113
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 1.798 Signif Level 0.080 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 1.109 Signif Level 0.274
Skewness -0.499 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.209 Skewness 0.447 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.260
Kurtosis (excess) -0.686 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.411 Kurtosis (excess) 1.077 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.197
Jarque-Bera 2.504 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.286 Jarque-Bera 3.347 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.188
Statistics on Series Australia Statistics on Series Mauritius
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 41 Observations 41
Sample Mean 1.759 Variance 5.836 Sample Mean 4.073 Variance 30.293
Standard Error 2.416 of Sample Mean 0.377 Standard Error 5.504 of Sample Mean 0.860
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 4.662 Signif Level 0.000 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 4.738 Signif Level 0.000
Skewness -3.335 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000 Skewness -0.390 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.326
Kurtosis (excess) 15.099 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) 4.635 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000
Jarque-Bera 465.470 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 37.737 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000
Statistics on Series Austria Statistics on Series India
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 41 Observations 41
Sample Mean 2.398 Variance 5.028 Sample Mean 3.403 Variance 10.637
Standard Error 2.242 of Sample Mean 0.350 Standard Error 3.261 of Sample Mean 0.509
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 6.847 Signif Level 0.000 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 6.681 Signif Level 0.000
Skewness -0.103 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.796 Skewness -0.049 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.902
Kurtosis (excess) 1.640 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.050 Kurtosis (excess) -0.200 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.811
Jarque-Bera 4.665 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.097 Jarque-Bera 0.085 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.959
Statistics on Series Bahamas Statistics on Series Indonesia
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 40 Skipped/Missing 1 Observations 41
Sample Mean 0.902 Variance 42.450 Sample Mean 4.200 Variance 15.6405
Standard Error 6.515 of Sample Mean 1.030 Standard Error 3.955 of Sample Mean 0.618
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 0.876 Signif Level 0.387 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 6.800 Signif Level 0.000
Skewness -0.739 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.066 Skewness -2.560 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000
Kurtosis (excess) 1.820 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.032 Kurtosis (excess) 11.905 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000
Jarque-Bera 9.158 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.010 Jarque-Bera 286.913 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000
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Statistics on Series Bahrain Statistics on Series Iran
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 40 Skipped/Missing 1 Observations 41
Sample Mean 0.484 Variance 69.943 Sample Mean 0.981 Variance 75.700
Standard Error 8.363 of Sample Mean 1.322 Standard Error 8.701 of Sample Mean 1.359
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 0.366 Signif Level 0.716 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 0.722 Signif Level 0.474
Skewness 0.248 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.538 Skewness -0.471 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.235
Kurtosis (excess) 5.324 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) -0.143 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.864
Jarque-Bera 47.652 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 1.552 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.460
Statistics on Series Bangladesh Statistics on Series Ireland
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 41 Observations 41
Sample Mean 1.709 Variance 13.978 Sample Mean 2.995 Variance 20.569
Standard Error 3.739 of Sample Mean 0.584 Standard Error 4.535 of Sample Mean 0.708
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 2.928 Signif Level 0.006 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 4.228 Signif Level 0.000
Skewness -1.589 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000 Skewness -0.565 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.155
Kurtosis (excess) 3.981 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) 0.788 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.345
Jarque-Bera 44.343 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 3.245 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.197
Statistics on Series Barbados Statistics on Series Israel
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 41 Observations 41
Sample Mean 0.473 Variance 25.000 Sample Mean 2.016 Variance 9.125
Standard Error 5.000 of Sample Mean 0.781 Standard Error 3.021 of Sample Mean 0.472
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 0.605 Signif Level 0.549 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 4.273 Signif Level 0.000
Skewness -0.191 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.630 Skewness -0.213 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.592
Kurtosis (excess) 0.143 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.864 Kurtosis (excess) -0.426 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.610
Jarque-Bera 0.284 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.867 Jarque-Bera 0.620 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.734
Statistics on Series Belgium Statistics on Series Italy
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 41 Observations 41
Sample Mean 2.189 Variance 5.340 Sample Mean 1.844 Variance 7.005
Standard Error 2.311 of Sample Mean 0.361 Standard Error 2.647 of Sample Mean 0.413
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 6.065 Signif Level 0.000 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 4.462 Signif Level 0.000
Skewness -0.407 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.305 Skewness -0.661 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.096
Kurtosis (excess) 0.518 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.535 Kurtosis (excess) 1.873 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.025
Jarque-Bera 1.592 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.451 Jarque-Bera 8.975 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.011
Statistics on Series Canada Statistics on Series Jamaica
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 41 Observations 41
Sample Mean 1.870 Variance 5.485 Sample Mean 0.376 Variance 15.594
Standard Error 2.342 of Sample Mean 0.366 Standard Error 3.949 of Sample Mean 0.617
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 5.112 Signif Level 0.000 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 0.610 Signif Level 0.545
Skewness -1.045 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.008 Skewness 0.995 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.012
Kurtosis (excess) 1.352 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.105 Kurtosis (excess) 1.660 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.047
Jarque-Bera 10.589 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.005 Jarque-Bera 11.474 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.003
Statistics on Series Chile Statistics on Series Japan
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 41 Observations 41
Sample Mean 2.750 Variance 36.457 Sample Mean 2.309 Variance 9.036
Standard Error 6.038 of Sample Mean 0.943 Standard Error 3.006 of Sample Mean 0.469
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 2.917 Signif Level 0.006 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 4.919 Signif Level 0.000
Skewness -1.813 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000 Skewness -0.401 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.312
Kurtosis (excess) 3.978 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) 1.775 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.034
Jarque-Bera 49.479 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 6.480 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.039
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Statistics on Series China ver1 Statistics on Series Jordania
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 41 Observations 41
Sample Mean 7.966 Variance 22.679 Sample Mean 1.110 Variance 50.281
Standard Error 4.762 of Sample Mean 0.744 Standard Error 7.091 of Sample Mean 1.107
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 10.711 Signif Level 0.000 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 1.002 Signif Level 0.322
Skewness 0.376 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.344 Skewness -0.333 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.402
Kurtosis (excess) 2.951 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) 0.516 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.537
Jarque-Bera 15.848 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 1.213 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.545
Statistics on Series China ver2 Statistics on Series Kenia
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 41 Observations 41
Sample Mean 5.991 Variance 16.558 Sample Mean 0.299 Variance 13.311
Standard Error 4.069 of Sample Mean 0.635 Standard Error 3.648 of Sample Mean 0.570
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 9.428 Signif Level 0.000 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 0.525 Signif Level 0.603
Skewness -0.394 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.321 Skewness -0.234 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.556
Kurtosis (excess) 0.022 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.979 Kurtosis (excess) 0.393 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.638
Jarque-Bera 1.064 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.587 Jarque-Bera 0.636 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.728
Statistics on Series Colombia Statistics on Series Mexico
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 41 Observations 41
Sample Mean 1.903 Variance 5.840 Sample Mean 1.533 Variance 17.971
Standard Error 2.417 of Sample Mean 0.377 Standard Error 4.239 of Sample Mean 0.662
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 5.043 Signif Level 0.000 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 2.316 Signif Level 0.026
Skewness -1.080 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.007 Skewness -1.211 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.002
Kurtosis (excess) 2.638 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.002 Kurtosis (excess) 1.222 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.143
Jarque-Bera 19.849 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 12.569 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.002
Statistics on Series Congo Rep Statistics on Series Morocco
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 41 Observations 41
Sample Mean 1.706 Variance 59.122 Sample Mean 2.427 Variance 29.770
Standard Error 7.689 of Sample Mean 10.201 Standard Error 5.456 of Sample Mean 0.852
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 1.421 Signif Level 0.163 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 2.848 Signif Level 0.007
Skewness 0.370 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.351 Skewness 0.313 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.431
Kurtosis (excess) 1.083 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.195 Kurtosis (excess) 1.272 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.128
Jarque-Bera 2.940 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.230 Jarque-Bera 3.433 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.180
Statistics on Series Costa Rica Statistics on Series Nepal
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 41 Observations 41
Sample Mean 1.625 Variance 12.323 Sample Mean 1.764 Variance 11.063
Standard Error 3.510 of Sample Mean 0.548 Standard Error 3.326 of Sample Mean 0.519
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 2.965 Signif Level 0.005 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 3.396 Signif Level 0.002
Skewness -1.441 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000 Skewness 0.092 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.816
Kurtosis (excess) 3.444 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) 0.371 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.657
Jarque-Bera 34.453 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 0.293 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.864
Statistics on Series Cote d'Ivoire Statistics on Series Netherlands
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 41 Observations 41
Sample Mean -0.043 Variance 16.852 Sample Mean 1.786 Variance 4.182
Standard Error 4.105 of Sample Mean 0.641 Standard Error 2.045 of Sample Mean 0.319
t-Statistic (Mean=0) -0.067 Signif Level 0.947 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 5.594 Signif Level 0.000
Skewness -0.225 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.571 Skewness -1.197 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.003
Kurtosis (excess) 1.800 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.031 Kurtosis (excess) 2.047 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.014
Jarque-Bera 5.883 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.053 Jarque-Bera 16.953 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000
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Statistics on Series Denmark Statistics on Series New Zealand
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 41 Observations 41
Sample Mean 1.653 Variance 6.269 Sample Mean 1.209 Variance 5.264
Standard Error 2.504 of Sample Mean 0.391 Standard Error 2.294 of Sample Mean 0.358
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 4.227 Signif Level 0.000 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 3.374 Signif Level 0.002
Skewness -0.704 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.076 Skewness -0.571 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.151
Kurtosis (excess) 2.394 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.004 Kurtosis (excess) 0.460 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.581
Jarque-Bera 13.178 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.001 Jarque-Bera 2.586 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.274
Statistics on Series Dominica Statistics on Series Nicaragua
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 40 Skipped/Missing 1 Observations 41
Sample Mean 3.575 Variance 20.874 Sample Mean -0.648 Variance 81.479
Standard Error 4.569 of Sample Mean 0.722 Standard Error 9.027 of Sample Mean 1.410
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 4.949 Signif Level 0.000 t-Statistic (Mean=0) -0.460 Signif Level 0.648
Skewness -0.774 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.054 Skewness -1.247 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.002
Kurtosis (excess) 2.801 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.001 Kurtosis (excess) 10.054 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000
Jarque-Bera 17.079 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 183.305 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000
Statistics on Series Belize Statistics on Series Nigeria
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 40 Skipped/Missing 1 Observations 41
Sample Mean 2.152 Variance 22.239 Sample Mean 0.965 Variance 61.395
Standard Error 4.716 of Sample Mean 0.746 Standard Error 7.836 of Sample Mean 10.224
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 2.886 Signif Level 0.006 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 0.788 Signif Level 0.435
Skewness 0.370 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.358 Skewness 0.392 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.324
Kurtosis (excess) -0.847 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.317 Kurtosis (excess) 0.173 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.836
Jarque-Bera 2.109 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.348 Jarque-Bera 1.099 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.577
Statistics on Series Benin Statistics on Series Norway
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 41 Observations 41
Sample Mean 0.995 Variance 31.390 Sample Mean 2.651 Variance 4.116
Standard Error 5.603 of Sample Mean 0.875 Standard Error 2.029 of Sample Mean 0.317
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 1.137 Signif Level 0.262 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 8.368 Signif Level 0.000
Skewness 1.280 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.001 Skewness -0.217 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.585
Kurtosis (excess) 5.252 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) -0.530 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.526
Jarque-Bera 58.318 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 0.800 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.670
Statistics on Series Bermuda Statistics on Series Oman
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 40 Skipped/Missing 1 Observations 40 Skipped/Missing 1
Sample Mean 1.655 Variance 20.744 Sample Mean 3.664 Variance 79.888
Standard Error 4.555 of Sample Mean 0.720 Standard Error 8.938 of Sample Mean 1.413
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 2.298 Signif Level 0.027 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 2.592 Signif Level 0.013
Skewness 1.671 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000 Skewness 0.875 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.030
Kurtosis (excess) 8.620 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) 4.085 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000
Jarque-Bera 142.451 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 32.906 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000
Statistics on Series Bolivia Statistics on Series Pakistan
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 41 Observations 41
Sample Mean 0.758 Variance 6.584 Sample Mean 2.487 Variance 7.753
Standard Error 2.566 of Sample Mean 0.401 Standard Error 2.784 of Sample Mean 0.435
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 1.890 Signif Level 0.066 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 5.720 Signif Level 0.000
Skewness -1.116 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.005 Skewness 1.612 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000
Kurtosis (excess) 1.202 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.150 Kurtosis (excess) 4.641 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000
Jarque-Bera 10.986 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.004 Jarque-Bera 54.554 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000
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Statistics on Series Botswana Statistics on Series Panama
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 41 Observations 41
Sample Mean 5.816 Variance 73.936 Sample Mean 3.073 Variance 24.964
Standard Error 8.599 of Sample Mean 1.343 Standard Error 4.996 of Sample Mean 0.780
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 4.331 Signif Level 0.000 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 3.938 Signif Level 0.000
Skewness 0.915 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.021 Skewness 0.756 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.057
Kurtosis (excess) 1.597 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.056 Kurtosis (excess) 3.148 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000
Jarque-Bera 10.077 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.006 Jarque-Bera 20.843 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000
Statistics on Series Brazil Statistics on Series Paraguay
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 41 Observations 41
Sample Mean 2.179 Variance 18.729 Sample Mean 1.823 Variance 19.274
Standard Error 4.328 of Sample Mean 0.676 Standard Error 4.390 of Sample Mean 0.686
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 3.224 Signif Level 0.003 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 2.658 Signif Level 0.011
Skewness 0.006 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.988 Skewness 0.839 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.035
Kurtosis (excess) 0.033 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.968 Kurtosis (excess) 1.335 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.110
Jarque-Bera 0.002 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.999 Jarque-Bera 7.852 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.020
Statistics on Series Bulgaria Statistics on Series Perù
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 40 Skipped/Missing 1 Observations 41
Sample Mean 3.504 Variance 22.177 Sample Mean 1.282 Variance 33.946
Standard Error 4.709 of Sample Mean 0.745 Standard Error 5.826 of Sample Mean 0.910
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 4.706 Signif Level 0.000 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 1.408 Signif Level 0.167
Skewness -1.150 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.004 Skewness -1.119 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.005
Kurtosis (excess) 0.512 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.546 Kurtosis (excess) 1.889 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.024
Jarque-Bera 9.258 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.010 Jarque-Bera 14.656 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.001
Statistics on Series Burkina Faso Statistics on Series Philippines
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 41 Observations 41
Sample Mean 1.596 Variance 24.169 Sample Mean 1.553 Variance 13.229
Standard Error 4.916 of Sample Mean 0.768 Standard Error 3.637 of Sample Mean 0.568
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 2.079 Signif Level 0.044 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 2.734 Signif Level 0.009
Skewness 1.380 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.001 Skewness -1.692 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000
Kurtosis (excess) 5.386 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) 3.891 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000
Jarque-Bera 62.576 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 45.430 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000
Statistics on Series Burundi Statistics on Series Poland
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 41 Observations 40 Skipped/Missing 1
Sample Mean 0.409 Variance 33.591 Sample Mean 2.692 Variance 20.149
Standard Error 5.796 of Sample Mean 0.905 Standard Error 4.489 of Sample Mean 0.710
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 0.452 Signif Level 0.654 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 3.793 Signif Level 0.001
Skewness 1.197 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.003 Skewness -2.045 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000
Kurtosis (excess) 5.888 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) 3.866 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000
Jarque-Bera 69.006 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 52.801 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000
Statistics on Series Cameroon Statistics on Series Portugal
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 41 Observations 41
Sample Mean 0.612 Variance 29.900 Sample Mean 2.615 Variance 18.990
Standard Error 5.468 of Sample Mean 0.854 Standard Error 4.358 of Sample Mean 0.681
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 0.716 Signif Level 0.478 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 3.842 Signif Level 0.000
Skewness 0.685 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.084 Skewness -0.682 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.086
Kurtosis (excess) 1.593 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.056 Kurtosis (excess) 2.445 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.003
Jarque-Bera 7.544 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.023 Jarque-Bera 13.387 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.001
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Statistics on Series Dominican Rep Statistics on Series Romania
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 41 Observations 41
Sample Mean 3.605 Variance 19.534 Sample Mean 3.248 Variance 39.857
Standard Error 4.420 of Sample Mean 0.690 Standard Error 6.313 of Sample Mean 0.986
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 5.223 Signif Level 0.000 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 3.294 Signif Level 0.002
Skewness -0.065 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.871 Skewness -0.585 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.141
Kurtosis (excess) -0.244 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.770 Kurtosis (excess) 0.449 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.591
Jarque-Bera 0.130 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.937 Jarque-Bera 2.682 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.262
Statistics on Series Ecuador Statistics on Series Rwanda
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 41 Observations 41
Sample Mean 2.054 Variance 20.345 Sample Mean 2.334 Variance 313.235
Standard Error 4.510 of Sample Mean 0.704 Standard Error 17.698 of Sample Mean 2.764
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 2.915 Signif Level 0.006 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 0.845 Signif Level 0.403
Skewness 0.175 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.659 Skewness 1.770 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000
Kurtosis (excess) 3.676 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) 12.402 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000
Jarque-Bera 23.294 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 284.161 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000
Statistics on Series Egypt Statistics on Series Sierra Leone
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 41 Observations 41
Sample Mean 3.685 Variance 18.164 Sample Mean 1.127 Variance 62.130
Standard Error 4.262 of Sample Mean 0.666 Standard Error 7.882 of Sample Mean 1.231
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 5.537 Signif Level 0.000 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 0.915 Signif Level 0.365
Skewness 1.297 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.001 Skewness -0.809 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.042
Kurtosis (excess) 4.080 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) 2.376 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.004
Jarque-Bera 39.941 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 14.123 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.001
Statistics on Series El Salvador Statistics on Series Singapore
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 41 Observations 41
Sample Mean 1.086 Variance 12.300 Sample Mean 5.543 Variance 23.581
Standard Error 3.507 of Sample Mean 0.548 Standard Error 4.856 of Sample Mean 0.758
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 1.983 Signif Level 0.054 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 7.309 Signif Level 0.000
Skewness -1.262 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.001 Skewness -0.714 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.072
Kurtosis (excess) 1.865 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.026 Kurtosis (excess) 0.369 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.658
Jarque-Bera 16.823 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 3.717 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.156
Statistics on Series Ethiopia Statistics on Series South Africa
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 41 Observations 41
Sample Mean 1.147 Variance 53.074 Sample Mean 1.016 Variance 7.662
Standard Error 7.285 of Sample Mean 1.138 Standard Error 2.768 of Sample Mean 0.432
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 1.008 Signif Level 0.320 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 2.350 Signif Level 0.024
Skewness 0.676 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.089 Skewness -0.413 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.298
Kurtosis (excess) 3.268 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) 0.152 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.856
Jarque-Bera 21.367 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 1.207 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.547
Statistics on Series Fiji Statistics on Series Spain
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 41 Observations 41
Sample Mean 1.536 Variance            2 25.426 Sample Mean 2.098 Variance 6.428
Standard Error 5.042 of Sample Mean 0.787 Standard Error 2.535 of Sample Mean 0.396
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 1.950 Signif Level 0.058 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 5.298 Signif Level 0.000
Skewness 0.446 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.262 Skewness -0.121 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.760
Kurtosis (excess) 0.073 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.930 Kurtosis (excess) 0.879 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.292
Jarque-Bera 1.365 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.505 Jarque-Bera 1.422 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.491
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Statistics on Series Finlandia Statistics on Series Sri Lanka
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 41 Observations 41
Sample Mean 2.412 Variance 15.224 Sample Mean 4.038 Variance 14.672
Standard Error 3.902 of Sample Mean 0.609 Standard Error 3.830 of Sample Mean 0.598
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 3.958 Signif Level 0.000 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 6.749 Signif Level 0.000
Skewness -1.481 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000 Skewness 0.868 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.029
Kurtosis (excess) 2.899 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.001 Kurtosis (excess) 2.705 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.001
Jarque-Bera 29.338 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 17.648 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000
Statistics on Series France Statistics on Series St. Kitss & Nevis
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 41 Observations 40 Skipped/Missing 1
Sample Mean 1.792 Variance 3.579 Sample Mean 4.204 Variance 21.010
Standard Error 1.892 of Sample Mean 0.295 Standard Error 4.584 of Sample Mean 0.725
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 6.067 Signif Level 0.000 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 5.800 Signif Level 0.000
Skewness -0.481 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.226 Skewness -0.856 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.033
Kurtosis (excess) 0.704 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.399 Kurtosis (excess) 1.275 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.132
Jarque-Bera 2.425 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.297 Jarque-Bera 7.594 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.022
Statistics on Series Gabon Statistics on Series St. Lucia
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 41 Observations 40 Skipped/Missing 1
Sample Mean 1.076 Variance 105.062 Sample Mean 3.150 Variance 27.932
Standard Error 10.250 of Sample Mean 1.601 Standard Error 5.285 of Sample Mean 0.836
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 0.672 Signif Level 0.505 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 3.769 Signif Level 0.001
Skewness 0.634 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.110 Skewness 0.869 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.031
Kurtosis (excess) 3.657 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) 0.738 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.384
Jarque-Bera 25.587 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 5.939 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.051
Statistics on Series Gambia Statistics on Series St. Vincent & Granadine
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 41 Observations 40 Skipped/Missing 1
Sample Mean 0.089 Variance 20.798 Sample Mean 3.297 Variance 37.786
Standard Error 4.560 of Sample Mean 0.712 Standard Error 6.147 of Sample Mean 0.972
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 0.125 Signif Level 0.901 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 3.392 Signif Level 0.002
Skewness 0.289 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.467 Skewness 0.265 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.511
Kurtosis (excess) 0.958 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.251 Kurtosis (excess) 3.337 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000
Jarque-Bera 2.140 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.343 Jarque-Bera 19.026 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000
Statistics on Series Germany Statistics on Series Swaziland
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 40 Skipped/Missing 1 Observations 40 Skipped/Missing 1
Sample Mean 1.854 Variance 4.280 Sample Mean 2.914 Variance 107.760
Standard Error 2.069 of Sample Mean 0.327 Standard Error 10.381 of Sample Mean 1.641
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 5.667 Signif Level 0.000 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 1.776 Signif Level 0.084
Skewness -1.097 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.006 Skewness 2.751 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000
Kurtosis (excess) 2.502 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.003 Kurtosis (excess) 10.093 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000
Jarque-Bera 18.446 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 220.248 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000
Statistics on Series Ghana Statistics on Series Sweden
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 41 Observations 41
Sample Mean 1.398 Variance 30.862 Sample Mean 1.555 Variance 5.622
Standard Error 5.555 of Sample Mean 0.868 Standard Error 2.371 of Sample Mean 0.370
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 1.611 Signif Level 0.115 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 4.199 Signif Level 0.000
Skewness 0.285 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.473 Skewness -0.952 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.016
Kurtosis (excess) 4.774 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) 0.667 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.425
Jarque-Bera 39.496 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 6.958 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.031
Table B1
 Continue
94 
 
 
 
 
 
Statistics on Series Greece Statistics on Series Switzerland
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 41 Observations 41
Sample Mean 2.065 Variance 14.517 Sample Mean 0.937 Variance 6.361
Standard Error 3.810 of Sample Mean 0.595 Standard Error 2.522 of Sample Mean 0.394
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 3.470 Signif Level 0.001 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 2.380 Signif Level 0.022
Skewness -0.314 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.428 Skewness -1.472 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000
Kurtosis (excess) 0.249 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.766 Kurtosis (excess) 5.414 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000
Jarque-Bera 0.781 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.677 Jarque-Bera 64.891 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000
Statistics on Series Grenada Statistics on Series Syria
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 40 Skipped/Missing 1 Observations 41
Sample Mean 4.279 Variance 36.678 Sample Mean 1.796 Variance 62.646
Standard Error 6.056 of Sample Mean 0.958 Standard Error 7.915 of Sample Mean 1.236
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 4.469 Signif Level 0.000 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 1.453 Signif Level 0.154
Skewness 0.813 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.043 Skewness -0.198 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.618
Kurtosis (excess) 3.783 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) 0.773 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.355
Jarque-Bera 28.266 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 1.288 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.525
Statistics on Series Guatemala Statistics on Series Tanzania
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 41 Observations 41
Sample Mean 1.142 Variance 6.093 Sample Mean 1.927 Variance 16.092
Standard Error 2.468 of Sample Mean 0.385 Standard Error 4.012 of Sample Mean 0.626
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 2.963 Signif Level 0.005 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 3.076 Signif Level 0.004
Skewness -0.333 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.402 Skewness -0.568 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.153
Kurtosis (excess) 0.166 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.842 Kurtosis (excess) 0.947 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.257
Jarque-Bera 0.804 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.669 Jarque-Bera 3.739 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.154
Statistics on Series Guinea Statistics on Series Thailand
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 41 Observations 41
Sample Mean 0.028 Variance 11.051 Sample Mean 4.369 Variance 18.115
Standard Error 3.324 of Sample Mean 0.519 Standard Error 4.256 of Sample Mean 0.665
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 0.054 Signif Level 0.958 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 6.573 Signif Level 0.000
Skewness -1.562 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000 Skewness -1.345 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.001
Kurtosis (excess) 5.398 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) 4.219 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000
Jarque-Bera 66.443 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 42.758 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000
Statistics on Series Honduras Statistics on Series Trinidad & Tobago
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 41 Observations 41
Sample Mean 1.094 Variance 13.516 Sample Mean 2.941 Variance 75.861
Standard Error 3.676 of Sample Mean 0.574 Standard Error 8.710 of Sample Mean 1.360
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 1.905 Signif Level 0.064 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 2.162 Signif Level 0.037
Skewness -0.400 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.313 Skewness 1.057 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.008
Kurtosis (excess) -0.038 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.964 Kurtosis (excess) 2.444 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.003
Jarque-Bera 1.098 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.577 Jarque-Bera 17.841 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000
Statistics on Series Hong Kong Statistics on Series Tunisia
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 41 Observations 41
Sample Mean 4.551 Variance 17.989 Sample Mean 2.475 Variance 19.905
Standard Error 4.241 of Sample Mean 0.662 Standard Error 4.462 of Sample Mean 0.697
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 6.870 Signif Level 0.000 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 3.552 Signif Level 0.001
Skewness -0.451 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.256 Skewness 0.945 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.017
Kurtosis (excess) 0.190 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.820 Kurtosis (excess) 4.533 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000
Jarque-Bera 1.451 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.484 Jarque-Bera 41.197 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000
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Statistics on Series Hungary Statistics on Series Turkey
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 40 Skipped/Missing 1 Observations 41
Sample Mean 1.961 Variance 11.184 Sample Mean 2.314 Variance 17.921
Standard Error 3.344 of Sample Mean 0.529 Standard Error 4.233 of Sample Mean 0.661
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 3.709 Signif Level 0.001 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 3.500 Signif Level 0.001
Skewness -1.331 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.001 Skewness -0.582 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.143
Kurtosis (excess) 3.052 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) -0.301 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.718
Jarque-Bera 27.331 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 2.471 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.291
Statistics on Series Iceland Statistics on Series United Kingdom
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 41 Observations 41
Sample Mean 1.874 Variance 35.894 Sample Mean 2.326 Variance 6.169
Standard Error 5.991 of Sample Mean 0.936 Standard Error 2.484 of Sample Mean 0.388
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 2.003 Signif Level 0.052 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 5.995 Signif Level 0.000
Skewness 0.308 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.438 Skewness -0.765 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.054
Kurtosis (excess) 1.667 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.046 Kurtosis (excess) 1.348 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.106
Jarque-Bera 5.395 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.067 Jarque-Bera 7.104 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.029
Statistics on Series Korea Rep Statistics on Series United Sattes
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 41 Observations 41
Sample Mean 5.858 Variance 20.042 Sample Mean 1.726 Variance 5.860
Standard Error 4.477 of Sample Mean 0.699 Standard Error 2.421 of Sample Mean 0.378
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 8.378 Signif Level 0.000 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 4.567 Signif Level 0.000
Skewness -1.674 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000 Skewness -0.809 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.042
Kurtosis (excess) 4.153 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) 0.774 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.354
Jarque-Bera 48.611 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 5.500 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.064
Statistics on Series Lebanon Statistics on Series Uruguay
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 40 Skipped/Missing 1 Observations 41
Sample Mean 3.341 Variance 561.261 Sample Mean 2.308 Variance 31.960
Standard Error 23.691 of Sample Mean 3.746 Standard Error 5.653 of Sample Mean 0.883
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 0.892 Signif Level 0.378 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 2.614 Signif Level 0.013
Skewness 0.127 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.753 Skewness -0.689 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.083
Kurtosis (excess) 2.279 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.007 Kurtosis (excess) 0.410 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.623
Jarque-Bera 8.761 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.013 Jarque-Bera 3.529 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.171
Statistics on Series Luxembourg Statistics on Series Venezuela
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 41 Observations 41
Sample Mean 3.030 Variance 14.392 Sample Mean 0.278 Variance 37.859
Standard Error 3.794 of Sample Mean 0.592 Standard Error 6.153 of Sample Mean 0.961
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 5.115 Signif Level 0.000 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 0.289 Signif Level 0.774
Skewness -0.892 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.025 Skewness 0.011 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.978
Kurtosis (excess) 2.160 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.010 Kurtosis (excess) -0.238 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.776
Jarque-Bera 13.406 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.001 Jarque-Bera 0.097 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.953
Statistics on Series Macao Statistics on Series Vietnam
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 40 Skipped/Missing 1 Observations 40 Skipped/Missing 1
Sample Mean 5.681 Variance 38.795 Sample Mean 4.172 Variance 11.862
Standard Error 6.229 of Sample Mean 0.985 Standard Error 3.444 of Sample Mean 0.545
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 5.768 Signif Level 0.000 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 7.661 Signif Level 0.000
Skewness 1.201 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.003 Skewness -0.642 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.111
Kurtosis (excess) 3.092 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) 0.642 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.448
Jarque-Bera 25.562 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 3.437 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.179
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Statistics on Series Madagascar Statistics on Series Zambia
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 41 Observations 41
Sample Mean -1.035 Variance 15.681 Sample Mean -0.012 Variance 71.958
Standard Error 3.960 of Sample Mean 0.618 Standard Error 8.483 of Sample Mean 1.325
t-Statistic (Mean=0) -1.673 Signif Level 0.102 t-Statistic (Mean=0) -0.009 Signif Level 0.993
Skewness -1.560 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000 Skewness 1.561 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000
Kurtosis (excess) 5.109 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) 4.819 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000
Jarque-Bera 61.215 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 56.337 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000
Statistics on Series Malawi Statistics on Series Zimbabwe
Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 0:01 To 2010:01
Observations 41 Observations 41
Sample Mean 1.098 Variance 55.239 Sample Mean 0.496 Variance 67.496
Standard Error 7.432 of Sample Mean 1.161 Standard Error 8.216 of Sample Mean 1.283
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 0.946 Signif Level 0.350 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 0.386 Signif Level 0.701
Skewness -0.559 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.159 Skewness -0.150 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.707
Kurtosis (excess) 0.332 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.691 Kurtosis (excess) -0.318 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.704
Jarque-Bera 2.325 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.313 Jarque-Bera 0.325 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.850
Table B1
 Continue
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Appendix C. Euclidean distance computed on the economic “deviation cycles” 
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Appendix D. Priors, posteriors distributions and the computational method  
 
The prior distributions proposed in this chapter are chosen according to previous 
experiences from related literature and because of their intuitiveness and convenience in 
the applications. 
Prior densities are assumed for §l = 		Ω-, d, zl, and @ is assumed to be 
known. The elements of §l are assumed to be independent. They are the parameters of the 
probability density functions of the innovations  and  and the initial state of the 
coefficients in system 	3.6-	3.7; hence, the assumption of independencies is very 
reasonable and, in fact, is a very common assumption in the related literature; therefore 
¥	zl, Ω, d = ¥	zl¥	Ω¥	d																																																																																				v1 
The matrix Ω with dimension 	
 × 
 is the variance/covariance matrix of 
the residuals x and so Ω- is the precision matrix. In Bayesian statistics, the Wishart 
distribution73, namely a probability distribution of symmetric positive-definite random 
matrix, is often used as the prior for the precision matrix, and also in this work it is 
assumed that the matrix	Ω- has the W distribution with Z degrees of freedom and scale 
matrix ¨ , namely: 
Ω-~	Z,			¨																																																																																																										v2 
The matrix d, whose dimension is  ×  where  = ∑ v"hh , is the 
variance/covariance matrix of the innovation . To guarantee orthogonality of factors, 
the matrix 	d must be block-diagonal, hence, d = v"s*	d, … , d. For R = 1,… , U each 
block 	dh, whose dimension is v"h × v"h, is assumed to be dh = ©h h`, where h` is the 
identity matrix with dimension v"h and ©h is a scalar74 which is distributed like an 
inverse gamma with shape parameter  2¦  and scale parameter ª 2¦ :   
©h~`
 2¦ , ª 2¦ 																																																																																																										v3  
The law of motion for the factors (eq. 3.5) implies that for  = 1,… , 8  z|z-, d~(z-, d), and so 
                                                 
73
 The Wishart distribution is a probability distribution of symmetric positive-definite random 
matrices, see Greenberg (2008) pag. 190. 
74
 Let me note that the block diagonality of the matrix B is preserved also a posteriori, this means 
that factors are orthogonal also a posteriori and this guarantees their a posteriori identifiability. 
99 
 
¥(z, … , z|zl, d) =«¥(z|z-, d)


 
						∝ |d|-21X­ ®− ∑ (z − z-)d-(z − z-) ¯									(v4)  
where the symbol “∝” stands for “proportional”. The prior for zl is assumed to be normal 
zl~(z̅l, /l)																																																																																																																			(v5) 
The values of the vector of hyperparameters _ = Z, ¨, ¤, ©, z̅l, /l,@ are 
selected either to produce rather loose priors (this is the case for Z, ¨, ¤, ©, /l), or 
chosen observing the data (the case for z̅l), or chosen to maximize the model in-sample 
fit of data (the case for @). 
The hyperparameter Z is set equal to 
 + 50, namely 162 (i.e., dimension of 
the squared matrix Ω plus 50) because, for the Wishart distribution to be proper, the 
degrees of freedom must be75 at least equal to the dimension of the matrix Ω. In some 
related literature (e.g., Cogley and Sargent (2003), Cogley (2003), Primiceri (2005), or 
Canova et al. (2007)), the scale matrix ¨ is chosen to be the inverse of 
variance/covariance matrix of the corresponding Ordinary Least Square estimates on a 
training sample. In this work, owing to available data, there is not a training sample and 
the scale matrix has been set equal to the identity matrix. This prior assumption means 
that the prior expected variance covariance matrix of residuals is a diagonal matrix, 
namely uncorrelated residuals between equations, and all equal elements on the diagonal; 
however, also in this case the prior probability density function on Ω allows for posterior 
non diagonal matrix, namely allows for the case of posterior correlated residuals between 
equations. The hyperparameters  and ª are set at 1 and 5, respectively. Following the 
related literature (e.g. Canova and Ciccarelli (2009)) z̅l is the Ordinary Least Squares 
estimate in the time-invariant version of the model, and the matrix /l is assumed to be 
/l = `± where `± is identity matrix whose dimension is  ×  (remind that  =
∑ v"hh ). Since the in-sample fit improves if @ goes to zero, an exact factorization of 
E is used. 
To compute the posterior distribution for § = (Ω-,, ©, … , © , jzk ) the prior 
is combined with the likelihood ℒ(§|K, … , K) which (conditional to the first  
observations before K) is proportional to: 
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ℒ(§|K, … , K) ∝ |Ω|-X­ ³−12: (K −Ξz)Ω-(K −Ξz)

 ´								(v6) 
As explained in Greenberg (2008), using the Bayes rule76, the likelihood of data 
(v6) and the prior probability density functions (v1)-(v5) the posterior distribution for § 
is proportional to: 
¥(Ω-,, ©, … , © , jzk |K, … , K) ∝ |Ω|-X­ ³−12: (K −Ξz)Ω-(K −Ξz)

 ´					 
     		× |Ω|-(µ5¶·¸¶5)1 X­ ®−  g(¨Ω-)¯ 
							×« ©-
¹[X­ ³− ª2©´

 																																		(v7) 
							× |d|-X­ ³−12: (z − z-)d-(z − z-)

 ´ 
and to compute the conditional posterior distribution of each parameter we can consider 
only the terms in the joint posterior (v7) that contain the parameter of interest. Let be 
§-º the vector § excluding the parameter º. After few algebraic passages (see Koop, 
2010) it is obtained: 
Ω-|K, … , K , §-»~(Z + 8, (¨- + ∑ (K −Ξz) (K −Ξz))-	)	(v8)  
©h|K, … , K , §-¼½~`
 A¹[∗¾¿½ , À[∑ Á½3-Á½3¶5
ÂÁ½3-Á½3¶53
 B , R = 1,… , U		(v9)  
The (v8) and (v9) have been used in the Gibbs sampling algorithm77 to draw samples of 
the parameters Ω-, ©h for R = 1,… , U; but to complete the algorithm it is needed a 
means of drawing from ¥z|K, …K , §-Á3. Canova et al. (2007) (see also Canova 2007, 
page 378) show that   
z|K, … , K , §-Á3~z̅| , /|,			 ≤ 8																																																															(v10)  
where z̅| and /| are the one-period-ahead forecasts of z and the variance/covariance 
matrix of the forecast error, respectively, calculated with the Kalman smoother as 
described in Chib and Greenberg (1995). 
                                                 
76
 From the Bayes rule (see for example Koop 2003, among others) ¥(§|K, … , K) =Ä(Å)ℒ(Å|Æ5,…,Æ2)
Ä(Æ5,…,Æ2) ∝ ℒ(§|K, … , K)¥(§). 
77
 The Gibbs sampling is an algorithm which draws sequentially the samples of parameters from 
the conditional posterior distributions (see Greenberg 2008 or Gelfand 2000 for more details on 
the Gibbs sampling). 
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The posterior density functions (v8) − (v10) have been used for sampling in the 
Gibbs sampling algorithm, as follows: 
1. Initiate the algorithm by choosing ©hl = 0.01 for R = 1,…U 
2. At the first iteration, draw 
z() = (z, z, … , z) with the Kalman smoother as in Chib Greenberg (1995) 
knowing ©hl for R = 1,…U 
Ω() from the conditional posterior distribution ¥Ω|K, … , K , z() 
©h() from the conditional posterior distribution ¥©h|K, … , K , z(), R =1,… , U 
3. At the gth iteration, draw 
z(t) = zt, zt, … , zt with the Kalman smoother as in Chib Greenberg (1995) 
knowing ©ht- for R = 1,…U 
Ω(t) from the conditional posterior distribution ¥Ω|K, … , K , z(t) 
©ht from the conditional posterior distribution ¥©h|K, … , K , z(t), R = 1,… , U  
until the desired number of iterations is obtained. Once the posterior distribution of z is 
available it can be constructed the posterior distribution of the indicators; for example, the 
posterior mean of the indicator 
 ` can be approximated by (1 Ç⁄ )∑ ztÇt  , where Ç 
is the number of draws, and a credible 68% interval can be obtained by ordering the 
draws of zt  and taking the 16th and the 84th percentiles of the distribution. 
The convergence of the sampler to the posterior distribution has been checked by 
increasing the length of the chain. The results presented in this chapter are based on 
100,000 runs of 200 elements drawn 500 times, and the last observation of the final 450 
times is used for inference. 
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Appendix E. Historical decomposition of GDP fluctuations 
The figure E.1 plots the historical fluctuations of GDP, the global component, the 
regional component and the idiosyncratic component (namely the country specific 
component and the residual term). 
Fig. E.1 Historical decomposition of GDP fluctuations
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Appendix F. Additional results 
This appendix proposes additional results obtained with counter factual 
experiments which, differently from those one presented in sub-section 2.3.5.2, have been 
performed on the model estimated on the entire data sample (1970-2010). Using the full 
set of data, instead of on the data until the time of the simulated shock, allows to consider 
a richer set of information in the estimation procedure. 
The main advantage of using the model estimated on the full set of information is 
that the CAs can be performed also for the first years of the sample period because also 
the parameters estimated at the beginning of the sample period are based on a rich set of 
information; and so I believe that also this exercise, which is in some way in the same 
logic of the ex-post forecast econometric exercises often presented in the empirical 
literature, could confirm and make robust the results discussed in subsection 2.3.5.2 of 
chapter 2. 
Both the immediate impact and the cumulated impact have been computed on the 
sample period from 1981-2010. 
Table F.1 presents the median responses of EEs together with the lower and 
upper values of the credible intervals (16th and 84th percentiles, respectively) for different 
sub-samples. 
The resilience of EEs (see also Figure F.1) was higher during the last fifteen 
years of the sample period than in the preceding fifteen, both when the evaluation is made 
in terms of the immediate impact and when it is made in terms of the cumulated impact. 
During the period 1996-2010, for example, the cumulated impact was about 15% lower 
Table F.1 Dynamic impact of the adverse scenario in AEs on EEs; additional results 
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 
Cumulated median 
impact  
  U M  L  U M  L  U M  L  U M  L   U M   L 
1981-1995 -0.037 -0.134 -0.235 -0.005 -0.050 -0.098 -0.035 -0.074 -0.117 -0.066 -0.136 -0.212 -0.143 -0.394 -0.663 
1996-2010 -0.036 -0.127 -0.222 -0.007 -0.044 -0.088 -0.001 -0.039 -0.082 -0.065 -0.122 -0.187 -0.108 -0.333 -0.580 
Subsamples                               
1981-1985 -0.047 -0.154 -0.262 0.003 -0.046 -0.099 -0.048 -0.091 -0.138 -0.062 -0.140 -0.226 -0.153 -0.431 -0.725 
1986-1990 -0.010 -0.096 -0.184 -0.022 -0.060 -0.103 -0.016 -0.056 -0.099 -0.068 -0.129 -0.193 -0.117 -0.341 -0.579 
1991-1995 -0.067 -0.168 -0.276 0.010 -0.037 -0.088 -0.037 -0.072 -0.110 -0.068 -0.137 -0.217 -0.162 -0.413 -0.690 
1996-2000 -0.018 -0.105 -0.193 -0.011 -0.046 -0.088 0.006 -0.030 -0.071 -0.065 -0.123 -0.186 -0.088 -0.304 -0.539 
2001-2005 -0.054 -0.151 -0.253 0.000 -0.040 -0.085 -0.004 -0.044 -0.091 -0.061 -0.119 -0.182 -0.118 -0.353 -0.612 
2006-2010 -0.036 -0.170 -0.281 -0.007 -0.037 -0.088 -0.001 -0.055 -0.105 -0.065 -0.131 -0.209 -0.108 -0.393 -0.683 
Note: M stands for median, L and U stand for lower and upper values of the credible interval, respectively (16th and the 84th percentiles). 
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than in the period 1981-1995. 
So the simulated weaker economic dynamic in the AEs during the 1996-2010 
period would have had a softer negative impact on the EEs than would the simulated 
weaker dynamic in the 1981-1995 period. 
Let us break down the whole sample period in smaller sub-samples (five-years). 
If we observe the last fifteen years of the sample period, we see that the resilience of the 
EEs fell rather than rose. The immediate impact (also shown in Figure F.2, panel 1) 
measured during the five-year period 2006-2010 was up 12% from that measured in the 
five-year period 2001-2005, and in turn the latter was 40% higher than that measured 
during the previous five-year period 1996-2000. The same conclusions are reached if the 
results obtained for the cumulated impacts are considered (Figure F.2, panel 2). 
Nevertheless if we extend the timeframe we see that, despite the increase in the intensity 
of impacts during the last fifteen years (1996-2010), the cumulated effect of the shock 
simulated in the five-year period 2006-2010 was approximately 9% lower than that 
simulated in the five-year period 1981-1985. Therefore, the EEs’ resilience at the end of 
the 2000s is greater than it was during the early 1980s. 
The above results broadly confirm the conclusion exposed in the sub-section 
2.3.5.2 in this chapter. 
  
 
 
-0.25
-0.20
-0.15
-0.10
-0.05
0.00
1981-95 1996-10
 
-0.70
-0.60
-0.50
-0.40
-0.30
-0.20
-0.10
0.00
1981-95 1996-10
1. Immediate impact 2. Cumulated impact 
Fig. F.1 Impact (median, 16th - 84th percentiles) on EEs of shocks spreading from the AEs; additional results  
 
 
-0.30
-0.25
-0.20
-0.15
-0.10
-0.05
0.00
1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-00 2001-05 2006-10
 
-0.80
-0.70
-0.60
-0.50
-0.40
-0.30
-0.20
-0.10
0.00
1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-00 2001-05 2006-10
1. Immediate impact 2. Cumulated impact 
Fig. F.2 Impact (median, 16th - 84th percentiles) on EEs of shocks spreading from the AEs; additional results 
110 
 
4. International (spillovers in) macroeconomic-credit linkages and 
the decoupling phenomenon 
1. Introduction 
This chapter extends the empirical investigation of chapter 3 by considering also 
the bank landing variable. Financial liberalization increased sharply in the globalization 
period; many structural changes took place among emerging economies and improved the 
degree of liberalization of financial systems. For example the liberalization of domestic 
banking systems and stock markets, and the removal of some restrictions on the 
acquisition of assets by foreigners (see Lane and Milesi Ferretti, 2007). 
The most part of the empirical literature on the decoupling focussed on the GDP 
growth, as it is one of the main indicator of the economic dynamic of a country, or on a 
set of indicators such as industrial production, consumption, investment, and financial 
indicators like stock exchange values for example; instead the bank landing has not been 
deeply considered though it is widely believed that credit plays a crucial role in the 
economic dynamics of countries, and in the spread of shocks across countries, see for 
example Cetorelli and Goldberg (2008, 2010). 
As in the chapter 3, in this one the empirical investigation was performed by 
using a Time Varying PANEL VAR econometric model, and following two steps. The 
first involved the implementation of three different model specifications in terms of their 
coefficients factorization. 
In the second step, the model specification best supported by the available data,  
in terms of the estimated marginal likelihood, was used to perform counterfactual 
analysis (CA) experiments and to evaluate the reaction of the GDP of EEs’ to financial 
shocks (in terms of credit shocks) coming from the AEs, in addition to the real shocks (in 
terms of GDP shocks) spreading from such countries. 
This chapter is of course closely related to the literature on decoupling but it is 
also related to the most recent studies on the international transmission of real and credit 
shocks e.g. Galesi and Sgherri (2009), Helbling, Huidrom, Kose, and Otrok (2011) or 
Devereux and Yetman (2010). Indeed that literature has largely focused on G7 and 
European economies, while little has been done to study the transmission of the AEs’ 
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shocks to emerging market economies. With this chapter I aims also to fill this gap and 
analyse the force with which shocks in the AEs spreads to the EEs; moreover it aims to 
identify those external shocks, either real or credit, to which the EEs are most vulnerable. 
One of the main conclusions of the empirical investigation performed in this 
chapter is that, over the course of the last thirty years, the EEs, despite remaining 
susceptible to the effects of any shocks spreading from the AEs, have become 
increasingly resilient to such external shocks, be they of a credit or a real nature. The 
results presented in this chapter are in line with those presented in the chapter 3. More 
specifically, the last five years of the period on question (i.e., 1996-2010) have witnessed 
the greatest resilience of the EEs. Over the course of the years, there has been a change in 
the relationship between the AEs and the EEs which lends support to the decoupling 
hypothesis; nevertheless, it need to note that the resilience of the EEs has changed over 
the course of time in a somewhat discontinuous rather than constant manner, with phases 
of greater resilience being followed by others of lesser resilience, and vice-versa. Another 
interesting result is that during almost the entire period analysed here, the EEs have been 
more vulnerable to external shocks of a credit kind than to those of a real kind; moreover, 
this greater relative vulnerability has substantially increased in recent years, reaching its 
highest ever level during the five-year period 1996-2010.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents the 
dataset used in this chapter, shortly recalls the methodology adopted, and discusses the 
results of the CA experiments; section 3 presents the conclusions of this chapter. 
2. Empirical analysis 
2.1 Countries and dataset 
The appendix G shows the list of the 78 countries used as sample, of which 17 
European countries, 3 Central and North American countries, 21 Latin American 
countries, 13 Asian countries, 9 MENA countries, 12 SSA countries and 3 Oceania 
countries. The database contains 43 EEs, 14 DEs and 21 AEs countries. The countries 
cover about 86% of the world's GDP (at PPP) and more than 79% of the world’s 
population78. As in the previous chapter, all countries of the sample have a rating at least 
                                                 
78
 Own computation on data provided by the IMF, WEO Database, April 2013. 
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“C” in the Penn World Table ranking, and have been grouped in AEs, EEs and Des 
groups according to Pritchett (2000)79. In this chapter, I used annual data on the growth 
rate of the GDP and the growth rate of the credit from 1978 to 2010 years. In particular, I 
used the annual growth rate of the real gross domestic product per head at purchasing 
power parity collected by the Penn World Table 7.180 database, and the annual growth 
rate of the domestic credit provided by the banking sector81 collected by the World 
Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank. The growth rate of credit has been 
deflated by using the GDP deflator collected by the WDI database. 
 In this chapter the dataset is slightly different with respect to the dataset used in 
the previous chapter because here I have adapted the dataset to consider also the credit 
variable, in the sense that the availability of data on the credit variable has conditioned 
                                                 
79
 As it has already said in chapter 3, the AEs were defined primarily by their pre-1990 
membership in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. All other 
economies were classified as EEs or DEs. The DEs were defined based on their current eligibility 
for concessional IMF loans. Remaining countries were classified as EEs. As a result of this 
classification scheme, some economies currently classified as AEs by the WEO (2012) of the IMF 
were classified as EEs in this article. However, according to Abdul Abiad et al. (2012), this 
categorization is appropriate because it is acceptable to think that those countries have acted more 
like EEs than AEs over the past 40 years. 
80
 Alan Heston, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 7.1, Center for 
International Comparisons of Production, Income, and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, 
Nov. 2012. 
81
 As explained in the catalog of the WDI, the domestic credit provided by the banking sector 
includes all credit to various sectors. The banking sector includes monetary authorities and deposit 
money banks, as well as other banking institutions where data are available. 
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the construction of the dataset. 
Even if the set of countries and the length of the time series is not exactly the 
same of the chapter 3, some of the main descriptive statistics of the GDP dataset in this 
chapter are very similar to the equivalent descriptive statistics of the GDP dataset in the 
previous chapter. In the entire dataset the average GDP growth rate (in per cent point) is 
1.9 with a standard deviation at 4.5, the minimum at -25.5 and the maximum at 26.6 (see 
Figure 4.1). 
 If we explore the dataset along the regional dimension (Central North 
America, Latin America, Asia, Europe, MENA, ASS, Oceania) we can see the Asian 
region to have the highest average GDP growth rate, about twice as much as the average 
of the entire dataset (see Figure 4.1); moreover, as highlighted in the Figure, the ASS and 
the MENA regions have the highest standard deviations, and the highest contraction of 
the GDP growth rate is recorded within the MENA region, while the record high is 
recorded within the Latin America area. 
Along the economic type dimension (see Figure 4.2), we have that the average 
GDP growth rate in EEs is the highest, and the standard deviations are quite similar in in 
the EEs and DEs groups and they are higher than AEs group’s standard deviation. 
From Table 4.1 it is possible to see the main stylized facts for the GDP 
fluctuations in sub-group of countries “crossing” the regional and the economic type 
Fig. 4.2
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dimensions82. Among the EEs, the Asian emerging countries have the highest average 
rate of GDP growth instead in the ASS emerging countries there is the highest standard 
deviation. Among the AEs, the Asian and European advanced economy countries have 
the highest average growth rate while the standard deviation in the European advanced 
economy is the highest. 
The credit dataset has high heterogeneity. When the entire dataset is considered, 
the average growth rate (%) of the credit variable is -8.7; the Latin America is the region 
with the worst average dynamic of the credit variable while the best one is in the Central 
North America region, see Figure 4.3. As highlighted in the Figure, along the regional 
dimension the Latin America is the region with the higher standard deviation, and the 
Central North America has the lower standard deviation. 
                                                 
82
 See appendix H, Table H1, for descriptive statistics of the GDP growth rate data for each 
country. 
Table 4.1 Main stylized facts of GDP in sub-groups of countries
Mean St. D. Min. Max. Mean St. D. Min. Max. Mean St. D. Min. Max. Mean St. D. Min. Max. Mean St. D. Min. Max. Mean St. D. Min. Max. Mean St. D. Min. Max. Mean St. D. Min. Max.
AEs 1.6 2.3 -5.5 6.6 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.9 2.7 -7.1 7.0 1.9 3.0 -13.0 12.6 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.8 1.7 -2.8 4.7 1.9 2.8 -13.0 12.6
EEs n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.9 4.8 -17.1 26.6 4.1 4.5 -14.4 17.6 2.0 4.4 -7.9 9.3 1.6 5.2 -24.8 16.5 1.0 5.5 -25.5 11.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.3 4.9 -25.5 26.6
DEs 2.2 4.9 -5.2 12.5 0.6 3.6 -7.1 7.2 2.2 3.0 -5.1 10.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.4 5.1 -16.7 23.2 0.9 4.8 -8.6 13.5 0.9 4.8 -16.7 23.2
All Types 1.8 3.4 -5.5 12.5 1.8 4.7 -17.1 26.6 3.6 4.3 -14.4 17.6 1.9 3.1 -13.0 12.6 1.6 5.2 -24.8 16.5 0.6 5.2 -25.5 23.2 1.5 3.1 -8.6 13.5 1.9 4.5 -25.5 26.6
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If we consider the economic type dimension (see Figure 4.4), we can note that in 
the AEs countries there is the strongest average growth rate of the credit, instead in the 
EEs countries the average dynamic of the credit is negative and the standard deviation in 
the group of EEs countries is very high. 
   See the Table 4.2 to see the main descriptive statistics for the credit dynamics in 
sub-group of countries “crossing” the regional and the economic type dimensions83. 
Within the EEs group, the European emerging countries have the worst average rate of 
credit dynamic, instead in the Latin America emerging countries (where the average 
dynamic of the credit is negative too) there is the highest standard deviation. Among the 
AEs, in all regions the average dynamic of the credit is positive, in particular the Asian 
advanced economy countries have the highest average growth rate; the standard deviation 
in the European advanced economy is the highest. 
                                                 
83
 See appendix H, table H2, for descriptive statistics of the credit growth rate data for each 
country. 
Table 4.2 Main stylized facts of domestic credit provided by the banking sector in sub-groups of countries
Mean St. D. Min. Max. Mean St. D. Min. Max. Mean St. D. Min. Max. Mean St. D. Min. Max. Mean St. D. Min. Max. Mean St. D. Min. Max. Mean St. D. Min. Max. Mean St. D. Min. Max.
AEs 5.8 11.1 -25.0 75.6 n.a n.a n.a n.a 8.9 14.0 -13.8 -13.8 6.3 23.4 -83.2 257.9 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 8.4 22.8 -32.1 146.8 6.6 22.1 -83.2 257.9
EEs n.a n.a n.a n.a -35.0 239.0 -304.7 178.3 6.6 22.3 -130.8 115.6 -38.6 40.0 -134.6 28.8 -10.0 91.9 -126.8 225.9 1.2 31.7 -72.9 211.5 n.a n.a n.a n.a -18.9 177.4 -304.7 225.9
DEs 9.0 12.4 -13.5 41.3 -1.7 19.8 -49.8 48.2 5.4 13.2 -33.8 53.2 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.4 44.0 -85.4 389.4 7.0 20.9 -38.7 83.8 2.7 36.7 -85.4 389.4
All Types 6.9 11.6 -25.0 75.6 -33.4 233.4 -304.7 178.3 6.6 20.6 -130.8 115.6 3.7 26.8 -134.6 257.9 -10.0 91.9 -126.8 225.9 1.4 41.2 -85.4 389.4 7.9 22.1 -38.7 146.8 -8.7 133.5 -304.7 389.4
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  Given the heterogeneity of the dataset, as in chapter 3 all the data have been 
standardized prior to estimation. This makes coherent the equal weighting scheme 
implicit in the econometric model used for the empirical investigation. 
2.2 The approach used to investigate the decoupling hypothesis 
2.2.1 The model and the CAs 
In this chapter I used the same modelling approach presented in chapter 3, 
namely a time-varying Panel VAR model with the factorization of coefficients (Canova 
and Ciccarelli, 2009), estimated on the data presented above and one lag in the 
predetermined variables. 
Three different model specifications were implemented, and the model with the 
greatest support from the data was used to perform the CA exercises. The model 
specifications included the global factor, the country-specific factors and the economic 
variable factors (namely, the GDP factor and the credit factor) in all three models, 
together with the group factors in the second model or the regional factors in the third 
model. 
Through the CA experiments, the responses of the GDP in the EEs to credit and 
real shocks (considered separately one at time) coming from the AEs were quantified for 
different sub-period, and the responses were compared to identify any changes. I 
followed the same approach explained in the paragraph 2.3.4 of the chapter 3 however, 
for the convenience of the readers, let me remind that the experiments performed in this 
work are the differences between two conditional expectations84. The first conditional 
expectation is the one the model, estimated using the data prior to time  when the 
supposed shock appears85, would have obtained for the GDP of each country on the time 
horizon  +   (  = 1,2,3 for example) based on the hypothesis that at time  for each 
advanced economy the actual growth rate of credit (when you wish to consider the credit 
shocks) or the growth rate of GDP (when you wish to consider the real shocks) were 
reduced by 1.0 point. The second conditional expectation of GDP is the one the model 
would have obtained based on the actual growth rate of credit  of each advanced economy 
at time  (when you wish to consider the credit shocks), or based on the actual growth 
                                                 
84
 The conditional expectations are computed orthogonaling the covariance matrix of the reduced 
form shocks, assuming that AEs block comes first, a natural choice given the patterns of trade, 
remittances and capital flows discussed in the first chapter.  
85
 Part of the experiments presented in this section have been performed also using the model 
estimated on the entire data sample (1978-2010); see the appendix J for the details. 
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rate of GDP  of each advanced economy at time  (when you wish to consider the real 
shocks). 
Given the way in which the experiment has been designed, in one case it has been 
simulated a credit shock which is given by the difference between the counterfactual and 
the actual credit growth rates of the AEs (namely a negative shock of 1.0 point86); in the 
other case it has been simulated a real shock which is given by the difference between the 
counterfactual and the actual GDP growth rates of the AEs (namely a negative shock of 
1.0 point). 
The results of these CA experiments did not have any structural content. For 
example, it was not possible to determine whether a certain policy had any effect, 
however this exercise is very useful to the end of this paper as it allows to observe how 
the resilience of the EEs to adverse scenarios that spread from AEs changed over time. 
2.2.2 The priors 
In this chapter, the assumptions about the functional form of the probability 
density functions of parameters are the same as those made in chapter 3 (see appendix D). 
Even the values of the hyperparameters are the same, with the exception of the 
hyperparameter Z; the value of the latter must be chosen in line with the specific 
characteristics of the model in this chapter. Z are the degrees of freedom of the matrix 
Ω-, and the matrix Ω with dimension (
 × 
) is the variance/covariance matrix of 
the residuals x in eq. (3.1) of chapter 3, so Ω- is the precision matrix. The Wishart 
distribution87 is often used as the prior for the precision matrix, however for the Wishart 
distribution to be proper the degrees of freedom must be88 at least equal to the dimension 
of the matrix Ω-, and so in this chapter the hyperparameter Z has been set equal to 
156 + 50 (i.e., dimension of the squared matrix Ω- plus 50). 
For the values of the other hyperparameters, the functional form of the 
conditional posterior distributions of parameters and the details on the sampling 
algorithm used to perform estimation in Bayesian framework see the appendix D.  
                                                 
86
 Let me note that, given that data have been standardized, in all cases I am simulating a 1.0 
standard deviation shock. As in chapter 3, it is assumed that the shocks do not affect the law of 
motion of the coefficients (equation 3.7). 
87
 The Wishart distribution is a probability distribution of symmetric positive-definite random 
matrices, see Greenberg (2008) pag. 190. 
88
 See Greenberg (2008) pag. 190.  
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2.3 Results: time path of the resilience of EEs 
In this section, counterfactual analyses have been employed to ascertain whether, 
and to what degree, the resilience of EEs’ GDP to credit and real shocks spreading from 
the AEs has changed over time. In particular, the following subsection 2.3.1 quantifies 
the effects of the credit shock spreading from the AEs, by simulating a one-point 
reduction in credit growth rate in the AEs; whereas the subsection 2.3.2 measures the 
effects on the EEs of a real external shock, by simulating a one-point reduction in the 
GDP growth rate in the AEs. It should be pointed out that the figures are standardized, 
and therefore in both cases the variable subjected to the shock witnessed a reduction in its 
own dynamic amounting to one standard deviation. Finally, the subsection 2.3.3 
compares the various ways in which financial and real shocks spread. 
First of all, the model needed to be implemented and so the first step was to 
determine which of the three models was best supported by the data. According to the 
marginal likelihood calculations89, data provided greater support to the model with the 
global factor, the variable specific factors and the country-specific factors. Table 4.3 
reports the marginal likelihood in logarithmic terms, and the appendix I presents the 
historical decomposition of fluctuations of GDP and of credit for each country at each 
point of time into their components, namely the global component, the respective variable 
component and the idiosyncratic component (the country specific component plus the 
residual term).  
All of the results presented in the remainder of this chapter were derived from the 
model with the global, the variable specific, and the country-specific factors. 
2.3.1 Spread of credit shocks from the AEs to the EEs  
 For each year in the period between 1991 and 2010, a calculation was made of 
the effect that a credit squeeze in the AEs has on the GDP of the EEs (see Table 4.4). 
                                                 
89Marginal likelihoods are computed as harmonic mean (Newton and Raftery, 1994). 
Table 4.3 Estimated Log marginal likelihood of models. 
Model 
Global cycle plus Variable 
cycles and Country 
Specific cycles 
Global cycle plus Variable 
cycles, Country Specific 
cycles and Group cycles 
Global cycle plus Variable 
cycles, Country Specific cycles 
and Regional cycles 
Harmonic Mean -2558 -3263 -5033 
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The cumulated median impact, shown in the last column of Table 4.4 and also 
graphically in Figure 4.5 panel 1, have fallen over the last twenty years; in fact, in the 
sub-period 2001-2010 they were estimated to be about 40% lower than they were over the 
previous ten years (1991-2000). 
 A more detailed inspection of the results (Figure 4.5 panel 2) puts in evidence 
that the EEs’ resilience to external credit shocks worsened from the 1991-1995 to 1996-
2000, as median impact reached its nadir in the second half of 1990s. However, thereafter 
the EEs’ resilience improved and in the period 2006-2010 the cumulated median impact 
on GDP was  lower (around 85%) than it had been during the period 1996-2000. 
In order to ascertain whether the abovementioned results also reflect evidence to 
be found at the geographical level, the EEs have been divided on the basis of their 
respective geographical areas (Latin American, Asian, MENA, and SSA), see Table 4.5. 
The force of the cumulated impact (also shown graphically in Figure 4.6, panels 1 
to 4) reveals an interesting result. Regional characteristic matter, in fact, while in Latin 
American EEs and Asian EEs the resilience has improved from 1990s to 2000s, in the 
same period for MENA EEs and SSA EEs it has worsened. 
These findings are confirmed by the additional results presented in the appendix 
J. 
Table 4.4 Dynamic impact of the  credit shock spreading from AEs to  Emerging Economies  
  
t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 
cumulated median 
impact  
  U M  L  U M  L  U M  L  U M  L  U M  L  
1991-2000 0.01 -0.04 -0.11 0.22 0.09 -0.03 -0.34 -1.03 -2.23 -0.35 -1.20 -5.88 -0.46 -2.19 -8.25 
2001-2010 0.01 -0.17 -0.38 -0.08 -0.21 -0.39 -0.25 -0.57 -1.09 -0.11 -0.35 -1.90 -0.43 -1.31 -3.76 
Subsamples 
1991-1995 0.02 -0.02 -0.07 0.08 -0.02 -0.11 0.07 -0.29 -1.03 1.14 -0.16 -2.08 1.31 -0.49 -3.29 
1996-2000 0.00 -0.07 -0.17 0.36 0.22 0.09 -1.04 -1.96 -3.20 -1.29 -5.26 -10.40 -1.96 -7.07 -13.67 
2001-2005 0.01 -0.12 -0.30 -0.14 -0.34 -0.62 -0.37 -0.80 -1.48 -0.61 -3.86 -13.38 -1.10 -5.13 -15.78 
2006-2010 -0.01 -0.23 -0.46 -0.04 -0.15 -0.27 -0.20 -0.40 -0.83 0.01 -0.16 -0.30 -0.23 -0.94 -1.87 
Note: M stands for median, L and U stand for lower and upper values (16th and the 84th percentiles, respectively). 
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Fig. 4.5 Cumulated (median, 16th and the 84th percentiles) impact of the credit shock spreading from AEs to EEs 
Table 4.5  Dynamic impact of the adverse credit scenario in AEs grouped on the basis of their geographical areas   
  
t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 
cumulated median 
impact  
  U M  L  U M  L  U M  L  U M  L  U M L 
Latin America 
1991-2000 0.01 -0.03 -0.11 0.22 0.09 -0.03 -0.25 -0.84 -2.08 -0.23 -1.19 -5.65 -0.24 -1.97 -7.88 
2001-2010 0.00 -0.18 -0.39 -0.09 -0.22 -0.41 -0.29 -0.64 -1.22 -0.14 -0.40 -2.27 -0.52 -1.45 -4.28 
Asia               
1991-2000 0.01 -0.04 -0.13 0.26 0.10 -0.02 -0.41 -1.16 -2.68 -0.10 -1.49 -7.76 -0.24 -2.60 -10.59 
2001-2010 -0.01 -0.20 -0.41 -0.13 -0.28 -0.48 -0.28 -0.60 -1.13 -0.25 -1.03 -3.70 -0.66 -2.10 -5.73 
MENA                 
1991-2000 0.01 -0.04 -0.13 0.24 0.07 -0.03 -0.45 -1.23 -2.88 5.83 1.06 -0.41 5.63 -0.14 -3.46 
2001-2010 -0.01 -0.20 -0.41 -0.12 -0.27 -0.46 -0.29 -0.60 -1.14 -0.24 -0.71 -3.40 -0.65 -1.78 -5.42 
SSA                 
1991-2000 0.00 -0.05 -0.12 0.21 0.09 0.02 -0.52 -1.16 -2.49 -0.09 -1.47 -3.92 -0.40 -2.60 -6.52 
2001-2010 -0.01 -0.22 -0.43 -0.19 -0.35 -0.56 -0.25 -0.56 -1.06 -0.31 -1.86 -4.38 -0.76 -2.99 -6.43 
Note: M stands for median, L and U stand for lower and upper values (16th and the 84th percentiles, respectively). 
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Fig. 4.6 Cumulated (median, 16th and 84th percentiles) impact of the credit shock spreading from AEs to EEs grouped by regions 
 
-6.0
-4.0
-2.0
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
1991-00 2001-10
 
-7.0
-6.0
-5.0
-4.0
-3.0
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1991-00 2001-10
3. MENA EEs 4. SSA EEs 
121 
 
2.3.2 Spread of real shocks from the AEs to the EEs 
At this point, the same type of analysis as conducted in the previous sub-section 
was carried out again, but this time rather than to simulate a credit shock, a real shock 
was taken into consideration. 
 
Table 4.6 shows the median impact for the entire group of EEs, calculated for 
different periods of time. The analysis of the immediate impact effect reveals that the 
degree of the impact on the EEs of the simulated AEs’ real shock over the last ten years 
was lower than that recorded during the previous ten years (see Figure 4.7 panel 1 and the 
relative column in Table 4.6). In order to obtain more detailed information, the entire 
sample period was broken down into five-year sub-periods, and as with the analysis of 
the credit shock, also in the case of real shock the results that emerge are rather 
interesting. The EEs’ resilience worsened from the five years 1996-2000 to the following 
five years 2001-2005, however it came back improving substantially thereafter, and in the 
sub period 2006-2010 it resulted better than all previous sub-periods (Figure 4.7, panel 2). 
 
Table 4.6 Dynamic impact of the  real shock spreading from AEs to  Emerging Economies  
  
t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 
cumulated median 
impact  
  U M  L  U M  L  U M  L  U M  L  U M  L  
1991-2000 -0.01 -0.09 -0.20 0.25 0.07 -0.08 -0.28 -1.15 -2.41 1.22 -0.93 -6.37 1.19 -2.10 -9.06 
2001-2010 0.12 -0.05 -0.29 0.01 -0.11 -0.24 0.64 0.19 0.01 -0.12 -0.44 -1.59 0.65 -0.41 -2.10 
Subsamples 
1991-1995 0.00 -0.07 -0.18 0.44 0.24 0.05 -1.74 -3.15 -5.64 -0.90 -3.34 -8.15 -2.20 -6.32 -13.92 
1996-2000 -0.02 -0.10 -0.23 0.08 -0.05 -0.22 0.29 -0.20 -0.83 0.94 -2.22 -9.60 1.30 -2.58 -10.88 
2001-2005 0.12 -0.03 -0.24 0.07 -0.07 -0.22 0.58 0.10 -0.27 -0.39 -2.95 -8.74 0.38 -2.94 -9.47 
2006-2010 0.12 -0.09 -0.32 -0.04 -0.14 -0.26 0.71 0.26 0.07 -0.07 -0.26 -0.45 0.71 -0.22 -0.96 
Note: M stands for median, L and U stand for lower and upper values (16th and the 84th percentiles, respectively). 
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Fig. 4.7 Cumulated (median, 16th and the 84th percentiles) impact of the real shock spreading from AEs to EEs 
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In geographical terms, that is, by sub-dividing the EEs into geographical areas, 
what emerges (see Figure 4.8 from panel 1 to 4) is that for all regions the magnitude of 
the cumulated impact has been lower in recent years than it was in previous years. If we 
compare the last ten years of the sample period with the previous ten years, the magnitude 
of the cumulated impact is estimated to have fallen at a rate ranging from 23% in the 
MENA EEs to about 90% in the SSA EEs (and at rates of 30% in the Latin American EEs 
and of 54% in the Asian EEs). See the appendix J for additional results. 
2.3.3 What type of external shock are EEs more sensible to? 
The emerging economies’ resilience to external shocks, be they financial or real, 
seems to have improved in more recent years compared with the initial period of 
economic globalization. Obviously, this does not mean that the emerging economies have 
become immune to the effects of any external shocks. Although with a lower degree of 
vulnerability with respect to the past, the EEs are still sensible to external shocks. At this 
point, it is natural to demand what kind of external shock – credit or real – such emerging 
economies are more sensible to. The ratios of credit shock’s impacts on the real shock’s 
impacts have been computed. Two interesting results emerge with regard to this question. 
First, starting from the second half of 1990s, the emerging economies have become more 
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vulnerable to financial shocks than to real shocks. Second, the greater relative 
vulnerability to financial shocks was particularly evident during the last five years of the 
sample period (2006-2010), when the cumulated impact of the simulated external credit 
shock was more than four times greater than the impact of the simulated external real 
shock (see Figure 4.9, panel 2), whereas during the early 2000s this multiplying factor 
was about 1.5, and it was about 2.5 at the end of 1990s. 
The greater vulnerability to credit shocks can be seen not only in the cumulated 
impact, but also in the immediate impact (see Figure 4.10, panels 1 and 2). 
3. Conclusion 
The results of the counterfactual analyses show that the resilience of EEs has 
increased over the last 30 years. In particular, the last five years of the sample period 
(2006-2010) were those during which the EEs proved more resilient to external shocks of 
both the financial and real kind. In that period, the cumulated impact of the simulated  
external credit shock on the emerging economies was 85% lower than the median 
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Fig. 4.9 Ratio of cumulated impact of credit shock on cumulated impact of real shock 
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cumulated impact calculated for the five-year period 1996-2000 (and said impact was 
around 90% lower in the case of the simulated real shocks).  
In general it appears clear that at the present moment in time, EEs are more 
resilient to adverse scenarios affecting the AEs than they have been over the past thirty 
years. This result lends support to the decoupling hypothesis endorsed in particular by the 
recent work of Kose et al. (2012). However, in line with the results discussed in the 
chapter 3, also from the results of the present chapter it arises that the degree of resilience 
of the EEs did not  grow constantly during the course of the entire sample period, but 
changed in a discontinuous manner during this thirty-year period, with certain phases of 
greater resilience followed by other periods of diminished resilience, and vice-versa.  
The empirical evidence that emerges regarding the emerging economies as a 
whole, basically reflects what is found at the regional level as well, that is, when the EEs 
are grouped together on the basis of their respective geographical areas. However some 
regional peculiarities emerge. If we compare the last ten years of the sample period with 
the previous ten years, the magnitude of the cumulated impact of the real credit shock is 
estimated to have fallen at rate ranging from 23% in the MENA EEs to 91% in SSA EEs, 
but the more evident heterogeneity among regions is observed in the case of the credit 
shock; in this case,  while in Latin American EEs and Asian EEs the resilience has 
improved from 1990s to 2000s, in that same period for MENA EEs and SSA EEs it 
worsened. 
To conclude this chapter, two further interesting results should be pointed out 
here. Starting from about the end of 1990s EEs have become more sensible to credit 
shocks than to real shocks; moreover, this greater relative vulnerability reached its peak 
in the last five years of the sample period (i.e. in the years 2006-10), when the cumulated 
impact of the simulated external credit shock was more than four times greater than the 
impact of the simulated external real shock. 
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Appendix G. Set of countries 
  
Table G.1 Countries. 
Advanced Economies   Emerging Economies       Developing Economies 
Australiag   Antiguab   Jordaniae   Bangladeshc 
Austriad   Argentinab   Korea Repc   Belizea 
Belgiumd   Bahamasb   Malaysiac   Beninf 
Canadaa   Bahraine   Mauritiusf   Burkina Fasof 
Denmarkd   Barbadosb   Mexicob   Burundif 
Finlandiad   Brazilb   Moroccoe   Cameroonf 
Franced   Chileb   Omanc   Fijig 
Germanyd   Chinac   Pakistane   Hondurasb 
Greeced   Colombiab   Panamab   Keniaf 
Icelandd   Costa Ricab   Paraguayb   Madagascarf 
Irelandd   Dominicab   Philippinesc   Malif 
Italyd   Dominican Repb   Singaporec   Nepalc 
Japanc   Ecuadorb   South Africaf   Nigeriaf 
Luxembourgd   Egypte   Sri Lankac   Swazilandf 
Netherlandsd   El Salvadorb   St. Vincent & Granadineb    
New Zealandg   Gabonf   Syriae    
Portugald   Grenadab   Thailandc    
Spaind   Guatemalab   Tunisiae    
Swedend   Indiac   Turkeyd    
United Kingdomd   Indonesiac   Uruguayb    
United Statesa   Irane   Venezuelab    
   Israele       
        
Notes: a) Central North America; b) Latin America; c) Asia; d) Europe; e) Middle East and North Africa; f) Sub-Saharan Africa; 
g) Oceania. According to the procedure in Pritchett (2000), AEs are primarily by their pre-1990 membership in the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development. All other economies are classified as EEs or DEs. The DEs are defined as those that 
are currently eligible for concessional IMF loans. Remaining countries are classified as EEs. This classification scheme implies 
that some economies currently classified as AEs by the WEO (2012) are classified as EEs in this article. In line with Abdul Abiad 
et al. (2012), this classification is appropriate, as those countries have likely acted more like EEs than AEs over the past 40 years. 
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Appendix H. Main descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
Statistics on Series Argentina Statistics on Series Iran
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 1.309 Variance 26.955 Sample Mean -0.267 Variance 59.795
Standard Error 5.192 of Sample Mean 0.904 Standard Error 7.733 of Sample Mean 1.346
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 1.449 Signif Level 0.157 t-Statistic (Mean=0) -0.198 Signif Level 0.844
Skewness -0.478 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.284 Skewness -0.837 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.061
Kurtosis (excess) -0.993 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.297 Kurtosis (excess) 0.143 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.880
Jarque-Bera 2.613 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.271 Jarque-Bera 3.883 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.144
Statistics on Series Antigua Statistics on Series Iceland
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 3.183 Variance 31.734 Sample Mean 0.817 Variance 24.597
Standard Error 5.633 of Sample Mean 0.981 Standard Error 4.960 of Sample Mean 0.863
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 3.246 Signif Level 0.003 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 0.947 Signif Level 0.351
Skewness 0.241 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.589 Skewness -0.545 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.222
Kurtosis (excess) 0.361 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.704 Kurtosis (excess) 2.010 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.035
Jarque-Bera 0.499 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.779 Jarque-Bera 7.189 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.027
Statistics on Series Australia Statistics on Series Israel
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 2.171 Variance 2.367 Sample Mean 1.815 Variance 6.285
Standard Error 1.539 of Sample Mean 0.268 Standard Error 2.507 of Sample Mean 0.436
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 8.107 Signif Level 0.000 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 4.159 Signif Level 0.000
Skewness -1.352 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.002 Skewness -0.148 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.741
Kurtosis (excess) 2.399 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.012 Kurtosis (excess) -0.483 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.612
Jarque-Bera 17.960 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 0.441 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.802
Statistics on Series Austria Statistics on Series Italy
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 1.894 Variance 3.972 Sample Mean 1.570 Variance 5.193
Standard Error 1.993 of Sample Mean 0.347 Standard Error 2.279 of Sample Mean 0.397
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 5.458 Signif Level 0.000 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 3.957 Signif Level 0.000
Skewness -0.135 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.763 Skewness -1.075 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.016
Kurtosis (excess) 4.446 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) 3.674 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000
Jarque-Bera 27.284 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 24.920 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000
Statistics on Series Burundi Statistics on Series Jordania
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean -0.783 Variance 18.447 Sample Mean 1.659 Variance 42.939
Standard Error 4.295 of Sample Mean 0.748 Standard Error 6.553 of Sample Mean 1.141
t-Statistic (Mean=0) -1.047 Signif Level 0.303 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 1.455 Signif Level 0.155
Skewness -0.897 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.045 Skewness -0.409 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.361
Kurtosis (excess) 1.980 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.037 Kurtosis (excess) 1.294 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.174
Jarque-Bera 9.814 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.007 Jarque-Bera 3.221 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.200
Statistics on Series Belgium Statistics on Series Japan
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 1.839 Variance 3.816 Sample Mean 1.941 Variance 7.136
Standard Error 1.953 of Sample Mean 0.340 Standard Error 2.671 of Sample Mean 0.465
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 5.407 Signif Level 0.000 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 4.174 Signif Level 0.000
Skewness -0.846 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.058 Skewness -1.061 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.018
Kurtosis (excess) 1.252 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.188 Kurtosis (excess) 2.926 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.002
Jarque-Bera 6.092 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.048 Jarque-Bera 17.965 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000
Table H1 Descriptive statistics of GDP growth rate (%) data for each country
127 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table H1 Continue
Statistics on Series Benin Statistics on Series Kenia
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 1.262 Variance 33.423 Sample Mean 0.566 Variance 9.764
Standard Error 5.781 of Sample Mean 1.006 Standard Error 3.125 of Sample Mean 0.544
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 1.254 Signif Level 0.219 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 1.041 Signif Level 0.306
Skewness 1.451 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.001 Skewness 0.431 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.334
Kurtosis (excess) 5.744 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) -0.013 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.989
Jarque-Bera 56.947 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 1.023 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.600
Statistics on Series Burkina Faso Statistics on Series Korea Rep
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 1.272 Variance 13.734 Sample Mean 5.596 Variance 22.706
Standard Error 3.706 of Sample Mean 0.645 Standard Error 4.765 of Sample Mean 0.829
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 1.972 Signif Level 0.057 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 6.746 Signif Level 0.000
Skewness -0.286 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.522 Skewness -1.613 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000
Kurtosis (excess) -0.132 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.889 Kurtosis (excess) 3.683 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000
Jarque-Bera 0.474 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.789 Jarque-Bera 32.969 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000
Statistics on Series Bangladesh Statistics on Series Sri Lanka
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 2.403 Variance 6.488 Sample Mean 4.218 Variance 14.560
Standard Error 2.547 of Sample Mean 0.443 Standard Error 3.816 of Sample Mean 0.664
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 5.419 Signif Level 0.000 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 6.350 Signif Level 0.000
Skewness -0.360 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.420 Skewness 1.076 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.016
Kurtosis (excess) 0.143 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.881 Kurtosis (excess) 3.673 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000
Jarque-Bera 0.743 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.690 Jarque-Bera 24.920 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000
Statistics on Series Bahrain Statistics on Series Luxembourg
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean -0.598 Variance 42.843 Sample Mean 3.324 Variance 12.303
Standard Error 6.545 of Sample Mean 1.139 Standard Error 3.508 of Sample Mean 0.611
t-Statistic (Mean=0) -0.525 Signif Level 0.603 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 5.444 Signif Level 0.000
Skewness -1.928 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000 Skewness -0.489 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.274
Kurtosis (excess) 4.909 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) 1.295 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.173
Jarque-Bera 53.575 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 3.621 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.164
Statistics on Series Bahamas Statistics on Series Morocco
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 1.820 Variance 25.798 Sample Mean 1.790 Variance 24.630
Standard Error 5.079 of Sample Mean 0.884 Standard Error 4.963 of Sample Mean 0.864
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 2.058 Signif Level 0.048 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 2.072 Signif Level 0.046
Skewness 0.353 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.430 Skewness -0.460 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.304
Kurtosis (excess) 0.740 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.437 Kurtosis (excess) -0.732 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.442
Jarque-Bera 1.437 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.488 Jarque-Bera 1.898 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.387
Statistics on Series Belize Statistics on Series Madagascar
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 2.246 Variance 24.074 Sample Mean -1.357 Variance 16.449
Standard Error 4.907 of Sample Mean 0.854 Standard Error 4.056 of Sample Mean 0.706
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 2.630 Signif Level 0.013 t-Statistic (Mean=0) -1.922 Signif Level 0.064
Skewness 0.363 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.417 Skewness -1.783 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000
Kurtosis (excess) -0.897 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.346 Kurtosis (excess) 5.389 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000
Jarque-Bera 1.829 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.401 Jarque-Bera 57.415 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000
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Statistics on Series Brazil Statistics on Series Mexico
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 1.018 Variance 13.478 Sample Mean 1.174 Variance 20.801
Standard Error 3.671 of Sample Mean 0.639 Standard Error 4.561 of Sample Mean 0.794
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 1.594 Signif Level 0.121 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 1.479 Signif Level 0.149
Skewness -0.260 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.561 Skewness -1.034 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.021
Kurtosis (excess) 0.774 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.416 Kurtosis (excess) 0.550 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.563
Jarque-Bera 1.196 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.550 Jarque-Bera 6.298 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.043
Statistics on Series Barbados Statistics on Series Mali
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 0.643 Variance 20.247 Sample Mean 1.965 Variance 25.823
Standard Error 4.500 of Sample Mean 0.783 Standard Error 5.082 of Sample Mean 0.885
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 0.821 Signif Level 0.418 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 2.221 Signif Level 0.034
Skewness -0.605 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.176 Skewness 0.157 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.726
Kurtosis (excess) 0.543 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.568 Kurtosis (excess) 0.837 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.379
Jarque-Bera 2.418 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.298 Jarque-Bera 1.099 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.577
Statistics on Series Canada Statistics on Series Mauritius
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 1.584 Variance 5.693 Sample Mean 3.385 Variance 18.448
Standard Error 2.386 of Sample Mean 0.415 Standard Error 4.295 of Sample Mean 0.748
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 3.814 Signif Level 0.001 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 4.527 Signif Level 0.000
Skewness -1.097 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.014 Skewness -2.773 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000
Kurtosis (excess) 1.173 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.218 Kurtosis (excess) 12.002 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000
Jarque-Bera 8.508 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.014 Jarque-Bera 240.360 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000
Statistics on Series China ver2 Statistics on Series Malaysia
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 6.730 Variance 12.797 Sample Mean 3.841 Variance 20.417
Standard Error 3.577 of Sample Mean 0.623 Standard Error 4.518 of Sample Mean 0.787
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 10.808 Signif Level 0.000 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 4.883 Signif Level 0.000
Skewness -0.277 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.536 Skewness -1.564 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000
Kurtosis (excess) -0.155 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.870 Kurtosis (excess) 2.428 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.011
Jarque-Bera 0.454 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.797 Jarque-Bera 21.551 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000
Statistics on Series Chile Statistics on Series Nigeria
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 3.640 Variance 27.058 Sample Mean 0.013 Variance 55.854
Standard Error 5.202 of Sample Mean 0.906 Standard Error 7.474 of Sample Mean 1.301
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 4.020 Signif Level 0.000 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 0.010 Signif Level 0.992
Skewness -2.217 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000 Skewness 0.178 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.691
Kurtosis (excess) 7.338 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) -0.446 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.639
Jarque-Bera 101.061 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 0.446 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.800
Statistics on Series Cameroon Statistics on Series Netherlands
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean -0.141 Variance 24.680 Sample Mean 1.545 Variance 4.078
Standard Error 4.968 of Sample Mean 0.865 Standard Error 2.019 of Sample Mean 0.352
t-Statistic (Mean=0) -0.163 Signif Level 0.871 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 4.394 Signif Level 0.000
Skewness 0.913 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.041 Skewness -1.475 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.001
Kurtosis (excess) 3.637 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) 2.386 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.012
Jarque-Bera 22.772 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 19.790 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000
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Statistics on Series Colombia Statistics on Series Nepal
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 1.605 Variance 6.069 Sample Mean 2.076 Variance 12.000
Standard Error 2.464 of Sample Mean 0.429 Standard Error 3.464 of Sample Mean 0.603
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 3.741 Signif Level 0.001 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 3.442 Signif Level 0.002
Skewness -0.944 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.035 Skewness -0.035 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.937
Kurtosis (excess) 2.902 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.002 Kurtosis (excess) 0.386 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.685
Jarque-Bera 16.481 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 0.212 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.899
Statistics on Series Costa Rica Statistics on Series New Zealand
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 1.167 Variance 13.325 Sample Mean 1.438 Variance 3.252
Standard Error 3.650 of Sample Mean 0.635 Standard Error 1.803 of Sample Mean 0.314
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 1.837 Signif Level 0.076 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 4.581 Signif Level 0.000
Skewness -1.381 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.002 Skewness -0.112 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.802
Kurtosis (excess) 2.960 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.002 Kurtosis (excess) -0.404 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.671
Jarque-Bera 22.533 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 0.293 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.864
Statistics on Series Dominica Statistics on Series Oman
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 3.312 Variance 23.772 Sample Mean 2.624 Variance 31.611
Standard Error 4.876 of Sample Mean 0.849 Standard Error 5.622 of Sample Mean 0.979
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 3.902 Signif Level 0.000 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 2.681 Signif Level 0.012
Skewness -0.650 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.145 Skewness -0.308 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.490
Kurtosis (excess) 2.345 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.014 Kurtosis (excess) 1.214 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.202
Jarque-Bera 9.891 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.007 Jarque-Bera 2.550 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.279
Statistics on Series Denmark Statistics on Series Pakistan
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 1.573 Variance 5.938 Sample Mean 2.446 Variance 4.960
Standard Error 2.437 of Sample Mean 0.424 Standard Error 2.227 of Sample Mean 0.388
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 3.709 Signif Level 0.001 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 6.309 Signif Level 0.000
Skewness -1.109 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.013 Skewness 0.698 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.118
Kurtosis (excess) 3.434 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) 1.230 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.196
Jarque-Bera 22.977 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 4.760 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.093
Statistics on Series Dominican Rep Statistics on Series Panama
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 2.876 Variance 16.439 Sample Mean 3.132 Variance 28.527
Standard Error 4.054 of Sample Mean 0.706 Standard Error 5.341 of Sample Mean 0.930
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 4.075 Signif Level 0.000 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 3.369 Signif Level 0.002
Skewness -0.247 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.580 Skewness 0.814 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.068
Kurtosis (excess) -0.208 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.827 Kurtosis (excess) 2.886 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.002
Jarque-Bera 0.395 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.821 Jarque-Bera 15.100 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.001
Statistics on Series Ecuador Statistics on Series Philippines
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 0.919 Variance 14.113 Sample Mean 1.032 Variance 13.732
Standard Error 3.757 of Sample Mean 0.654 Standard Error 3.706 of Sample Mean 0.645
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 1.405 Signif Level 0.170 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 1.601 Signif Level 0.119
Skewness -1.191 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.008 Skewness -1.830 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000
Kurtosis (excess) 1.576 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.098 Kurtosis (excess) 3.578 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000
Jarque-Bera 11.209 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.004 Jarque-Bera 36.020 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000
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Statistics on Series Egypt Statistics on Series Portugal
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 4.178 Variance 9.643 Sample Mean 2.096 Variance 9.658
Standard Error 3.105 of Sample Mean 0.541 Standard Error 3.108 of Sample Mean 0.541
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 7.729 Signif Level 0.000 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 3.874 Signif Level 0.000
Skewness 1.979 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000 Skewness -0.119 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.789
Kurtosis (excess) 6.815 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) 0.029 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.975
Jarque-Bera 85.387 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 0.080 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.961
Statistics on Series Spain Statistics on Series Paraguay
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 1.745 Variance 5.308 Sample Mean 1.082 Variance 19.910
Standard Error 2.304 of Sample Mean 0.401 Standard Error 4.462 of Sample Mean 0.777
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 4.350 Signif Level 0.000 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 1.392 Signif Level 0.173
Skewness -0.667 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.135 Skewness 1.295 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.004
Kurtosis (excess) 1.066 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.262 Kurtosis (excess) 2.616 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.006
Jarque-Bera 4.009 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.135 Jarque-Bera 18.634 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000
Statistics on Series Finlandia Statistics on Series Singapore
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 2.212 Variance 16.343 Sample Mean 5.022 Variance 23.950
Standard Error 4.043 of Sample Mean 0.704 Standard Error 4.894 of Sample Mean 0.852
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 3.143 Signif Level 0.004 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 5.894 Signif Level 0.000
Skewness -1.616 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000 Skewness -0.716 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.109
Kurtosis (excess) 3.003 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.002 Kurtosis (excess) 0.436 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.647
Jarque-Bera 26.758 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 3.082 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.214
Statistics on Series Fiji Statistics on Series El Salvador
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 0.873 Variance 22.604 Sample Mean 0.649 Variance 13.726
Standard Error 4.754 of Sample Mean 0.828 Standard Error 3.705 of Sample Mean 0.645
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 1.055 Signif Level 0.299 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 1.006 Signif Level 0.322
Skewness 0.461 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.302 Skewness -1.089 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.015
Kurtosis (excess) 0.553 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.561 Kurtosis (excess) 1.189 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.211
Jarque-Bera 1.590 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.452 Jarque-Bera 8.469 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.014
Statistics on Series France Statistics on Series Sweden
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 1.402 Variance 2.460 Sample Mean 1.631 Variance 6.145
Standard Error 1.568 of Sample Mean 0.273 Standard Error 2.479 of Sample Mean 0.432
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 5.135 Signif Level 0.000 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 3.779 Signif Level 0.001
Skewness -0.955 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.033 Skewness -0.998 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.026
Kurtosis (excess) 2.050 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.031 Kurtosis (excess) 0.748 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.431
Jarque-Bera 10.798 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.005 Jarque-Bera 6.244 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.044
Statistics on Series Gabon Statistics on Series Swaziland
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean -1.231 Variance 52.492 Sample Mean 1.159 Variance 32.629
Standard Error 7.245 of Sample Mean 1.261 Standard Error 5.712 of Sample Mean 0.994
t-Statistic (Mean=0) -0.976 Signif Level 0.336 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 1.166 Signif Level 0.252
Skewness -1.456 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.001 Skewness 0.688 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.123
Kurtosis (excess) 3.553 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) 0.898 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.345
Jarque-Bera 29.014 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 3.713 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.156
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Statistics on Series United Kingdom Statistics on Series Syria
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 2.376 Variance 6.116 Sample Mean 1.426 Variance 34.628
Standard Error 2.473 of Sample Mean 0.431 Standard Error 5.885 of Sample Mean 1.024
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 5.520 Signif Level 0.000 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 1.392 Signif Level 0.174
Skewness -1.171 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.009 Skewness -1.042 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.020
Kurtosis (excess) 1.966 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.039 Kurtosis (excess) 2.392 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.012
Jarque-Bera 12.851 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.002 Jarque-Bera 13.845 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.001
Statistics on Series Germany Statistics on Series Thailand
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 1.658 Variance 4.208 Sample Mean 4.187 Variance 19.971
Standard Error 2.051 of Sample Mean 0.357 Standard Error 4.469 of Sample Mean 0.778
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 4.644 Signif Level 0.000 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 5.382 Signif Level 0.000
Skewness -1.291 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.004 Skewness -1.328 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.003
Kurtosis (excess) 3.071 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.001 Kurtosis (excess) 4.235 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000
Jarque-Bera 22.130 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 34.358 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000
Statistics on Series Greece Statistics on Series Tunisia
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 1.443 Variance 8.560 Sample Mean 1.861 Variance 7.101
Standard Error 2.926 of Sample Mean 0.509 Standard Error 2.665 of Sample Mean 0.464
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 2.834 Signif Level 0.008 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 4.011 Signif Level 0.000
Skewness -0.307 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.492 Skewness -0.563 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.208
Kurtosis (excess) -0.648 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.496 Kurtosis (excess) 1.040 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.274
Jarque-Bera 1.096 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.578 Jarque-Bera 3.228 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.199
Statistics on Series Grenada Statistics on Series Turkey
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 3.753 Variance 42.397 Sample Mean 1.966 Variance 19.620
Standard Error 6.511 of Sample Mean 1.133 Standard Error 4.429 of Sample Mean 0.771
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 3.311 Signif Level 0.002 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 2.550 Signif Level 0.016
Skewness 1.032 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.021 Skewness -0.483 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.280
Kurtosis (excess) 3.631 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) -0.502 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.598
Jarque-Bera 23.987 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 1.629 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.443
Statistics on Series Guatemala Statistics on Series Uruguay
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 0.531 Variance 4.809 Sample Mean 2.334 Variance 37.675
Standard Error 2.193 of Sample Mean 0.382 Standard Error 6.138 of Sample Mean 1.068
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 1.392 Signif Level 0.173 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 2.184 Signif Level 0.036
Skewness -0.679 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.129 Skewness -0.687 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.124
Kurtosis (excess) -0.004 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.997 Kurtosis (excess) 0.071 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.940
Jarque-Bera 2.533 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.282 Jarque-Bera 2.603 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.272
Statistics on Series Honduras Statistics on Series United Sattes
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 0.584 Variance 13.252 Sample Mean 1.689 Variance 5.489
Standard Error 3.640 of Sample Mean 0.634 Standard Error 2.343 of Sample Mean 0.408
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 0.922 Signif Level 0.363 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 4.141 Signif Level 0.000
Skewness -0.524 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.240 Skewness -1.022 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.022
Kurtosis (excess) -0.492 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.605 Kurtosis (excess) 1.897 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.046
Jarque-Bera 1.846 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.397 Jarque-Bera 10.695 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.005
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Statistics on Series Indonesia Statistics on Series St. Vincent & Granadine
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 3.460 Variance 14.782 Sample Mean 3.767 Variance 13.652
Standard Error 3.845 of Sample Mean 0.669 Standard Error 3.695 of Sample Mean 0.643
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 5.170 Signif Level 0.000 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 5.858 Signif Level 0.000
Skewness -3.358 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000 Skewness 0.475 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.288
Kurtosis (excess) 14.621 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) 0.866 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.362
Jarque-Bera 355.954 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 2.273 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.321
Statistics on Series India Statistics on Series Venezuela
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 3.958 Variance 10.395 Sample Mean -0.525 Variance 39.595
Standard Error 3.224 of Sample Mean 0.561 Standard Error 6.292 of Sample Mean 1.095
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 7.052 Signif Level 0.000 t-Statistic (Mean=0) -0.479 Signif Level 0.635
Skewness -0.234 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.600 Skewness 0.189 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.672
Kurtosis (excess) 0.092 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.923 Kurtosis (excess) -0.138 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.885
Jarque-Bera 0.314 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.855 Jarque-Bera 0.223 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.895
Statistics on Series Ireland Statistics on Series South Africa
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 3.018 Variance 22.850 Sample Mean 0.98011 Variance 9.15841
Standard Error 4.780 of Sample Mean 0.832 Standard Error 3.026286 of Sample Mean 0.526809
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 3.627 Signif Level 0.001 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 1.860467 Signif Level 0.072031
Skewness -0.581 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.193 Skewness -0.372531 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.404368
Kurtosis (excess) 0.767 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.420 Kurtosis (excess) -0.263917 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.781436
Jarque-Bera 2.668 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.263 Jarque-Bera 0.859058 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.650816
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Table H2
 Descriptive statistics of credit growth rate (%) data for each country
Statistics on Series Argentina Statistics on Series Iran
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean -244.637 Variance 403.141 Sample Mean -12.406 Variance 509.774
Standard Error 635.478 of Sample Mean 110.623 Standard Error 22.578 of Sample Mean 3.930
t-Statistic (Mean=0) -2.211 Signif Level 0.034 t-Statistic (Mean=0) -3.156 Signif Level 0.003
Skewness -3.650 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000 Skewness -0.136 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.761
Kurtosis (excess) 13.668 Signif Level (Ku=o) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) -0.591 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.534
Jarque-Bera 330.159 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 0.582 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.747
Statistics on Series Antigua Statistics on Series Iceland
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 5.850 Variance 45.942 Sample Mean -3.861 Variance 112.179
Standard Error 6.778 of Sample Mean 1.180 Standard Error 33.544 of Sample Mean 5.839
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 4.958 Signif Level 0.000 t-Statistic (Mean=0) -0.661 Signif Level 0.513
Skewness 0.360 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.420 Skewness 0.100 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.823
Kurtosis (excess) 1.071 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.260 Kurtosis (excess) 0.563 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.554
Jarque-Bera 2.291 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.318 Jarque-Bera 0.491 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.782
Statistics on Series Australia Statistics on Series Israel
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 7.332 Variance 196.575 Sample Mean -38.472 Variance 731.371
Standard Error 14.021 of Sample Mean 2.441 Standard Error 85.512 of Sample Mean 14.886
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 3.004 Signif Level 0.005 t-Statistic (Mean=0) -2.584 Signif Level 0.015
Skewness 0.772 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.084 Skewness -2.794 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000
Kurtosis (excess) 1.052 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.269 Kurtosis (excess) 8.246 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000
Jarque-Bera 4.800 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.091 Jarque-Bera 136.416 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000
Statistics on Series Austria Statistics on Series Italy
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 6.005 Variance 182.173 Sample Mean 2.122 Variance 193.698
Standard Error 13.497 of Sample Mean 2.350 Standard Error 13.918 of Sample Mean 2.423
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 2.556 Signif Level 0.016 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 0.876 Signif Level 0.388
Skewness 0.842 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.060 Skewness 0.016 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.971
Kurtosis (excess) 0.678 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.476 Kurtosis (excess) 0.644 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.499
Jarque-Bera 4.529 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.104 Jarque-Bera 0.571 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.752
Statistics on Series Burundi Statistics on Series Jordania
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33.000 Observations 33
Sample Mean 2.330 Variance 137.891 Sample Mean 7.116 Variance 341.703
Standard Error 37.053 of Sample Mean 6.450 Standard Error 18.485 of Sample Mean 3.218
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 0.361 Signif Level 0.720 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 2.211 Signif Level 0.034
Skewness 3.267 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000 Skewness 0.229 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.608
Kurtosis (excess) 14.177 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) 6.519 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000
Jarque-Bera 335.088 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 58.715 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000
Statistics on Series Belgium Statistics on Series Japan
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 6.937 Variance 697.327 Sample Mean 8.928 Variance 195.544
Standard Error 26.407 of Sample Mean 4.597 Standard Error 13.984 of Sample Mean 2.434
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 1.509 Signif Level 0.141 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 3.668 Signif Level 0.001
Skewness 3.315 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000 Skewness 1.117 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.012
Kurtosis (excess) 14.855 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) 2.474 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.009
Jarque-Bera 363.862 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 15.272 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000
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Statistics on Series Benin Statistics on Series Kenia
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 6.692 Variance 122.807 Sample Mean -0.849 Variance 377.002
Standard Error 34.997 of Sample Mean 6.092 Standard Error 19.417 of Sample Mean 3.380
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 1.099 Signif Level 0.280 t-Statistic (Mean=0) -0.251 Signif Level 0.803
Skewness 1.027 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.022 Skewness -1.076 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.016
Kurtosis (excess) 2.015 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.034 Kurtosis (excess) 3.337 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000
Jarque-Bera 11.383 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.003 Jarque-Bera 21.684 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000
Statistics on Series Burkina Faso Statistics on Series Korea Rep
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 5.516 Variance 639.205 Sample Mean 8.221 Variance 173.988
Standard Error 25.283 of Sample Mean 4.401 Standard Error 13.190 of Sample Mean 2.296
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 1.253 Signif Level 0.219 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 3.580 Signif Level 0.001
Skewness 0.896 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.045 Skewness -0.451 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.313
Kurtosis (excess) 2.518 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.008 Kurtosis (excess) 1.523 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.109
Jarque-Bera 13.128 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.001 Jarque-Bera 4.308 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.116
Statistics on Series Bangladesh Statistics on Series Sri Lanka
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 5.241 Variance 122.707 Sample Mean -0.436 Variance 405.980
Standard Error 11.077 of Sample Mean 1.928 Standard Error 20.149 of Sample Mean 3.507
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 2.718 Signif Level 0.011 t-Statistic (Mean=0) -0.124 Signif Level 0.902
Skewness 0.734 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.100 Skewness 0.492 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.271
Kurtosis (excess) 2.853 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.003 Kurtosis (excess) 0.932 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.327
Jarque-Bera 14.156 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.001 Jarque-Bera 2.524 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.283
Statistics on Series Bahrain Statistics on Series Luxembourg
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 30 Skipped/Missing 3 Observations 33
Sample Mean -40.546 Variance 662.430 Sample Mean 17.050 Variance 756.035
Standard Error 257.403 of Sample Mean 46.995 Standard Error 27.496 of Sample Mean 4.786
t-Statistic (Mean=0) -0.863 Signif Level 0.395 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 3.562 Signif Level 0.001
Skewness -4.028 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000 Skewness 1.750 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000
Kurtosis (excess) 18.542 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) 6.226 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000
Jarque-Bera 510.887 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 70.146 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000
Statistics on Series Bahamas Statistics on Series Morocco
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 4.663 Variance 49.327 Sample Mean 5.772 Variance 162.627
Standard Error 7.023 of Sample Mean 1.223 Standard Error 12.753 of Sample Mean 2.220
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 3.814 Signif Level 0.001 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 2.600 Signif Level 0.014
Skewness -2.218 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000 Skewness 0.026 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.953
Kurtosis (excess) 8.158 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) 0.096 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.920
Jarque-Bera 118.556 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 0.016 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.992
Statistics on Series Belize Statistics on Series Madagascar
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 9.028 Variance 153.633 Sample Mean -10.241 Variance 882.262
Standard Error 12.395 of Sample Mean 2.158 Standard Error 29.703 of Sample Mean 5.171
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 4.184 Signif Level 0.000 t-Statistic (Mean=0) -1.981 Signif Level 0.056
Skewness 0.685 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.125 Skewness 0.014 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.976
Kurtosis (excess) 0.483 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.612 Kurtosis (excess) -0.075 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.937
Jarque-Bera 2.904 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.234 Jarque-Bera 0.009 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.996
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Statistics on Series Brazil Statistics on Series Mexico
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean -407.023 Variance 550.560 Sample Mean -21.034 Variance 194.619
Standard Error 742.254 of Sample Mean 129.210 Standard Error 44.075 of Sample Mean 7.672
t-Statistic (Mean=0) -3.150 Signif Level 0.004 t-Statistic (Mean=0) -2.741 Signif Level 0.010
Skewness -2.201 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000 Skewness -1.504 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.001
Kurtosis (excess) 4.301 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) 1.392 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.143
Jarque-Bera 52.071 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 15.100 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.001
Statistics on Series Barbados Statistics on Series Mali
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 5.023 Variance 33.546 Sample Mean -0.519 Variance 593.557
Standard Error 5.792 of Sample Mean 1.008 Standard Error 24.363 of Sample Mean 4.241
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 4.982 Signif Level 0.000 t-Statistic (Mean=0) -0.122 Signif Level 0.903
Skewness 0.181 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.686 Skewness -0.666 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.136
Kurtosis (excess) -0.269 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.777 Kurtosis (excess) 1.779 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.061
Jarque-Bera 0.279 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.870 Jarque-Bera 6.795 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.033
Statistics on Series Canada Statistics on Series Mauritius
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 6.406 Variance 229.114419 Sample Mean 3.238 Variance 198.565
Standard Error 15.137 of Sample Mean 2.635 Standard Error 14.091 of Sample Mean 2.453
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 2.431 Signif Level 0.021 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 1.320 Signif Level 0.196
Skewness 2.875 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000 Skewness 0.939 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.036
Kurtosis (excess) 14.015 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) 3.467 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000
Jarque-Bera 315.544 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 21.375 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000
Statistics on Series Chile Statistics on Series Malaysia
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean -3.421 Variance 396.415 Sample Mean 9.734 Variance 384.111
Standard Error 19.910 of Sample Mean 3.466 Standard Error 19.599 of Sample Mean 3.412
t-Statistic (Mean=0) -0.987 Signif Level 0.331 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 2.853 Signif Level 0.008
Skewness -0.749 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.094 Skewness 0.588 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.188
Kurtosis (excess) 0.232 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.807 Kurtosis (excess) 6.773 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000
Jarque-Bera 3.157 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.206 Jarque-Bera 64.981 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000
Statistics on Series China Statistics on Series Nigeria
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 11.001 Variance 153.068 Sample Mean -2.869 Variance 591.673
Standard Error 12.372 of Sample Mean 2.154 Standard Error 76.907 of Sample Mean 13.388
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 5.108 Signif Level 0.000 t-Statistic (Mean=0) -0.214 Signif Level 0.832
Skewness 0.374 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.402 Skewness 3.474 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000
Kurtosis (excess) 2.348 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.014 Kurtosis (excess) 16.429 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000
Jarque-Bera 8.351 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.015 Jarque-Bera 437.529 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000
Statistics on Series Cameroon Statistics on Series Netherlands
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 0.409 Variance 476.986 Sample Mean 5.745 Variance 190.805
Standard Error 21.840 of Sample Mean 3.802 Standard Error 13.813 of Sample Mean 2.405
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 0.108 Signif Level 0.915 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 2.389 Signif Level 0.023
Skewness -0.185 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.680 Skewness 0.132 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.767
Kurtosis (excess) 0.029 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.976 Kurtosis (excess) -0.513 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.589
Jarque-Bera 0.188 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.910 Jarque-Bera 0.459 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.795
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Statistics on Series Colombia Statistics on Series Nepal
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean -6.525 Variance 421.457 Sample Mean 5.528 Variance 233.319
Standard Error 20.529 of Sample Mean 3.574 Standard Error 15.275 of Sample Mean 2.659
t-Statistic (Mean=0) -1.826 Signif Level 0.077 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 2.079 Signif Level 0.046
Skewness 0.081 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.857 Skewness 0.394 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.378
Kurtosis (excess) -0.619 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.516 Kurtosis (excess) 2.789 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.003
Jarque-Bera 0.562 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.755 Jarque-Bera 11.551 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.003
Statistics on Series Costa Rica Statistics on Series New Zealand
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean -6.662 Variance 958.965 Sample Mean 9.460 Variance 858.270
Standard Error 30.967 of Sample Mean 5.391 Standard Error 29.296 of Sample Mean 5.100
t-Statistic (Mean=0) -1.236 Signif Level 0.226 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 1.855 Signif Level 0.073
Skewness -1.837 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000 Skewness 3.297 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000
Kurtosis (excess) 5.064 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) 15.235 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000
Jarque-Bera 53.829 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 378.927 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000
Statistics on Series Germany Statistics on Series Oman
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 5.651 Variance 152.499 Sample Mean 9.451 Variance 107.336
Standard Error 12.349 of Sample Mean 2.150 Standard Error 32.792 of Sample Mean 5.708
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 2.629 Signif Level 0.013 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 1.656 Signif Level 0.108
Skewness 0.798 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.074 Skewness 0.489 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.273
Kurtosis (excess) 0.310 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.744 Kurtosis (excess) 2.956 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.002
Jarque-Bera 3.638 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.162 Jarque-Bera 13.332 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.001
Statistics on Series Dominica Statistics on Series Pakistan
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 3.795 Variance 123.486 Sample Mean -1.010 Variance 153.960
Standard Error 11.112 of Sample Mean 1.934 Standard Error 12.408 of Sample Mean 2.160
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 1.962 Signif Level 0.059 t-Statistic (Mean=0) -0.468 Signif Level 0.643
Skewness 1.354 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.002 Skewness -0.354 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.428
Kurtosis (excess) 2.828 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.003 Kurtosis (excess) 0.084 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.930
Jarque-Bera 21.079 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 0.699 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.705
Statistics on Series Denmark Statistics on Series Panama
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 8.953 Variance 628.458 Sample Mean 4.969 Variance 90.311
Standard Error 25.069 of Sample Mean 4.364 Standard Error 9.503 of Sample Mean 1.654
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 2.052 Signif Level 0.048 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 3.004 Signif Level 0.005
Skewness 3.632 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000 Skewness -0.364 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.416
Kurtosis (excess) 16.768 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) 0.364 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.702
Jarque-Bera 459.152 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 0.910 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.634
Statistics on Series Dominican Rep Statistics on Series Philippines
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean -5.780 Variance 156.732 Sample Mean 0.855 Variance 925.644
Standard Error 39.519 of Sample Mean 6.879 Standard Error 30.424 of Sample Mean 5.296
t-Statistic (Mean=0) -0.840 Signif Level 0.407 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 0.161 Signif Level 0.873
Skewness -1.762 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000 Skewness 0.720 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.107
Kurtosis (excess) 3.019 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.002 Kurtosis (excess) 6.428 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000
Jarque-Bera 29.621 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 59.662 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000
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Statistics on Series Ecuador Statistics on Series Portugal
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 7.404 Variance 117.883 Sample Mean 1.503 Variance 207.677
Standard Error 34.291 of Sample Mean 5.969 Standard Error 14.411 of Sample Mean 2.509
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 1.240 Signif Level 0.224 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 0.599 Signif Level 0.553
Skewness 3.907 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000 Skewness -0.858 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.055
Kurtosis (excess) 20.279 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) -0.102 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.915
Jarque-Bera 649.415 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 4.065 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.131
Statistics on Series Egypt Statistics on Series Paraguay
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean -1.201 Variance 191.384 Sample Mean -3.930 Variance 826.022
Standard Error 13.834 of Sample Mean 2.408 Standard Error 28.741 of Sample Mean 5.003
t-Statistic (Mean=0) -0.499 Signif Level 0.621 t-Statistic (Mean=0) -0.786 Signif Level 0.438
Skewness -0.735 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.100 Skewness 0.164 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.713
Kurtosis (excess) 0.743 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.435 Kurtosis (excess) 0.348 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.715
Jarque-Bera 3.731 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.155 Jarque-Bera 0.314 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.854
Statistics on Series Spain Statistics on Series Singapore
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 4.921 Variance 230.220 Sample Mean 14.210 Variance 370.828
Standard Error 15.173 of Sample Mean 2.641 Standard Error 19.257 of Sample Mean 3.352
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 1.863 Signif Level 0.072 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 4.239 Signif Level 0.000
Skewness -0.269 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.548 Skewness 1.679 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000
Kurtosis (excess) -0.214 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.822 Kurtosis (excess) 5.318 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000
Jarque-Bera 0.460 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.795 Jarque-Bera 54.396 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000
Statistics on Series Finlandia Statistics on Series El Salvador
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 6.032 Variance 219.085 Sample Mean 4.405 Variance 212.567
Standard Error 14.802 of Sample Mean 2.577 Standard Error 14.580 of Sample Mean 2.538
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 2.341 Signif Level 0.026 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 1.736 Signif Level 0.092
Skewness -0.173 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.699 Skewness -1.502 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.001
Kurtosis (excess) -0.235 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.805 Kurtosis (excess) 3.994 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000
Jarque-Bera 0.240 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.887 Jarque-Bera 34.340 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000
Statistics on Series Fiji Statistics on Series Sweden
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 7.034 Variance 436.955 Sample Mean 7.130 Variance 630.363
Standard Error 20.903 of Sample Mean 3.639 Standard Error 25.107 of Sample Mean 4.371
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 1.933 Signif Level 0.062 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 1.631 Signif Level 0.113
Skewness 1.211 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.007 Skewness 1.103 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.014
Kurtosis (excess) 5.095 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) 5.683 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000
Jarque-Bera 43.763 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 51.092 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000
Statistics on Series France Statistics on Series Swaziland
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 10.058 Variance 219.715 Sample Mean 12.460 Variance 608.457
Standard Error 46.816 of Sample Mean 8.150 Standard Error 77.990 of Sample Mean 13.576
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 1.234 Signif Level 0.226 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 0.918 Signif Level 0.366
Skewness 4.887 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000 Skewness 3.759 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000
Kurtosis (excess) 26.364 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) 17.639 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000
Jarque-Bera 1087.024 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 505.528 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000
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Statistics on Series Gabon Statistics on Series Syria
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 2.437 Variance 2591.398 Sample Mean -2.336 Variance 603.686
Standard Error 50.906 of Sample Mean 8.862 Standard Error 24.570 of Sample Mean 4.277
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 0.275 Signif Level 0.785 t-Statistic (Mean=0) -0.546 Signif Level 0.589
Skewness 2.197 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000 Skewness -1.021 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.022
Kurtosis (excess) 8.219 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) 0.395 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.678
Jarque-Bera 119.435 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 5.943 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.051
Statistics on Series United Kingdom Statistics on Series Thailand
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 8.966 Variance 320.166 Sample Mean 8.544 Variance 191.098
Standard Error 17.893 of Sample Mean 3.115 Standard Error 13.824 of Sample Mean 2.406
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 2.878 Signif Level 0.007 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 3.550 Signif Level 0.001
Skewness 3.018 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000 Skewness -0.801 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.073
Kurtosis (excess) 13.195 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) 2.497 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.009
Jarque-Bera 289.476 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 12.108 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.002
Statistics on Series Greece Statistics on Series Tunisia
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 1.346 Variance 481.838 Sample Mean 2.040 Variance 107.671
Standard Error 21.951 of Sample Mean 3.821 Standard Error 10.376 of Sample Mean 1.806
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 0.352 Signif Level 0.727 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 1.129 Signif Level 0.267
Skewness 2.460 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000 Skewness 0.248 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.579
Kurtosis (excess) 9.996 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) 2.346 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.014
Jarque-Bera 170.663 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 7.903 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.019
Statistics on Series Grenada Statistics on Series Turkey
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 5.830 Variance 92.011 Sample Mean -38.634 Variance 159.067
Standard Error 9.592 of Sample Mean 1.670 Standard Error 39.988 of Sample Mean 6.961
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 3.491 Signif Level 0.001 t-Statistic (Mean=0) -5.550 Signif Level 0.000
Skewness -0.238 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.593 Skewness -0.548 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.220
Kurtosis (excess) 0.732 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.442 Kurtosis (excess) 0.598 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.530
Jarque-Bera 1.049 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.592 Jarque-Bera 2.145 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.342
Statistics on Series Guatemala Statistics on Series Uruguay
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 0.221 Variance 475.014 Sample Mean -27.372 Variance 202.319
Standard Error 21.795 of Sample Mean 3.794 Standard Error 45.026 of Sample Mean 7.838
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 0.058 Signif Level 0.954 t-Statistic (Mean=0) -3.492 Signif Level 0.001
Skewness -2.342 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000 Skewness 0.136 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.761
Kurtosis (excess) 7.464 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) 0.096 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.920
Jarque-Bera 106.787 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 0.114 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.944
Statistics on Series Honduras Statistics on Series United Sattes
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean -1.673 Variance 390.081 Sample Mean 5.139 Variance 20.929
Standard Error 19.750 of Sample Mean 3.438 Standard Error 4.575 of Sample Mean 0.796
t-Statistic (Mean=0) -0.487 Signif Level 0.630 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 6.453 Signif Level 0.000
Skewness -0.388 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.386 Skewness -0.817 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.067
Kurtosis (excess) 1.202 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.206 Kurtosis (excess) 1.305 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.170
Jarque-Bera 2.812 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.245 Jarque-Bera 6.015 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.049
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Table H2
 Continue
Statistics on Series Indonesia Statistics on Series St. Vincent & Granadine
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 0.244 Variance 105.854 Sample Mean 4.924 Variance 63.751
Standard Error 32.555 of Sample Mean 5.667 Standard Error 7.984 of Sample Mean 1.390
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 0.043 Signif Level 0.966 t-Statistic (Mean=0) 3.543 Signif Level 0.001
Skewness -2.232 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.000 Skewness -0.627 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.160
Kurtosis (excess) 7.567 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.000 Kurtosis (excess) 0.671 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.480
Jarque-Bera 106.133 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000 Jarque-Bera 2.784 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.249
Statistics on Series India Statistics on Series Venezuela
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 3.884 Variance 114.050 Sample Mean -19.909 Variance 208.076
Standard Error 10.679 of Sample Mean 1.859 Standard Error 45.608 of Sample Mean 7.939
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 2.089 Signif Level 0.045 t-Statistic (Mean=0) -2.508 Signif Level 0.017
Skewness -0.776 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.083 Skewness -1.441 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.001
Kurtosis (excess) 2.076 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.029 Kurtosis (excess) 3.273 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.001
Jarque-Bera 9.232 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.010 Jarque-Bera 26.148 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.000
Statistics on Series Ireland Statistics on Series South Africa
Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01 Annual Data From 197 8:01 To 2010:01
Observations 33 Observations 33
Sample Mean 12.626 Variance 428.678 Sample Mean -2.111 Variance 267.803
Standard Error 20.705 of Sample Mean 3.604 Standard Error 16.365 of Sample Mean 2.849
t-Statistic (Mean=0) 3.503 Signif Level 0.001 t-Statistic (Mean=0) -0.741 Signif Level 0.464
Skewness 0.804 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.072 Skewness 0.795 Signif Level (Sk=0) 0.075
Kurtosis (excess) 2.056 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.031 Kurtosis (excess) 1.999 Signif Level (Ku=0) 0.036
Jarque-Bera 9.374 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.009 Jarque-Bera 8.971 Signif Level (JB=0) 0.011
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Appendix I. Historical decomposition of GDP growth rate and credit growth rate 
The Figure I.1 plots the historical fluctuations of GDP, the global component, the 
variable component and the idiosyncratic component (namely the country specific 
component and the residual term). 
 
Fig. I1
 Historical decomposition of fluctuations of GDP
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The Figure I.2 plots the historical fluctuations of credit, the global component, the 
variable component and the idiosyncratic component. 
  
Fig. I2
 Historical decomposition of fluctuations of the credit
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Appendix J. Additional results 
 
On the basis of the consideration did in the appendix F, this appendix presents the 
results of the CAs, for both credit and real shocks spreading from AEs, obtained using the 
model estimated on the entire data sample (1978-2010). 
Spread of credit shocks from the AEs to the EEs 
The median impact for the entire group of EEs, calculated at different sub-
samples, is shown in Table J.1, together with the lower and the upper values (16th and the 
84th percentiles, respectively). 
The cumulated median responses, shown also graphically in Figure J.1, have 
fallen substantially over the last 15 years. In the sub-period 1996-2010 they were 
estimated to be about 45% lower than over the previous fifteen years (Figure J.1, panel 
1). The resilience of the EEs, as can be deduced from the cumulated impact, seems to 
have been particularly strong during the last five years of the sample period, that is from 
2006 to 2010 (see Figure J.1, panel 2); in fact the EEs’ resilience to external credit shocks 
Table J.1 Dynamic impact of the  credit shock spreading from AEs to  Emerging Economies; additional results 
  
t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 cumulate impact  
  U M  L  U M  L  U M  L  U M  L  U M  L  
1981-1995 -0.188 -0.402 -0.629 0.028 -0.106 -0.247 -1.758 -2.996 -4.597 0.291 -0.067 -0.533 -1.627 -3.571 -6.005 
1996-2010 -0.110 -0.324 -0.523 -0.015 -0.111 -0.205 -0.688 -1.339 -2.353 0.016 -0.178 -0.420 -0.797 -1.952 -3.501 
Subsamples 
1983-1985 -0.213 -0.496 -0.757 -0.155 -0.259 -0.363 -0.687 -1.155 -1.881 -0.056 -0.394 -0.767 -1.112 -2.304 -3.768 
1986-1990 -0.179 -0.353 -0.548 0.127 0.025 -0.078 -0.885 -1.550 -2.642 0.455 0.031 -0.177 -0.482 -1.847 -3.445 
1991-1995 -0.187 -0.419 -0.666 0.036 -0.186 -0.414 -5.345 -7.688 -10.569 0.407 -0.084 -1.094 -5.089 -8.377 -12.742 
1996-2000 -0.091 -0.312 -0.505 -0.006 -0.122 -0.235 -1.986 -3.093 -4.199 0.021 -0.407 -0.979 -2.063 -3.934 -5.919 
2001-2005 -0.097 -0.324 -0.501 -0.031 -0.126 -0.224 -1.716 -3.258 -5.376 -0.038 -0.362 -1.100 -1.881 -4.071 -7.202 
2006-2010 -0.133 -0.333 -0.565 -0.008 -0.089 -0.171 -0.166 -0.267 -0.428 0.030 -0.075 -0.171 -0.278 -0.764 -1.336 
Note: M stands for median, L and U stand for lower and upper values (16th and the 84th percentiles, respectively). 
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Fig. J.1 Cumulated (median, 16th and 84th percentiles) impact of the credit shock spreading from AEs to EEs; additional results 
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reached its nadir in the early 1990s, thereafter it improved, but it was only in the period 
2006-2010 that the cumulated median impact was lower (about 58%) than it had been 
during the period 1983-1985. 
Spread of real shocks from the AEs to the EEs 
Table J.2 shows the median impact for the entire group of EEs. The analysis of 
the results reveals that the force of the impact of the simulated AEs’ real shock on the 
EEs over the last fifteen years was lower than that recorded during the previous fifteen 
years (both in terms of immediate and cumulated impact). When the entire sample period 
was broken down into five-year sub-periods, as with the case of the credit shock, also in 
the case of real shock it emerges a rather interesting result. The five-year period 2006-
2010 was the one in which the EEs displayed the greatest resilience to external real 
shocks. During those years, the cumulated impact of the simulated real external shock 
was 80% lower than it was in the five-year period 1981-1985. 
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Fig. J.2 Cumulated (median, 16th and 84th percentiles) impact of the real shock spreading from AE to EEs; additional results 
Table J.2 Dynamic impact of the  real shock spreading from AEs to  Emerging Economies; additional results 
  
t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 cumulated impact  
  U M  L  U M  L  U M  L  U M  L  U M  L  
1983-1995 -0.012 -0.168 -0.312 0.017 -0.057 -0.132 -0.766 -1.262 -1.919 0.168 -0.025 -0.308 -0.593 -1.512 -2.671 
1996-2010 0.017 -0.116 -0.242 -0.006 -0.063 -0.242 -0.247 -0.416 -0.242 0.033 -0.085 -0.242 -0.203 -0.679 -0.968 
Subsamples 
1983-1985 0.000 -0.152 -0.292 0.010 -0.056 -0.118 -0.235 -0.390 -0.684 0.105 -0.100 -0.334 -0.120 -0.697 -1.427 
1986-1990 -0.073 -0.212 -0.337 0.051 -0.018 -0.089 -0.587 -1.062 -1.592 0.226 0.004 -0.125 -0.382 -1.286 -2.144 
1991-1995 0.034 -0.123 -0.295 -0.021 -0.107 -0.191 -1.755 -2.477 -3.455 0.163 -0.048 -0.556 -1.579 -2.754 -4.497 
1996-2000 0.012 -0.112 -0.234 -0.032 -0.091 -0.148 -0.781 -1.246 -1.728 0.014 -0.158 -0.418 -0.787 -1.607 -2.527 
2001-2005 -0.021 -0.152 -0.283 -0.020 -0.090 -0.161 -0.922 -1.684 -2.842 -0.034 -0.221 -0.914 -0.997 -2.147 -4.200 
2006-2010 0.058 -0.078 -0.212 0.022 -0.024 -0.068 0.032 -0.038 -0.108 0.032 0.007 -0.075 0.143 -0.133 -0.463 
Note: M stands for median, U and L stand for upper and lower values (16th and the 84th percentiles, respectively). 
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5. Conclusions 
In this monograph, I analysed the way in which the degree of vulnerability of EEs 
to shocks from AEs has changed over the past 30 years. I sought to contribute to the 
debate concerning the decoupling of EEs, namely the debate on the possibility that EEs 
may have become less dependent on the economic performance of advanced economies, 
i.e., the now long-discussed hypothesis that EEs are currently less vulnerable than in the 
past to possible adverse economic scenarios affecting AEs. 
In recent decades, the importance of EEs in the international economic scenario 
has gradually increased. It is striking that, on the basis of global GDP share90, the G7 (the 
group of the seven nations with the world’s largest economies) would consist of the 
United States, China, India, Japan, Germany, Russia and Brazil, i.e., three advanced 
economies and four emerging economies, rather than its current official members (the 
United States, Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Canada), i.e. 
solely AEs. The economic importance of EEs at the global level has grown in various 
areas. The increases in their shares of global trade and international capital flows have 
been driven not only by technological innovation and economic policies in favour of 
international trade and financial exchange, resulting in increasing economic integration 
between EEs and AEs, but also by reinforcement of the economic ties between the 
various EEs. 
If, on the one hand, it is plausible that the global economic scenario, 
characterized by an international network of economic relationships that has become 
increasingly dense and complex over time, has increased its capacity to serve as a channel 
for transmitting shocks from one country to another, on the other hand it is also possible 
to hold that the strengthening economic ties between EEs, along with the growth of their 
domestic markets, have made EEs less vulnerable to shocks from AEs. 
The results of the empirical investigation proposed in this monograph suggest 
that EEs indeed have become less vulnerable to eventual adverse scenarios in AEs, 
without of course becoming immune to such events, but rather remaining sensitive to 
them, as also emphasized by the recent financial crisis. 
While the synchronization of the economic cycles of advanced and emerging 
economies (measured by the correlation between GDP growth rates) does not show a 
                                                 
90
 In 2013, the shares of global GDP, at purchasing-power parity, of the United States, China, 
India, Japan, Germany, Russia and Brazil were 19.3%, 15.4%, 5.7%, 5.5%, 3.7%, 3.0% and 2.8%, 
respectively (source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database).  
151 
 
clear tendency to decrease and suggests that one could rule out the possibility that the ties 
between advanced and emerging economies have declined over time, a more thorough 
and in-depth analysis conducted using simulation experiments indicates that over the last 
thirty years EEs have become less vulnerable (albeit with particularities in the various 
geographical areas) to shocks from AEs, whether of a real or credit nature. Despite this 
evidence in favour of the decoupling hypothesis, it is important to note that EEs’ 
resilience to external shocks has changed in a non-progressive manner over time, with 
phases of greater resilience followed by phases of lower resilience, and vice versa; this 
outlines a “wave-like” path whose evidence has yet been fully analyzed. 
In terms of the nature of “external” shocks (namely shocks spreading from AEs), 
EEs are more sensitive to credit shocks than real ones, and this greater relative 
vulnerability intensified during the final years of the sample period used in this 
monograph. 
In light of these results, below I discuss some policy implications, and then also 
indicate some possible extensions of the study presented in this monograph for future 
research on the subject of decoupling. 
EEs may represent a valid opportunity for the diversification of risks by foreign 
investors. Accordingly, AEs have good reasons to reinforce real and financial channels 
with EEs. However, the reinforcement of financial ties, such as, for example, the credit 
channel, presents important challenges that must be managed through appropriate 
regulation. 
EEs are more highly sensitive to credit shocks than real shocks. Consequently, 
the level and nature of the exposure of their financial systems to foreign banks must be 
carefully monitored. It is therefore necessary to define regulations for the credit channel 
that reduce the possibility that foreign banks may serve as the vehicle for financial 
contagion. Foreign bank credit for emerging economies may be provided in essentially 
two forms: direct credit disbursed by the foreign banks’ headquarters (cross-border) or 
through affiliates operating in the host country. The two forms of foreign credit may act 
differently in a scenario of financial stress external to the country. As illustrated, for 
example, by Kamil and Rai (2010), following the 2008 default of the investment bank 
Lehman Brothers, the foreign bank credit disbursed to the Latin American and Caribbean 
region slowed rapidly; however, most of this slowdown was the consequence of the sharp 
decline in cross-border loans, which are primarily denominated in foreign currencies and 
funded through recourse to the interbank or bond market. On the other hand, the credit 
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disbursed by the affiliates of foreign banks, primarily denominated in the local currency 
and funded through domestic deposits, continued to grow even at the height of the global 
turmoil. In regulating foreign banks’ participation in their economies, politicians in EEs 
must somehow take account of the different strategies employed by multinational banks 
in their foreign credit activity (cross-border or through affiliates operating in the host 
country), as well as the sources of funding and financial autonomy granted to foreign 
affiliates operating in host countries. 
The results of this work also highlight the importance of some policy implications 
for the global economy that have already been debated in the G20 and other international 
forums (see Kose and Prasad, 2010). Attention has been drawn to the importance of also 
involving countries with emerging economies in order to coordinate national policies and 
set international policies in response to regional and global shocks. It might also be 
helpful to strengthen the representation of emerging economies (at least the largest among 
them) within international financial institutions, in order to improve the stability of the 
international monetary system. In this regard, during the summit organized in 2013 in 
Durban, South Africa, the BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) 
announced a desire to establish a BRICS Bank capable of competing with the 
International Monetary Fund in order to achieve greater relevance in the global economic 
scenario. 
The study presented in this monograph may be extended in various directions. 
First of all, one might identify the various fundamental variables underlying the 
decoupling phenomenon, and more precisely estimate the relationships between such 
variables and decoupling. Such estimates could also explain why, although on the whole 
EEs are currently more resistant to shocks of an “external” nature (i.e., from outside the 
group of EEs) than in the early years of globalization, the process of reinforcement has 
not been linear, but rather characterized by phases of lesser vulnerability (greater 
resilience) followed by phases of greater vulnerability (lesser resilience), and vice versa. 
It could also be interesting to focus attention on individual emerging countries as 
case studies in order to identify the relationship between the degree of resilience of a 
given country and the structural characteristics of its economy, not only at a macroscopic 
level, such as its level of openness to trade and financial dealings, but also at a more 
detailed level, such as the characteristics of its industrial system for example. It might be 
useful to study the role of the geographical proximity of the country, and in this way one 
could also study in-deph the regional peculiarities which also emerged in this research. 
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The case studies could also be interesting in order to compare, for example, a given 
country’s degree of resilience with its specific political scenario or the implementation of 
country specific economic policies. 
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